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 The American abortion debate has existed since the early 19th century; however, 
the previous four decades have born witness to fundamental changes within the abortion 
opposition movement.  Beginning in the 1970s, activists started to focus more of their 
attention on abortion providers.  Soon thereafter, the traditionally peaceful protest 
activities of the activist movement began to share space with acts of harassment, arson, 
bombings, assaults, and even assassination.  Today, abortion provider-related crime has 
become an unwelcome staple within the broader pro-life movement.  In an attempt to 
prevent future attacks, state and federal legislatures have enacted a seri s of p otection 
laws designed to raise the penalties associated with crimes against abortion providers.  
Despite the recent proliferation of these laws, their impact on abortion provider-related 
crime has seldom been the subject of rigorous empirical research. 
 In this dissertation, I aim to address this shortcoming by using zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression modeling to present the first longitudinal test of the
relationship between protection laws and abortion provider-related crime using incident-
level data from 1975 to 2008, collected during a year-long research project at The
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).  
The results of this study offer considerable support for the backlash hypothesis and the 
notion that traditional deterrence-based policy is often demonstrably unsuccessf l in the 
prevention of this particular type of crime.  Additionally, the findings suggest that not all 
protection laws are created equal with respect to their impact on crime.  Whilestate laws 
prohibiting minor forms of anti-abortion crime are shown to produce a backlash effect for 
crimes of harassment and vandalism, other types of state protection laws were shown to 
have no effect on crime whatsoever.  Furthermore, the presence of the highly visible 
FACE Act is shown to generate similar increases for both major and minor crime types.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The debate over a woman’s choice to terminate her own pregnancy is nearly two 
millennia old.  Early Christian documents (circa 100 A.D.) indicate that the practice of 
abortion was fairly common, yet controversial enough to draw public condemnation from 
early church elders (Blanchard, 1994)1.  Today, the topic of abortion is more 
controversial than ever.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the United States, which 
over the previous 40 years has surpassed many if not all other nations in terms of the 
amount of abortion-related crime it has experienced (King and Husting, 2003).          
 Beginning in the mid-1970s, protests which had traditionally taken the form of 
congressional lobbying and peaceful civil disobedience would begin to share space with 
acts of arson, bombings, assaults, and even assassination.  On May 31, 2009, Dr. George 
Tiller was gunned down at the Reformation Lutheran Church in Wichita, Kansas by a 
militant pro-life activist.  Such acts provide a clear reminder that violent and illegal forms 
of pro-life protest remain a problem that simply will not go away.  Indeed, the abortion 
controversy has existed in this country since the early nineteenth century and yet, the 
recent use of violence from within a radicalized minority represents a fundamental 
change within the pro-life movement.  Protestors who use such tactics of violence and 
coercion against pro-choice advocates, abortion clinics, and clinic staff members engage 
                                                
1 Christian writings such as the Didache, which translates to “The Teaching” in Greek, condemn the 
practice of abortion.  However, the church did not establish a formal doctrine on the practice of abortion 
until the year 450 (Blanchard, 1994).   
2 
 
in what is increasingly referred to as acts of anti-abortion terrorism2 (Kaplan, 1993; 
Hewitt, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Mason, 2004). 
 Horgan (2008) recently suggested that all forms of terrorism are instrumental in 
that they are carried out with the express purpose of achieving a particular objective.  The 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) for instance, carried out a series of lethal attacks against 
British interests in an attempt to secure national independence.  For the mili ant pro-life 
activist, this objective is most often the elimination of abortion practices, whether at a 
particular clinic or on a national level.  In this view, anti-abortion terrorism can be seen as 
a political resource used to eliminate the practice of abortion by driving up the costs of 
provision and legalization (Doan, 2007).  Previous studies on the effects of violent and 
coercive forms of pro-life protest indicate that anti-abortion terrorists are in this sense, 
partially successful.  Research conducted by Kahane (2000) and Medoff (2003) for 
example, provide evidence that these increased costs have led a substantial number of 
physicians to discontinue their services; effectively lowering the supply and availability 
of the procedure (see also Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001).    
 The eight fatalities resulting from anti-abortion attacks represent perha s the most 
quantifiable cost of anti-abortion terrorism.  However, as Kaplan (1993) notes, property 
damage has over the years become a hallmark of the more militant wing of the pro-lif
movement, and the costs associated with these crimes are considerable.  In their study of 
pro-life property crime, Grimes et al (1991) find that the average monetary cost to 
abortion clinics for each of 110 arson attacks from 1977 through 1988 was $141,000 
(roughly $269,000 adjusting for 2011 inflation rates).  This amount alone represents a 
                                                
2 In this dissertation, the term anti-abortion terrorism refers to acts of anti-abortion protest involving the use 
of violence directed at clinic staff, patients and/or clinic, staff and patient property.     
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significant burden for most every clinic and yet, the total monetary costs are actually 
much higher.  Indeed, this figure cannot speak to the related costs of increasing security, 
maintaining insurance coverage, and the loss of business during repairs.   
 Somewhat akin to the increase in certain property insurance premiums following 
a natural disaster,  reproductive health centers are often beset with premium increases 
(Kirkwood, 2003) or even policy cancelations (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001) following 
acts of terrorism.  The problem has become severe enough to require the passage of state 
legislation in California (see Cal. Ins. Code § 676.10) and Washington (see Chapter 145, 
2006 Laws) in order to minimize the potential for abuse.   It is little wonder that the total 
monetary cost borne by reproductive health centers as a result of terrorist actions can 
quickly become prohibitive.   
 And yet, the damage estimates listed above are incomplete.  Scholars posit that 
acts of terrorism also serve to create an atmosphere of fear and extortion (Enders and 
Sandler, 2002).  Research into the effects of anti-abortion terrorism in particular, bears 
this assertion out.  In fact, one of the more common assertions within the literature on 
anti-abortion violence is that such acts exact a psychological toll on clinic staff (Faux, 
1990; Solinger, 1998; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Kenny and Reuland, 2002).  In 
their study of 71 abortion clinic workers from eight states, Fitzpatrick and Wilson (1999) 
find that chronic exposure to violence among clinic staff increases the risk of sustaining 
mental health problems.  Fully 21% of their sample met the criteria for posttraumatic 
stress disorder; nearly three times the prevalence rate for the general popultion (Kessler 
et al., 1995).  Forced into a constant state of hyper-vigilance and increased anxiety
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following an attack, reproductive health care workers exist in an extremely high stress 
atmosphere which in turn, poses considerable risks to their mental health.   
 In addition to acts of personal and property violence, the majority of abortion 
providers in the United States report annual experiences with threats, vandalism, stalking 
and other forms of anti-abortion harassment (Forrest and Henshaw, 1987; Finer and 
Henshaw, 2003).  Much like the more violent acts of anti-abortion terrorism, illegal acts 
of anti-abortion harassment force providers to incur sizeable fiscal and mental costs 
which have been empirically linked to a reduction in the number of providers (Kahane, 
2000; Doan, 2007).          
 Although reproductive healthcare clinics and their staff are most often the targets 
of anti-abortion terrorism and harassment, the costs of these acts extend far beyond clinic 
property lines.  Women seeking abortions for instance, may be forced to pay higher fees 
for service as increased security costs are passed down from the clinic to the customer.  
Women of lower socioeconomic status are particularly vulnerable to these cost 
increases3.  Furthermore, prior research has shown that both the monetary and 
psychological costs associated with acts of anti-abortion crime have led to the cessation 
of abortion practices by a number of physicians (Kahane, 2000; Baird-Windle and Bader, 
2001; Medoff, 2003) which in turn, reduces the availability of the procedure for all 
women (Kaplan, 1995; Risen & Thomas, 1998; Maxwell, 2002).  This is all the more 
troubling given that fully 87% of U.S. counties have no abortion provider (Jones et al., 
2008; Jones and Kooistra, 2011).  Furthermore, the threat of violence may result in fewer 
                                                
3 Previous studies on the prevalence of abortion procedures suggests that the market for abortion services 
follows a basic supply and demand structure wherein the price of the procedure is inversely related to 
demand as measured through the number of procedures und rtaken Medoff (1988; 1997).  Thus, rising 
costs may result in a greater number of poor women bei g forced to endure the physical, fiscal and 
psychological risks associated with unwanted pregnancies and childbirth.  
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medical students who are willing to replenish the rapidly aging and shrinking provide  
pool (Henshaw and Van Vort, 1994; Heilig and Wilson, 1999; Jones et al., 2008; Jones 
and Kooistra, 2011).   
 Law enforcement personnel are also tasked with bearing the costs of the e crimes.  
Police officers for example, often act as both first responders to attacks as well as hired 
clinic security.  As such, they often find themselves at risk.  Officer Robert Sanderson for 
instance, was killed during a 1998 clinic bombing in Birmingham, Alabama.  Although 
such instances are rare, they illustrate the potential for physical harm that is endemic to 
abortion clinic security.  This, however, is not the only risk posed to police departments 
by anti-abortion activities.  In her study of unconventional4 and illegal forms of pro-life 
protest, Doan (2007) notes how for one police department, each abortion-related call for 
service averaged a cost of $19 and 45 minutes of an officer’s time.  Depending on the 
frequency with which a particular clinic is subject to attacks, these costs an easily 
become prohibitive5.   
 As the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, the consequences associated 
with acts of anti-abortion terrorism and harassment are substantial.  To date, such crimes 
within the United States alone have resulted in eight murders, (National Abortion 
Federation, 2010), millions of dollars in clinic and personal property damage, and in 
certain areas, a reduction in healthcare availability (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; 
Kaplan, 1993; Maxwell, 2002; Risen and Thomas, 1998).  And yet, despite their 
                                                
4 In this dissertation, the term unconventional protest refers to behavior that is technically considere  legal 
in most jurisdictions, but falls outside the realm of traditionally non-confrontational pro-life protest.  Such 
acts include sidewalk counseling, clinic demonstrations and picketing without physical contact (Doan, 
2007).  
5 Doan (2007) goes on to note that this added cost may be especially burdensome for police departments 
serving smaller communities with limited budgets. 
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destructive and sometimes violent nature, these crimes are all but ignored by 
criminologists.  As Kenney and Reuland (2002:356) observe: It is surprising that “lit le 
systematic, objective, analysis of the nature and extent of the violence [and] its 
antecedents has occurred.”  It is perhaps not so surprising, that the near total l ck of 
empirical research has inhibited our understanding of anti-abortion violence.  To date, we 
remain uncertain as to the extent and causes of anti-abortion terrorism and harassment.  
Moreover, we continue to know very little about the effectiveness of the various 
countermeasures that have been put in place to deter future attacks.  
 In this dissertation, I address these shortcomings in several ways.  To begin, I 
undertake a data collection effort for the Global Terrorism Database at th University of 
Maryland, culminating in what I believe is the most comprehensive event-based d tabase 
on anti-abortion crime currently in existence.  I use these data to empirically ex mine 
whether state and federal laws aimed at coercive and violent forms of pro-life protest 
serve to reduce, increase or have no impact on the number of future attacks.  Notably, 
there are several types of clinic protection laws.  Certain laws prohibit t e use of violence 
or the threat of violence against people and clinic property while others are direct  
solely at non-violent, but criminal acts of harassment and vandalism.  My research builds 
upon previous attempts to measure the impact of clinic protection laws on levels of anti-
abortion crime by identifying and controlling for the specific types of acts that are 
prohibited by each of the nation’s 24 state and federal laws.  Such an examination is 
crucial to establishing whether or not such crimes are preventable via conventi al 
deterrence-based policy.   
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 However, it is not enough to simply ask whether a law deters or encourages future 
acts of anti-abortion crime.  As Pridemore and Freilich, (2007) note, laws designed to 
deter violent acts of protest may serve to reduce the most violent acts only toincrease the 
number of illegal yet non-violent forms of criminal protest.  This dissertation builds pon 
previous efforts to examine the possibility of this substitution effect6 through the first 
ever use of a longitudinal analysis on the impact of state and federal protection laws on 
acts of anti-abortion terrorism and harassment.    
 
Summary and Outline 
 
 The current study seeks to advance our understanding of anti-abortion crime in 
the United States by examining the impact of state and federal laws protecting access to 
reproductive health clinics on anti-abortion terrorism and harassment.  Using a series of 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial regression models, I examine whether certain laws 
result in a deterrent, backlash, substitution or null effect.   
 The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, I review the 
relevant literature with respect to the causes and inhibitors of anti-abortion c ime in the 
United States.  This will include a brief summary of the history of the anti-abortion 
movement, with a particular focus on the shift from peaceful to violent forms of protest 
over the previous four decades.  Additionally, this chapter will outline the previous 
research on legislative countermeasures and the causes of this brand of political crime 
                                                
6  Hakim and Rengert (1981) refer to this type of substitution as crime type or functional displacement.  
Notably, crime interventions can also produce temporal, spatial, tactical, target and perpetrator 
displacement effects (for a review, see Barr and Pease, 1990).  However, in this dissertation, the term 
substitution effect refers solely to the process wherein a crime intervention causes a shift from one typ of 
criminal behavior to another (see Enders and Sandler, 2002 for a review).  
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within the context of rational choice theory.  Chapter 3 outlines the focus for the current 
research as well as the specific theoretical models to be tested.  In Chapter 4, I present an 
in-depth description of the data collection process and the resulting strengths a d 
weaknesses of the data used for this study while Chapter 5 describes the statistical 
methodology used in this dissertation.  The results of the statistical models are presented 
in Chapter 6.  Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this study with a discussion of the findings 



















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the use of violence and other forms of illegal protest by 
pro-life activists is a relatively recent development within the history of the American 
abortion debate.  The first recorded act of pro-life arson in the United States occurred less 
than 40 years ago (Tims, 1976).  Since this time, the repertoire of militant pro-life 
activists has grown to include an array of coercive and illegal tactics which have come to 
be defined by some as anti-abortion terrorism (Kaplan, 1993; Hewitt, 2000a; 2000b; 
2000c; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001).  However, as I will show in the following 
paragraphs, the uniform classification of all forms of illegal protest proves problematic to 
the study of these phenomena.     
 
Anti-Abortion Terrorism and the Low Utility of Uniform Classification  
 
 Although the term anti-abortion terrorism has gained a certain amount of traction 
within the academic community in recent years (Kaplan, 1993; Hewitt, 2000a; 2000b; 
2000c; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001), its use remains controversial in both the policy 
and academic arenas.  As recent as 1984, former FBI director William Webster declared 
that while the bombing of a post office or church may be considered an act of terrorism, 
the bombing of an abortion clinic is not considered so (Mason, 2004).  According to 
Webster, the reason the FBI did not consider attacks on abortion clinics to be terrorism 
was because the intent of the act was not to overthrow the government, but rather to 
further a social objective (Associated Press, 1984).  Notably, the FBI’s stance on this 
10 
 
issue has changed somewhat in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001 and today, 
the Bureau includes certain types of attacks on abortion providers such as clinic 
bombings and anthrax threats in their annual report on terrorism (FBI, 2006).   
 This controversy is perhaps most evident, however, amongst academics and 
researchers for whom there is little agreement regarding what constitutes an act of anti-
abortion terrorism.  According to Baird-Windle and Bader (2001), anti-abortion terrorism 
includes everything from acts of lethal force such as the assassination of Dr. Tiller, to 
clinic bombings and the more mundane acts of clinic vandalism.  Kaplan (1995) and 
Johnson (2007) by contrast, reserve the term solely for acts of deadly force against 
individuals.  In his comparative study of abortion and militant animal rights activists, 
Johnson (2007) argues that the term terrorism should be reserved for the most severe and 
violent political offenses.  To do otherwise in Johnson’s opinion, would serve only to 
lump political extremists in with common criminals thereby diluting the meaning of the 
term and facilitating the misallocation of finite resources.  Liddick (2006) and 
Vanderheiden (2008) offer similar arguments for keeping a clear distinction between 
terrorist violence and nonviolent, yet illegal forms of protest among animal rights 
activists.  Militant animal rights activists, much like their anti-abortion counterparts, 
choose their targets carefully (Liddick, 2006); and although studies show that instances of 
anti-abortion violence outnumber those committed by animal rights activists by as much 
as three to one (Johnson, 2007), the fact remains that the majority of incidents involve 
attacks on property.  Therefore, according to Vanderheisen (2008:314), to consider every 
type of anti-abortion crime as a terrorist act is “to ignore the crucial difference in moral 
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status between persons and inanimate objects, and no defensible account of the 
wrongness of terrorism could fail to treat these as categorically different acts.” 
 Although the distinction between personal and property attacks is warranted, it is 
arguable that a definition of terrorism excluding all attacks where civilian property is the 
primary target goes too far.  Few would disagree with a definition of anti-abortion 
terrorism that included the assassination of physicians, but the inclusion of clinic arson, 
clinic bombings and acts of sabotage would not fit under such a rubric7.  Even more 
controversial is the inclusion of minor property incidents such as clinic vandalism and 
butyric acid8 attacks.  And yet, as the previous chapter indicates, the damage produced 
from these acts is often substantial and as such, they are no less deserving of our 
attention.  Because the myriad of anti-abortion crime types defies uniform classifi ation 
as acts of terrorism, I shall from this point forward, refer to the entirety of all such acts as 
anti-abortion crime.  In the following section, I will illustrate the different types of anti-
abortion crime and chronicle the tactical evolution within the pro-life activist movement.   
 
A Brief History of the Anti-Abortion Movement in the United States 
 
 Public attitudes toward the practice of abortion have changed considerably since 
the early days of the republic.  Americans in the 18th century were largely unconcerned 
                                                
7 It is worth noting however that the definitions of terrorism are legion and although the acts mentioned 
above do not meet Vanderheisen’s (2008) definition, they do fit the general definition of terrorism as 
proposed by LaFree and Ackerman (2009:1), which includes “the threatened or actual use of illegal force, 
directed against civilian targets, by non-state actors, in order to obtain a political goal through fear, 
coercion or intimidation.” 
8 Butyric acid is a colorless, oily and noxious compound which has been used in several attacks on 
reproductive health centers.  The liquid and vapors of the acid are corrosive to the eyes, skin and 
respiratory tract (International Program on Chemical Safety, 2010).  Thus, introduction of the substance 




with what was seen as a fairly common practice (Sauer, 1974).  Extramarital sex, 
however, was disdained by a Puritan culture for both moral and economic reasons, and 
much like today, the Christian Church viewed sex outside the marriage as a moral failing.  
From an economic standpoint, children born out of wedlock were thought of as a 
potential liability to the community and a drain on much needed resources (Schnucker, 
1975).  Unmarried and pregnant women were often ostracized or subject to punishment 
for their sexual indiscretions.  Thus, abortion provided a way for women to avoid these 
social and economic penalties. 
 The permissive nature of 18th century abortion law, which held any abortion 
performed before the quickening9 as legal, reflects this mindset.  Opinions of 19th century 
America bear striking contrast, as nearly every state passed laws outlawing abortion10.  
More recent accountings suggest the presence of a middle ground with respect to modern 
public opinion.  A recent Gallup poll suggests that while half of Americans currently 
view the practice as “morally wrong” (Saad, 2010a), a majority favors laws which allow 
for abortion under certain circumstances (Saad, 2010b).   
 Clearly, feelings and perspectives surrounding the topic of abortion are not fixed 
in time.  This is perhaps best illustrated by the evolution of pro-life activism in America.  
Although the elimination of abortion has consistently remained the goal of pro-life 
activists throughout, the pro-life movement has undergone substantial demographic and 
tactical changes since it first came into being.  For instance, the criminal abortion laws of 
the 19th century were largely the result of efforts from professionals within the medical 
                                                
9 Despite the formal break with the English crown, 18th century Americans borrowed much of their legal 
ideas from English common law which defined the quickening as the time in which the mother first feels 
the fetus move (Sauer, 1974).      
10 Although the restrictive nature of these statutes varied, most states included an exception for instances in 
which the pregnancy was deemed detrimental to the health of the mother (Tribe, 1992). 
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community to protect the health of the mother.  By 1840, the practice of abortion had 
become so commonplace and lucrative as to inspire the creation of a broad provider pool 
(Doan, 2007).  Unfortunately, the quality of the provider varied greatly due to the largely 
unregulated state of the medical industry.  Medical training also varied greatly in quality 
and was often available to anyone who could afford the cost of tuition (Luker, 1984).  As 
a result, the more established, formally trained doctors from the upper echelons of s ciety 
were forced to compete with a bevy of semi-trained physicians.  As Doan (2007) notes, 
once the American Medical Association (AMA) was established in 1847, elite physicians 
were finally equipped with a means to regulate both the medical profession and the 
practice of abortion.  Soon thereafter, the AMA would begin to push for the outright 
criminalization of abortion. 
Today, the majority of pro-life activists consist not of elite professional males, but 
working and middle-class men and women of various philosophical leanings (Munson, 
2008).  Although pro-life activists uniformly seek the end of all abortions, there is no 
consensus on why abortion is “wrong”.  Some believe it is a sin against God (Green, 
1999; McVeigh and Sikkink, 2001), while others believe abortion weakens the local and 
national economies and stifles medical progress (Munson, 2008).       
   
Evolution in Protest Tactics (1973-2011) 
 Just as the pro-life demographic has changed over the years, so too has the nature 
of pro-life protest.  In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the case of 
Roe v. Wade (1973), which involved one Norma McCorvey, a.k.a. Jane Roe, and one 
Henry Wade.  McCorvey, an unmarried, pregnant woman in Dallas, Texas, brought suit 
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in 1970 against Wade (the Dallas County Prosecutor), to prevent him from enforcing the 
state’s criminal abortion laws.  Since the condition of Ms. McCorvey’s pregnancy was 
not such that it threatened her life, Texas laws forbade her from obtaining the procedure.  
Seeking injunctive relief, she argued that these laws by design, infringed upon her 
constitutional right to personal privacy under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.  In 
a 7-2 decision, the court concluded that Texas criminal abortion laws violated 
McCorvey’s constitutional right to privacy and as such, were struck down in their entirety 
(see Finkelman and Urofsky, 2007 for a review).   
 In the years following the landmark decision, pro-life activism has undergone a 
tactical revolution.  Prior to Roe, pro-life organizations and individuals were fairly 
uniform with respect to the forms of protest that were employed.  As the first organized 
opposition to abortion in America came from the medical community and to a lesser 
extent, social purists11 who saw abortion as an unwelcome consequence of social and 
sexual vice, protest tactics first emerged in the form of the peaceful lobbying of judges, 
lawyers and congressmen to enact more restrictive legislation (Tribe, 1990; Doan, 2007).  
 In the aftermath of Roe, efforts to pursue political and legislative change 
proliferated.  In 1974, pro-life activists successfully lobbied congress to introduce the 
right to life amendment, which would have overturned the Ro decision; however the 
legislation failed to pass.  Since this time, members of congress have made several 
additional attempts to criminalize abortion, each of them proving unsuccessful (Tribe, 
                                                
11 Having evolved from the temperance movement of 19th and early 20th century America, the social purity 
movement centered on the ideal that virtuous sexual behavior provided the foundation for social and 
cultural health.  Social purists were often viewed as reformers, committed to the abolition of prostitution or 
“white slavery”, pornography and other forms of sexual vice which were seen as harmful not only to 
women, but to the larger social fabric.  Their oppositi n to abortion stemmed in large part from the 
procedure’s association with prostitution and premarital sex (Olasky, 1992).        
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1992; Blanchard, 1994; Doan, 2007).  Ultimately, the pro-life activist movement had 
more success in lobbying for incremental policy change.  For example, in 1976, congress 
passed the Hyde Amendment; effectively banning the use of Medicaid funding for 
abortions save those for which the pregnancy poses a significant health risk to the mother 
(Tribe, 1992; Blanchard, 1994; Doan, 2007).  Regardless of this newfound success in the 
pro-life movement, additional forms of protest began to emerge.  Unlike the previous 
efforts however, these innovations in pro-life protest portrayed an increasingly 
confrontational and violent tone.   
 The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed the first wave of unconventional and 
illegal pro-life protest.  Innovations such as direct action protest for example, ark a 
significant turning point within the pro-life movement (see Maxwell, 2002 for a review).  
Emphasizing the immediacy of abortion and the desire to save lives, direct action protests 
typically involve attempts to stop planned abortions from taking place at a specific 
clinic12 through the use of several tactics such as picketing, demonstrations, vigils, 
blockades13, sidewalk counseling14 and civil disobedience (Risen and Thomas, 1998; 
Munson, 2008).  Unlike their counterparts who seek to bring about an end to abortion 
                                                
12 As abortion became a national issue, pro-life interests became increasingly successful in pressuring local 
hospital administrations to abandon the procedure.  As a result, fully 95% of all abortions are now 
conducted in clinics or private doctor’s offices (Jones, Zolna, Henshaw and Finer, 2008).       
13 The term blockade is often used to refer to a typeof direct action which aims to prevent planned 
abortions by temporarily shutting down a specific cl ni .  Typically, this involves hundreds to thousands of 
protestors physically preventing entrance to or regess from a clinic via the construction of a human wall 
around the building’s entrances (Doan, 2007).  Although the first major blockade did not take place until 
1984, this form of protest became the hallmark of certain radical pro-life organizations during the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Blanchard, 1994; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Doan, 2007; Munson, 2008). 
14 Sidewalk counseling is a form of protest wherein protestors make verbal contact with pregnant women as 
they enter a clinic in an effort to persuade them to carry the pregnancy to term.  Observational research of 
pro-life protestors indicates that sidewalk counseli g can be passive and soft-spoken or verbal and 
aggressive; some women are physically assaulted, chased or spit upon (Munson, 2008).  Research also 
suggests this tactic does little to actually reduce the number of abortions, however; there is evidence to 
suggest that it has a negative psychological impact on the woman and clinic staff (Cozzarelli and Major, 
1994; Munson, 2008).   
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through the legislative process, direct action protestors seek to bring about change via 
confrontation with clinic employees and their patients. 
 The introduction of direct action is significant because it marks the first time in 
this tactical evolutionary timeline wherein a substantial number of pro-life activists 
routinely used both persuasion and coercion to accomplish their goals (Munson, 2008).  
Illustratively, the clinic blockade was designed for the express purpose of physically 
preventing women and clinic employees from entering a clinic, (Faux, 1990; Baird-
Windle and Bader, 2001; Maxwell, 2002; Doan, 2007).  Even the less physical forms of 
direct action protest such as sidewalk counseling often rely on confrontation wih patients 
and clinic staff.  As much, they possess a unique character which separates this form of 
protest from the more traditional legislative approach.  Furthermore, these confrontational 
and sometimes illegal forms of protest have with some regularity been associated with 
the presence of various forms of harassment and illegal behavior (Bair-Windle and 
Bader, 2001; Munson, 2008).  As Ziad Munson notes in his observational study of pro-
life activists, these forms of confrontational protest create an atmosphere w ich may be 
more conducive to violence and harassment than more traditional forms of protest: 
 
Attending pro-life protests in front of the clinics is the hardest part of 
conducting research on the movement, largely because emotions among 
the participants are always so high and the conflict between pro-life and 
pro-choice forces is so palpable.  The intensity, anger, and sadness of pro-
life activists is frequently combined with crying young women (or their 
crying mothers) entering the clinic; shouting matches between activists 
and those using the clinic; honking and yelled out insults from drivers of 
passing cars; and grim-faced, determined pro-choice volunteers who are 
sometimes present at the clinic to escort clients into the centers (Munson, 




 Direct action is not the only innovation in pro-life protest to emerge from this 
time period.  As clinic picketing and blockades grew more prevalent, so too did the 
number of attacks involving the physical destruction of abortion clinics.  In 1975, a local 
protestor set fire to a Planned Parenthood clinic in Eugene Oregon (Tims, 1976).  Six 
years later, militant activists from the pro-life organization Army of Gd15 successfully 
detonated two pipe bombs at a clinic in Virginia with the added warning that “this is just 
a preview of things to come” (Walsh, 1982:B6).  Indeed it was.  According to the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), extremists over the course of the 
following 12 years would commit no fewer than 123 acts of arson and 37 bombings 
across 33 states (Goodstein and Thomas, 1995).   
 By the dawn of the 1990s, the destruction of clinics and clinic property had 
become a staple of pro-life activism (Kaplan, 1993).  That said, the vast majority of these 
attacks were aimed solely at causing damage to clinic or staff property in lieu of 
bloodshed.  In 1993, the movement’s prohibition of lethal force appeared to end however, 
when Michael Griffin; a member of the activist community, shot and killed Doctor David 
Gunn outside of his clinic in Pensacola, Florida.  Over the course of the next 22 months, 
four other clinic employees would be assassinated at clinics in Florida and Massachusetts 
(Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001).  Since then, four more murders have taken place, the 
most recent occurring in 2009 when Doctor George Tiller was gunned down inside his 
local church on Pentecost Sunday (Slevin, 2009).   
                                                
15 The Army of God (AOG) is part of the militant and extremist wing of pro-life activism.  Similar to other 
extremist groups, the AOG is a leaderless resistance movement promoting the use of violence as a means to 
achieve its primary objective (i.e., to end the practice of abortion).  Since 1982, AOG members have 
claimed responsibility for a series of arson, bombings, shootings and acid attacks (Kirkwood, 2003; Mason, 
2004).  The AOG manual provides detailed instructions n how to manufacture weapons such as C-4 




 Some suggest that the use of lethal violence represents the culmination of the 
tactical evolution of pro-life activism (Blanchard, 1994; Kaplan, 1995; Baird-Windle and 
Bader, 2001; Doan, 2007).  What began as a primarily homogenous and peaceful 
movement centered on legislative change, steadily evolved into a more diverse and 
confrontational movement centered on the public confrontation of clinics and individuals.  
As Ralph Ostrowski; former chief of ATF's arson and explosives division notes, “We 
have seen a consistent pattern, acknowledging the fact that people are willing to go to any 
means for their cause.  In the past we would have acts of violence directed at proper y.  
Now we see acts of violence directed at people" (Goodstein and Thomas, 1995:A01).   
 The arrival of violent pro-life protest is also indicative of a gradual, yet highly 
significant ideological shift within the pro-life activist movement.  Although the growing 
number of factions that comprise the pro-life movement retains the single goal of ending 
the practice of abortion, they differ in what they see as the most effective or appr priate 
means to achieve this end (Munson, 2008).  The use of personal violence by the radical 
fringe is premised on the concept of defensive action wherein the use of lethal violence s 
justified through the potential gain in preventing a certain number of future abortions.  As 
one militant activist interviewed by Luker (1984:217) stated, “even if lives w re lost in 
violence directed at an abortion clinic, that loss would be outweighed, and justified, by 
the greater net saving of unborn lives.”  Although protests involving the use of lethal 
force are rare in comparison to other forms of protest, the toll exacted by these crimes is 
considerable and as the Tiller assassination indicates, remains a problem to this day. 
 Together, the increased use of criminal harassment, property destruction and 
personal violence has exacted a considerable toll among the reproductive healthcar  
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community both from a monetary (Grimes et al. 1991) and psychological sense (Faux, 
1990; Solinger, 1998; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Kenny and Reuland, 2002).  
Although the number of violent attacks has declined since the mid-1990s, the use of 
illegal methods of protest continues.  According to a 2008 national survey of abortion 
providers, 54% of responding clinics had experienced some form of anti-abortion 
violence in the previous year (Border, Gilligan, Kohsin-Kintigh, and Crews-Pless, 2009).  
These rising costs, in conjunction with the fact that violent attacks against clinics and 
staff have traditionally garnered a significant amount of media attention (Munson, 2008) 




 Since the dawn of the post-Roe era, public opinion on abortion has consistently 
been divided along general pro-life and pro-choice lines.  Even so, public polling data 
and survey research indicates that an overwhelming majority of Americans dispprove of 
unconventional protest tactics such as confronting women outside of abortion clinics, as 
well as illegal forms of protest such as blockades and clinic bombings (Raymond and 
Norrander 1990; Norrander and Raymond, 1998).  Predictably, the rise in clinic 
bombings and arson during the 1980s combined with increases in the number of assaults 
and murder in the 1990s raised the awareness and outrage of the general public, which in 
turn prompted a response from government officials.  
 Beginning in the mid-1980s, several states enacted legislation designed to protect
abortion clinics and staff from criminal acts associated with increasingly violent and 
disruptive forms of protest.  Wisconsin for instance, enacted legislation in 1985 which 
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made the entering of any medical facility for the purpose of causing a breach in the peace 
a criminal offense (Criminal Trespass to a Medical Facility, 1985).  In 1993, the state of 
Washington prohibited the use of force or threat of force to obstruct the entrance to a 
clinic (Interference with health care facilities or providers, 1993).  State laws such as 
these essentially served to criminalize the use of violence, property destruction and 
harassment against clinics, staff and patients (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007). 
 Legislative response to violent protest also came at the federal level in th  form of 
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act.  Signed into law by President 
William Jefferson Clinton in May of 1994, the FACE Act serves to prohibit the threat or 
use of force or physical obstruction to “injure, intimidate, or interfere with providers of 
reproductive health services or their patients” (18 U.S.C. Sec. 48).  The FACE Act also 
makes it a federal crime to damage clinic property, and raises the penalties for such 
crimes considerably (Kenney and Reuland, 2002).  Whereas before, an activist engaging 
in such crimes would often be subject to local misdemeanor charges carrying a penalty of 
30 days in jail or less, today with the presence of the FACE Act, the same activist is 
subject to federal prosecution resulting in a fine of up to 15 thousand dollars for a first 
offense and possible prison time.  Enhanced criminal penalties such as these were 
designed to reduce anti-abortion attacks by raising the costs for potential offenders.   
 Although the aforementioned state and federal legislation was designed for the 
purpose of protecting clinics and staff members from acts of harassment and viole ce, 
scholars remain conflicted as to whether or not this goal has been attained.  Traditional 
interpretations of deterrence and rational choice theories contend such laws will reduce 
the number of attacks, (Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  By contrast, theories of relative 
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deprivation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970) and psychological reactance (Brehm and Brehm, 
1981) suggest these laws will create a backlash effect wherein the enactment of 
protective legislation leads to additional attacks.   
 
Deterrence, Rational Choice and Crime       
 The idea that the state can deter crime has existed since the inception of the 
written law.  Early illustrations of the deterrence process emphasized the importance of 
pain or costs associated with criminal sanctions (Beccaria, 1764).  The utility principle 
originally put forth by Bentham (1781) posits that individuals are rational and self-
interested and as such, are perpetually engaged in a series of attempts to aximize 
pleasure and minimize pain.  Prohibited behaviors therefore are to be deterred by 
introducing laws which raise the severity, certainty or celerity of the sanction.  Put 
another way, deterrence theory suggests that the fear of punishment can be used to det r 
crime (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993).  Rational choice theory shares much in common 
with these classical precepts.  At its core, this theory views crime as the result of the same 
cognitive process as that for alternative behaviors.  The offender’s decision to engage in 
crime or some alternative behavior is seen as the product of the rational calculation of the 
potential costs and benefits associated with the act (Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  Thus, the 
likelihood of a crime being committed is said to be higher when the perceived benefits 
outweigh the perceived costs.   
 Throughout the years, classical notions of deterrence and choice as they relate to 
criminal behaviors have received a substantial amount of attention from the social 
sciences.  As a result, these theories and many of the policies they engender have been 
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subject to an expansive set of empirical tests.  The objective deterrence litrature for 
example, demonstrates a consistent, if modest deterrent effect for policies which increase 
the certainty of punishment.  Gibbs’s (1968) seminal study of homicide sentences 
provides an early example.  Using state-level data on the number of persons admitted to 
prison for the crime of murder, Gibbs found that increases in the certainty of punishment 
as measured through the number of prison commitments, resulted in significant and 
sizeable reductions in the annual number of murders.  More recently, Pratt and Cullen 
(2005) conducted a meta-analysis of over 200 deterrence-based research studies.  While 
the authors’ findings point to a noticeable absence of a deterrent effect for several 
deterrence-based policies (increased arrest rate, additional police, etc.), th y ultimately 
conclude that on average, policies which raise the certainty of punishment, produce a 
significant, albeit weak deterrent effect (see also Pratt, 2008).   
 
Research on Sanction Severity 
 Studies estimating the effects of increasing punishment severity are just as 
numerous.  Although early research efforts suggested that raising penalties for serious 
crimes such as homicide, significantly reduced crime rates (Gibbs, 1968), more recent 
studies have often failed to replicate these findings.  Research on the effects of so-called 
three strikes laws provides an example.  Briefly, in 1993, the state of Washington eacted 
legislation which mandated an extended period of incarceration for offenders who had 
been convicted of at least three serious crimes.  Since this time, 24 states have followed 
suit and enacted their own versions of three strikes (for a review, see Zimring, Hawkins 
and Kamin, 2001).  In 2001, Marvel and Moody estimated the impact of three strikes 
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laws on violent crime rates among 24 states over a 29 year period.  The authors conclude 
that instead of producing the intended deterrent or incapacitation effects, three s rikes 
laws actually produce a 10-12% short-term and a 23-29% long-term rise in homicides.  
Clearly, research on the utility of three strikes laws suggests that broad increases in 
sanction severity not only fails to act as a significant deterrent for multiple forms of 
personal and property crime (Kovandzic, Sloan and Vieraitis, 2004), but these policies 
may actually serve to increase the number of some of the crimes they are intended o 
prevent. 
 Research on the effects of capital punishment provides another substantial test of 
sanction severity.  Ehrlich’s (1975) seminal study on the effects of executions in the 
United States provided what was for the time, the most rigorous test on the effects of 
capital punishment on crime rates.  Employing multiple regression analyses, Ehrlich 
expanded Becker’s (1968) econometric model of individual choice and criminal behavior 
into his study of national murder rates from 1933 to 1969.  Results from this study 
suggest that for every execution, seven or eight murders will be avoided.  The author’s 
controversial conclusion: that capital punishment serves as a deterrent for homicides, 
spurred additional research on capital punishment.   
 Contemporary research into the effects of capital punishment has led to a more 
nuanced understanding of sentence severity.  Baily’s (1984) study of executions in the 
District of Columbia provided evidence suggesting that not only do executions lack a 
deterrent value, they also produce a brutalizing effect on the local populace, which leads 
to an increase in murder rates.  Researchers have long since puzzled over the 
contradictory findings that have emerged from the capital punishment literature, but in 
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2000, Cochran and Chamlin released results from a study of the highly publicized 
execution of Robert Alton Harris.  Their findings indicate that executions can act as  
deterrent in some instances and as a brutalizing agent in others.  Specifically, the authors 
found that in the wake of the Harris execution, argument-based stranger homicides 
increased while non-stranger felony homicides decreased.  This finding is notable as it 
indicates that simply increasing the severity of a sanction can simultaneously produce 
deterrent and backlash effects.  I will talk more about this dual effect in thenext section.                   
 
Deterrence, Rational Choice and Political Violence 
 
 The study of political violence has also enabled researchers to draw comparisons 
between this brand of deviance and more common street crime.  Because illegal acts of 
pro-life protest have a discernibly political aspect, a review of both literatures is 
warranted.  LaFree and Dugan (2004) point out several conceptual similarities between 
these two crime types.  The authors note how crime and political violence are both 
socially constructed concepts that have been subjected to intensive interdisciplinary 
research.  Additionally, they note that common street crime, much like its politically 
motivated counterpart, is predominantly the province of young males.   
 LaFree and Dugan (2004) also point out several key conceptual differences 
between political violence and street crime.  Notably, acts of political violence often 
involve the violation of common criminal statutes.  Abortion clinic arson for instance, is 
punishable in every state under pre-existing arson laws.  As mentioned previously 
however, this crime is also recently punishable under specific clinic protection statutes 
such as the FACE Act, which carries a stronger penalty.  Street crime and politically 
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motivated crime also differ in terms of motivation.  Whereas street crime is often 
motivated by material or selfish reasons, “the intent of terrorist violence is psychological 
and symbolic, not material” (Crenshaw, 1983:2).  Relatedly, terrorists, unlike most 
criminals, will often eschew efforts to avoid attention, as public exposure/media attention 
is often viewed as a commodity (Enders and Sandler, 2002).  Despite these notable 
differences, LaFree and Dugan (2004:21) argue that many if not all of them can be 
reconciled through currently available research methods which “might make a real 
contribution to the study of terrorism”.  Bearing this in mind, criminological theory 
presents a uniquely fertile context for the study of political violence in general and anti-
abortion crime in particular.    
 In recent years, research on terrorism and politically motivated violence has 
increasingly focused on the rational actor perspective which rests on the assumption that 
terrorism (Caplan, 2005; Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005; Kruglanski et al. 2008; 
LaFree and Ackerman, 2009) like more common types of crime (Cornish and Clarke, 
1986; Paternoster and Piquero, 1995; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Piquero and 
Paternoster, 1998; McCarthy, 2002; Weisburd, Einat, and Kowalski, 2008; Paternoster 
and Pogarsky, 2009) is instrumental in nature.  People choose to engage in crime because 
the act is viewed as producing some form of benefit that is greater than the perceived 
costs.  Although some have argued that the more violent acts of terrorism and anti-
abortion crime (Kaplan, 1995) tend to be the province of the mentally unstable or of 
marginal personalities, the bulk of the research evidence suggests otherwise.  Indeed, 
studies have shown acts of terrorism in general (for a review, see LaFree and Ackerman, 
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2009) and anti-abortion violence in particular (Clarke, 1987a; Kirkwood, 2003) are more 
rational than psychopathological.    
 Research in the rational actor tradition suggests the benefits associated with these 
crimes can be either internal or external to the offender.  For example, internal b nefits 
from crime can arise in the form of personal economic gain (Becker, 1968; Piliavin et. 
al., 1986), or in the case of an abortion clinic bomber, through the satisfaction felt from 
knowing that a certain number of future abortions have been prevented (Blanchard and 
Prewitt, 1993; Blanchard, 1994; Kirkwood, 2003).   
 External benefits on the other hand, may manifest as the sense of political 
recognition or notoriety that can be accrued through acts of political violence (E d rs and 
Sandler, 1993; Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005).  Scholars maintain that violent and 
illegal actions by pro-life activists are similarly motivated by a desire for media and 
public attention (Kenny and Reuland, 2002; Mason, 2004) and the hope that a front page 
story will focus the public’s attention on their cause16.  In 2002, Kenny and Reuland 
published results from a national three-wave survey of 512 police departments in major 
U.S. cities.  Interestingly, police officials cited the desire to draw media or public 
attention and to disrupt clinic practices as the most common reasons for anti-abortion 
crime.   
 Evidence suggests these tactics have proven somewhat successful, as violent 
forms of pro-life protest tend to garner more media coverage than do conventional protest 
actions (Blanchard, 1996; Munson, 2008).  Furthermore, as mentioned in the paragraphs 
                                                
16 Although it is unlikely that mainstream U.S. media coverage would, in the aftermath of a violent attack 
on a clinic or staff member, portray the offending activist in a positive light, research suggests that m ny 
pro-life activists believe that most Americans would join the cause if they were more informed on the 
issues (Munson, 2008).  Thus, for certain activists, any attention may be viewed as good attention. 
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above, anti-abortion crime often succeeds in raising operating costs for providers, leading 
to a reduction in provider access (Kahane, 2000; Medoff, 2003; Doan, 2007; Jacobson 
and Royer, 2011).  A recent study by Jacobson and Royer (2011) found that clinic 
violence reduces both the number of abortion providers as well as the abortion rate.  
Further evidence suggests that these effects are not exclusive to violent acts of protest.  
Medoff’s (2003) study of abortion clinics and abortion rates finds that certain forms of 
anti-abortion harassment and property crime such as stalking and clinic vandalism are 
also significantly related to reductions in the number of providers.              
 Just as offenders must consider the benefits of crime, rational choice theory also 
posits that they must interpret and weigh the associated costs.  From this perspective, the 
cause of political violence is rooted in the offender’s belief that violence and other illegal 
forms of protest represent the best available means for achieving one’s gals (Crenshaw, 
1990).  Contemporary rational choice models predict that offenders will try to maximize 
their satisfaction and thus, they will refrain from crime or political violence when the 
perceived costs are relatively high (Becker, 1968; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Paternoster 
and Pogarsky, 2009).  In other words, “the choice of crime is more appealing when legal 
options are less rewarding, when crime is less punishing, or when crime is more 
rewarding” (Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005:1033).   
 Research into the effectiveness of terrorism countermeasures provides some 
support for the rational actor perspective.  Empirical studies evaluating the utility of 
airline hijacking countermeasures for instance, have routinely shown that certain ta get 
hardening policies such as the installation of airport metal detectors are succes ful 
deterrents (Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005; Enders and Sandler 1993; Enders and 
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Sandler 2006; Landes, 1978).  Dugan, LaFree and Piquero (2005) find these deterrent 
effects also extend to policies which seek to raise the severity of penalties for hijacking.  
Specifically, they found the enactment of criminal hijacking legislation had a significant 
deterrent effect17.  In this dissertation, I ask the question of whether the enactment of 
abortion clinic protection legislation will have a deterrent effect for crimes against 
abortion providers.   
 From the rational actor perspective, anti-abortion offenders are less likely to 
engage in illegal forms of protest when they view the costs as greater than the potential 
gains.  With this is mind, state and federal policymakers have in recent years, attempted 
to increase the perceived costs of anti-abortion crime through criminal legislation which 
raises the severity of sanctions for illegal forms of protest.  For example, in 1991, the 
Oregon state legislature enacted legislation which made the intentional dam ge to a 
clinic’s property a felony punishable by up to five years in prison and a $125,000 fine 
(Criminal mischief in the first degree, 1991). 
 Scholars who adhere to the rational choice perspective often point to the 
precipitous drop in certain forms of anti-abortion violence and harassment following the 
implementation of the FACE Act in 1994 (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Kenny and 
Reuland, 2002).  As such, it is widely assumed that the FACE Act was largely 
responsible for the demise of Operation Rescue; one of the most prominent and radical 
activist organizations in the pro-life movement (Kaplan, 1995; Solinger, 1998; Press, 
2006; Doan, 2007; Johnson, 2007).  However, support for such assertions is based 
entirely upon case studies, as the effects of the FACE Act have yet to be empirically 
examined.   
                                                
17 However, this deterrent effect was limited to non-terrorist hijackings (Dugan et al. 2005). 
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 Although the effects of the FACE Act have yet to be empirically assessed, a pair 
of researchers has empirically tested rational choice assumptions as they relat  to state 
protection laws.  Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) study of clinic protection laws and anti-
abortion violence and harassment stands as perhaps the most thoughtful and 
methodologically rigorous attempt to explain the causes of anti-abortion crime.  Building 
on Nice’s (1988) study of clinic bombings, the authors set out to test the effects of state 
protection laws on clinic bombings as well as several additional forms of violence and 
harassment using state-grouped clinic victimization data18.  Controlling for the effects of 
female income levels, religious conservatism, levels of anti-female violence and abortion 
rates, several cross-sectional, logistic models were run to estimate the effects of state 
protection laws.  Results from the study suggest that clinic protection laws have no 
discernible effect with respect to anti-abortion crime.   
 To summarize, theories of choice predict that policies which increase the costs 
associated with the commission of anti-abortion crime will serve as an effective deterrent.  
Although Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) null findings raises questions with regard to 
this hypothesis, the research community remains split over the predicted utility of clinic 
protection laws.  As I will detail in the following section, research has also been brought 
to bear, suggesting that simply increasing the severity of sanctions may backfire, leading 
to an increase in prohibited behavior.  
 
                                                
18 Pridemore and Freilich (2007) obtained data on the frequency of clinic attacks from a 2000 self-report 
victimization survey of clinics in 48 states (see Lonsway et. al., 2001 for a review of the survey). 
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Backlash, Substitution and Crime 
 Although the rational actor perspective predicts that threats of apprehension a d 
punishment can be used to deter criminal acts, research from criminology (Becker, 1963; 
Braithwaite, 2005; Sherman, 1993; Tannenbaum, 1938), terrorism (LaFree, Dugan and 
Korte, 2009; McCauley, 2006; Nice, 1988) psychology (Baumeister et al., 2002; Brehm, 
1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974) and political science (Davies, 1962; 
Gurr, 1970), suggests such threats may not only fail to produce a deterrent effect, but in 
certain situations they may also may evoke an increase in violent and criminal behavior.  
This backlash effect is perhaps best conceptualized as “the extent to which government 
threats or imposition of punishment increases future incidents of prohibited behavior” 
(LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009:19).   
 Criminologists in particular have long provided support for this theoretical 
approach to the utility of sanctions.  Early labeling theorists pointed to the interaction 
between actions and labels wherein the individual’s criminal actions are viewed as the 
product of sanctions which serve to dramatize the offense and hold the offender’s status 
up for public scrutiny (Becker, 1963; Tannenbaum, 1938).  The stigmatizing nature of the 
criminal sanction was said to label the offender as deviant and the more this label i
reinforced, the more likely it is the offender will begin to associate with it.  Thus, the 
initial sanction begets the deviant label, which in turn alters one’s identity, ensuring the 
individual will continue to offend (Lemert, 1951).  Furthermore, a number of scholars 
maintain that people are more likely to become outraged (Sherman, 1993) or 
noncompliant when the state or a particular law is seen as oppressive or unfair (Tyler, 
1990; Tyler, 2000; see also Tyler, 2006 for a review).   
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 The literature on the causes of terrorism provides additional support for the 
backlash perspective.  Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) point to the increase in 
the number of attacks on Israel following the 1972 air raids on Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) camps in Syria.  More recently, LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009) 
found that half of all major British intervention strategies aimed at lowering the level of 
political violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 generated increases in political 
violence.  This research suggests that certain government-based counterterrorism 
measures such as military interventions (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994) may 
actually “outrage participants or energize a base of potential supporters” (LaFree, Dugan 
and Korte, 2009:21), thus increasing the potential for future attacks.  Admittedly, due to
their repressive nature, military interventions have never been, nor are they likely to b  
used in response to domestic anti-abortion crime; however, research has shown that 
criminal justice-based terrorism interventions such as the mass internment of suspected 
Catholic terrorists in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1975 or the subsequent Ulsterization 
policies19 can produce similar backlash effects.  Indeed, research on the causes of 
terrorism suggests that state responses have often led to unintended increases in terrorist 
violence (for a review, see Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2008).   
 More generally, a review of the psychological literature indicates broad support 
for the idea that certain forms of punishment may, under the right circumstances, bring 
about an increase in proscribed behavior (see LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009 for a 
review).  According to Brehm’s (1966) reactance theory, people desire to have freedom 
to choose their actions, especially from those which are viewed by the individual as 
                                                
19 In 1976, British authorities enacted a policy of Ulsterization which shifted security duties in Northern 
Ireland from the British military to the local police.  As a result, detained terrorist suspects were tr ated less 
like political prisoners and more like common criminals (LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009:26). 
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“reasonably possible” (Springer and Larson, 2008:270).  This can include anything from 
the choice to have a cigarette, to living in a community without an abortion provider.  
New forms of social control which effectively limit or threaten to limit the number of 
available actions are often seen as a threat to these personal freedoms.  This perceived 
threat in turn often elicits a negative reaction wherein the individual seeks to retaliate 
against the perceived cause of the restriction with the goal of restoring all freedoms once 
more.     
 Reactance theorists also maintain that the severity of the reaction or crime is in 
part, a function of how important the proscribed freedom is to the individual (Brehm, 
1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974; see Springer and Larsen, 2008 for a 
review).  Thus, violent and criminal responses to state actions are said to be more likely 
when said action threatens those freedoms which are held most dear.  Research condu ted 
by Springer and Larson (2008) suggests that recent increases in levels of xenophobic 
violence in the U.S. can be explained in part by increases in terrorist activity, wh ch 
represents a threat to core American values of personal freedom and the abiliy to live 
free of violence and fear.  For some, violence directed at “others” represents an effort to 
restore this lost sense of freedom.   
 A substantial literature indicates that pro-life activists often se abortion as 
conflicting with traditional values, the moral fabric of society and ultimately their way of 
life (Clarke, 1987a; Clarke, 1987b; Raymond and Norrander, 1990; Blanchard, 1994; 
McVeigh and Sikkink, 2001; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008).  For example, McVeigh 
and Sikkink (2001) find that people are more likely to approve of contentious20 protest 
                                                
20 The authors define contentious forms of pro-life protest as those which “may cause conflict and set 
people against each  other” (McVeigh and Sikkink, 2001:1434). 
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tactics when they perceive their religious values as being threatened.  It follows that the 
presence of abortion clinics and the laws which protect them may be seen as a direct 
threat to their ability to live in a world that conforms to their core beliefs.  From this 
perspective, enforcing clinic-protection laws should lead to defiance (Braithwaite, 2005) 
rather than deterrence, as certain pro-life activists may feel as though they have no other 
recourse but to indirectly reassert their lost sense of control or freedom (Springer and 
Larsen, 2008) through violent and illegal forms of protest (Kaplan, 1993, 1995; Kaufman, 
2000; Mason, 2004; Maxwell, 2002).   
 Political science research also indicates that expectations may be related to 
various forms of political violence.  Relative deprivation theorists for instance (Davies, 
1962; Gurr, 1970), argue that groups and individuals often engage in acts of adverse 
social comparison with other groups and individuals.  These comparisons can evoke 
feelings of frustration, aggression (Berkowitz, 1989; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and 
Sears, 1939), even discrimination and injustice among those who view themselves as 
socially, economically or politically worse off than other people.  As LaFree and 
Ackerman (2009:356) note, “This apparent deviation from actual (or expected; see 
Davies, 1962) social equity is posited to lead to feelings of injustice and of being 
discriminated against that can in turn result in acts of rebellion and violence, including 
terrorism.”   
 Research on the causes of anti-abortion crime provides some support for the 
relative deprivation perspective.  In 1993, Blanchard and Prewitt published their 
individual-level study of abortion clinic bombers and arsonists.  Using a series of 
offender interviews, questionnaires and media reports, the authors conclude that the rise 
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in anti-abortion violence during the 1980s was in part attributable to a sense of political 
failure within the activist community.  They go on to argue that the 1980 election of 
ardently pro-life president Ronald Reagan served to raise activist expectations for the 
criminalization of Roe either through the judiciary or through the enactment of a 
constitutional amendment.  When this did not come to fruition, a number of activists 
became frustrated to the point of foregoing conventional means of protest in favor of 
more radical and violent tactics.   
 In Nice’s seminal 1988 state-level study of abortion clinic violence, the autor 
examines the effects of political failure, as measured through legislative ac ion and 
abortion rates.  Using a cross-sectional model of abortion clinic bombings from May 
1982 to January 1985, the author concluded that legislative failure is significantly rela ed 
to anti-abortion crime.  Specifically, Nice found that states which passed legislative 
resolutions calling for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution banning abortions were less 
likely to experience clinic bombings.  This finding suggests that activists may see 
favorable legislation (i.e. pro-life legislation) as a form of progress towards their ultimate 
goal whereas activists in non-resolution states may be more likely to view violence as a 
necessary action.  As Hewitt (2000c:343) notes, “Groups that lose in the political game – 
particularly if they lose consistently – are likely to find the resort to violence a tempting 
option”.   
 Other scholars (Kaplan, 1995; Garrow, 1999; Johnson, 2007; Kaufman, 2000; 
King and Husting, 2003) argue that activist perceptions of political failure are also 
influenced by state and federal interventions which may exacerbate political and social 
disparities thereby making the problem worse.  Kaplan (1995) argues that stae and 
35 
 
federal clinic protection laws represent both the erosion of pro-life interests and a lack of 
social equity between the pro-life and pro-choice camps.  Thus, protection laws m y 
inadvertently raise the ire and frustrations of pro-life activists, thereby increasing the 
number of violent attacks against abortion providers.  Others argue that while clinic 
protection laws such as FACE may reduce minor criminal acts, they ultimatey increase 
the number of violent attacks (Garrow, 1999; Johnson, 2007; Kaufman, 2000).   
 Still, some evidence suggests that political failure may have little effect on the 
number and severity of violent and illegal protests.  Building on the work of Nice (1988), 
Freilich and Pridemore (2007) use self-report victimization data to estimate the effects of 
political failure and female empowerment on several types of abortion-related crime 
including violence, harassment and vandalism.  The results of the study indicate that none 
of the measures for political failure (state bans on certain abortion-related procedures, 
state laws allowing minor’s access to abortion and public funding for abortions, and 
legislation protecting abortion rights21) had a significant impact on major forms of 
violence (arson, bombings, assassination) or property crime.   
 
A Blended Model of Deterrence and Backlash 
 
 In the paragraphs above, I have demonstrated that traditionally, macro-level 
empirical tests on the effects of terrorism (see Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2008 for a 
review) and criminal justice countermeasures (see Nagin, 1998 for a review) tend to 
approach the question of countermeasure utility from an either, or stance.  That is to say, 
                                                
21 Similar to the Pridemore and Freilich (2007) study, this measure was based on a NARAL Foundation 
index score comprised of 14 separate abortion-related categories.  Only one of these categories refers 
directly to the presence of clinic protection laws.  Unlike the former study however, the authors do not 
construct a separate measure for clinic protection laws. 
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the majority of these studies usually look to see whether a particular terrorism or criminal 
justice countermeasure acts either as a deterrent or as an additional source of 
violence/crime.  This approach may be suitable for the study of specific criminal or 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda (Freeman, 2008) or ETA (Clark, 1984), which 
maintain a unified ideology and tactical strategy.  These characteristi s may lead the 
organization’s members to respond to a countermeasure in a uniform fashion; however, 
such an approach to the study of anti-abortion crime is overly simplistic and conducive to 
model misspecification.  Given the ideological and tactical heterogeneity that pervades 
the pro-life activist movement (Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Kenny 
and Reuland, 2002; Munson, 2008), it stands to reason that perhaps “both models are 
correct: statutes protecting reproductive rights and access to abortion clin cs may lead to 
a backlash among some groups and a deterrent effect on others” (Pridemore and Freilich, 
2007).  
 Recent research on pro-life activism suggests that the various groups which make 
up the whole of the movement are more varied than previously thought.  Munson’s 2008 
ethnographic study of pro-life activists in four major U.S. cities indicates that the pro-life 
movement is vast not only in terms of their numbers, but in ideology as well.  Combining 
data from a series of individual life histories along with pro-life organization l data, 
Munson finds that most of the pro-life activists he interviewed fall into one of four 
categories or movement streams.  Although activists from each stream generally adhere 
to the single goal of ending the practice of abortion, the author notes how these factions 
exhibit striking differences with respect to how they believe this goal should be 
accomplished.  In this dissertation, I examine the effects of various clinic protection laws 
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on acts of anti-abortion crime.  Thus, I do not look at individuals or groups, but rather at 
various criminal behaviors which, as the following paragraphs illustrate, are indicative of 
certain groups.     
 Munson (2008) avers that activists and organizations such as the National Right to 
Life Committee (NRLC), which represent the politics stream of the movement, generally 
view abortion as a political issue requiring a political solution.  Ultimately, hese activists 
believe that the most efficient way to end abortion lies within the democratic process.  
Hence, they focus their energies on traditional protest tactics such as the lobbying of state 
and federal representatives for a “human life amendment” to the Constitution or for more 
incremental legislation which would reduce the accessibility of abortion22.  Activists in 
the individual outreach and the public outreach streams are similarly denoted by the use 
of traditional or peaceful protest tactics (counseling services and advertising campaigns 
respectively).  Since the activists in these movement streams generally eschew the use of 
violence and other illegal forms of protest, it is unlikely that the presence of clinic 
protection laws would have a significant impact on their decision to engage in abortion-
related crime.    
 Although the majority of pro-life activists are relatively peaceful in nature 
(Kenney et al., 1999), there are those for which traditional and legal forms of protest a e 
viewed as insufficient.  Activists within what Munson (2008) refers to as the direct action 
stream endeavor to prevent abortions by intervening directly, often through the use of 
picketing, demonstrations, clinic blockades, invasions, contaminating or damaging 
medical equipment and sidewalk counseling (see also Maxwell, 2002).  Munson (2008) 
                                                
22 Examples include state parental and consent notification laws as well as legislation banning certain 
abortion procedures such as intact dilation and extraction-commonly referred to as “partial birth abortion” 
(Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Doan, 2007; Munson, 2008). 
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notes that although the majority of pro-life protests are nonviolent, the highly emotional 
and anxious atmosphere surrounding direct action protests is conducive to the use of 
verbal abuse and harassment by pro-life activists.  Indeed, direct action taccs are 
indicative of the sense of immediacy and anger with which this movement stream reg rds 
the abortion issue. 
   Direct action protests are often characterized as emotionally charged and 
extremely confrontational (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 
2008).  It is therefore little wonder that harassment is often used in combination with 
legal forms of protest.  The fact that 16 states, the District of Columbia and the federal 
government have enacted specific clinic protection statutes to enhance penalties for clinic 
blockades, vandalism and stalking indicates that illegal forms of pro-life harassment are 
all too common and serious enough to merit the attention of state lawmakers.   
 That acts of interpersonal violence have and continue to be a rarity among these 
protests (Munson, 2008) speaks to the fact that even direct action activists regard certain 
forms of protest as inappropriate or counterproductive.  Pridemore and Freilich (2007) 
suggest that despite the use of harassment tactics, activists in this stream are not unlike 
the majority of the pro-life movement, as they are generally non-violent and law abiding.  
These individuals typify what rational choice theorists refer to as the minor (Cernkovich, 
Giordano, and Pugh, 1985) or mundane (Cornish and Clarke, 2003:62) offender in that 
they “are ordinary and basically law-abiding people with consciences and a stake in 
society who from time to time commit certain types of “minor” crimes.”   
 Put simply, mundane and direct action offenders are said to engage primarily in 
minor offenses because they perceive the associated costs as acceptable ompar d to the 
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potential benefits.  Crimes of harassment and vandalism are instrumental in that they re 
designed to bring about a cessation in abortion at a specific clinic.  The effect may be 
temporary and immediate as in the case of a blockade or invasion, or permanent and 
gradual as the toll of numerous vandalisms and threats proves unsustainable (Dover, 
2007).  Traditionally, these crimes would at most, subject the individual to local 
misdemeanor charges carrying a penalty of 30 days in jail or less (Kenny and Reuland, 
2002).  Such a penalty is not likely to seriously threaten either the offender’s conscience 
or his/her stake in society.   
 Conversely, acts of arson, bombing or assault incur much greater penalties both in 
terms of jail or prison time, and morally.  Indeed, it is likely difficult to retain one’s self-
perception as an average, law-abiding citizen while serving time for committing a violent 
felony.  Relatedly, the label of “convicted felon” poses a threat to the offender’s 
employment status, relationships and overall stake in society.  The typical direct action 
offender refrains from more serious offenses because he/she perceives these added costs 
as out of balance with the potential gains.  The opposite appears true for crimes of 
harassment and vandalism which carry much lower penalties; however, as these penalti s 
increase, the offender should perceive fewer situations that offer acceptable opportunities 
to offend (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  Thus, when presented with a new law which raises 
the penalties for anti-abortion harassment crime, “Their logical response would be to 
cease low-level behaviors—such as harassment and some forms of intimidation—that are 
criminalized and turn to legal means of promoting their cause” (Pridemore and Freilich, 
2007:614).    
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 Although Munson’s (2008) research and classification system does not extend to 
the more serious forms of anti-abortion property and violent crime, there is some 
evidence that activists who engage in these acts represent a distinct secton or extremist 
stream within the pro-life movement.  Blanchard and Prewitt’s (1993) study revealed that 
abortion clinic bombers exist within well defined, extremely narrow and homogenous 
social networks marked by religious and cultural fundamentalism, and a view of abortion 
and those who practice it as true evil23 (Blanchard, 1994).  One of the characteristics that 
appears to separate the more radical offenders from other activists is a profound sense of 
social isolation:  
 
 “One very important characteristic is that all the convicted perpetrators appear to 
be isolated “loners” with a restricted number of significant relationships.  Several 
of them have virtually no close relationships, especially no close female friends or 
romantic relationships.  Others do have strong, even intense personal ties that still
typify the social isolate in that those relationships are limited or encapsulated 
within a network of a solitary worldview” (Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993:209-210). 
 
This research indicates that the most severe anti-abortion offenses tend to be committed 
by a small number of socially isolated individuals or lone wolves (Phillips, 2011; 
Victoroff, 2005) who share a tenuous connection to mainstream society and similar 
abortion-related views.   
 This stands in stark contrast to the other movement streams which are marked by 
broader societal connections and a distinct lack of ideological congruity (Ginsberg, 1989; 
Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008).  Although virtually every pro-life activist shares th  
belief that abortion is wrong:  
 
                                                
23 This differs from activists in other streams who view abortion as undesirable, but more of a difference i  
opinion (Munson, 2008). 
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 There is no consensus, even within the pro-life movement, on how to understand 
the abortion issue.  Even among those most committed to ending all abortion in 
the United States, there are marked disagreements about how to understand 
abortion, why abortion is wrong, and how it is tied to other moral issues.  These 
are more than cosmetic differences in how people explain the issue; they are 
fundamental tensions within the movement” (Munson, 2008:149). 
  
For instance, some activists believe abortion is wrong because it degrades or harms 
women, while others view it strictly from an economic/lost productivity standpoint.  Still, 
there are those who view it as a civil rights issue (Munson, 2008).  Previous research 
indicates that major anti-abortion offenders such as assassins, clinic arsonists and 
bombers tend to uniformly perceive abortion as the murder of the unborn and the 
ascension of a culture of death that threatens to engulf the world (Mason, 2004).  It is this 
dualist perspective that enables offenders in the extremist stream to view the abortion 
conflict as the forefront in the eternal battle between good and evil (Blanchard, 1994; 
Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Risen and Thomas, 1998).   
 These characteristics help to explain why members of the extr mist stream choose 
to engage primarily in crimes that those within the dir ct action stream will not.  Again, 
the answer from the rational choice perspective rests on the perceived utility of he act.   
The tendency for extremist offenders to view abortion as a conflict between good and evil 
brings with it an increased sense of urgency.  Defining the conflict in this way generates 
great incentive for the individual to not only act now, but in a decisive manner.  Clarly, 
acts of arson or assassination are designed not for gradual and temporary relief (as with 
most forms of harassment or vandalism), but rather to bring about the immediate and 
permanent end to the abortion wars.  The effect is to raise both the perceived benefits of 
the act (i.e., you will not only be ending abortion at this one clinic, you will also be 
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eliminating a source of “evil” from the world) as well as the cost of inacton or not 
offending.        
 In addition to raising the perceived benefits associated with anti-abortion c ime 
and the perceived costs of inaction, the extremist ideology aids in the creation and 
reinforcement of exceptionally narrow and homogenous social networks.  Research 
indicates that extremists such as clinic bombers tend to live a solitary existence at the 
margins of society and the broader pro-life movement (Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993).  
The individual is rarely exposed to countervailing viewpoints or, more importantly, 
opportunities to form strong pro-social ties with moderate individuals and institutions.  In 
turn, the extremist offender is an individual who is more likely to view the costs of 
committing a violent felony or an act of severe property damage as accept ble.       
  Given the argument laid forth here, it stands to reason that the most radical and 
violent anti-abortion offenders should be less likely to respond to the presence of clinic 
protection laws with a reduction in criminal behaviors than their direct action 
counterparts.  Whereas activists from the other streams are generally opposed to the use 
of the most extreme and violent tactics (Munson, 2008), members of this radical stream
are more likely to view the use of such methods as not only appropriate, but as the only 
viable path to immediate change (Kaplan, 1995; see also Moskalenko and McCauley, 
2009).   
 Rational choice theory suggests that even the most serious and predatory 
offenders (Cornish and Clarke, 2003; Wortley, 1998) can be deterred either by raising 
costs or lowering benefits.  Although protection laws are designed for the formr, they 
are not generally crafted to influence those at the margins of society.  Given their 
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augmented perceptions of benefits and their reduced sense of costs associated with 
committing serious and violent crimes, it seems unlikely that such laws produce much of 
a deterrent effect.   
 In fact, protection laws aimed at reducing serious violent and property crimes may 
actually create a backlash effect.  Reactance theory dictates that the more important the 
freedom that is taken away, the more likely it is that the individual will respond with 
aggression and violence (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974).  
Protection laws represent not only an increase in costs, but of encroaching pro-choice 
interests.  Thus, as Pridemore and Freilich (2007:614) hypothesize, for those within the 
pro-life movement who are willing to kill, maim and destroy, the presence of new 
protection laws may be perceived not as a deterrent, but as a sign that they are losing the 
“battle between good and evil”.  The null results of the study however, suggest that clinic 
protection laws have neither a deterrent nor a backlash effect on anti-abortion crime. 
 Although instructive, there are several limitations in the extant research on anti-
abortion crime.  First, previous works are mostly descriptive or rely solely upon 
qualitative designs (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and 
Prewitt, 1993; Clarke, 1987a; Clarke, 1987b; Ferrell and Websdale, 1999; Garrow, 1999; 
Kaplan, 1993, 1995; Risen and Thomas, 1998; Mason, 2000a; Mason, 2000b; Reiter, 
2000; Maxwell, 2002; Mason, 2004).  While qualitative and descriptive research on the 
topic of anti-abortion crime and clinic protection laws has contributed to the theore ical 
groundwork for both the deterrence (Kaplan, 1995; Solinger, 1998; Press, 2006; Doan, 
2007; Johnson, 2007) and backlash hypotheses (Hewitt, 2000a; 2000c; Kaufman, 2000; 
Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Press, 2006; Johnson, 2007),  seldom have these 
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hypotheses been subjected to empirical tests.  I address this limitation by empirically 
assessing the effects of clinic protection laws on anti-abortion crime in the United States 
from 1975 to 2008. 
 Second, although Pridemore and Freilich (2007) provide a thoughtful test of the 
effects of state laws protecting abortion clinics, the cross-sectional design of their study 
prohibits a more thorough assessment.  This time invariant approach is likely to hinder 
efforts to uncover the causes of anti-abortion crime which may develop subtly over the 
course of weeks, months, even years.  It is conceivable that the effects of the e protection 
laws vary over time and as such, a longitudinal approach is more appropriate.  The 
current study makes use of a unique longitudinal dataset which allows me to look for 
trends developing over a 34 year period. 
 Third, the apparent overreliance on abortion clinic self-survey reports in previous 
studies of anti-abortion crime has opened the door to additional criticism.  While useful,
clinic survey data often contain information on incident prevalence in lieu of informati n 
on the precise number of incidents (Freilich and Pridemore, 2007; Pridemore and 
Freilich, 2007).  Although this information allows one to speculate on the prevalence of 
anti-abortion crime, it prevents us from knowing the exact number of incidents for any 
given time period. This information is important, for without it, we can never fully 
appreciate the true extent of these crimes much less the precise effect of the protection 
laws they have inspired.  Additionally, low response rates commonly associated wth 
clinic survey data may introduce selection bias into the model as “characteristics of the 
clinic or staff, such as size, workload, type of abortion provider (e.g., clinic or private 
doctor’s office), professionalism, or experience with victimization may lead to 
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differential response” (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007:621).  This study improves upon the 
current literature through the use of a unique, open-sourced dataset on anti-abortion 
attacks, precluding the need to rely on clinic survey data. 
 Fourth, Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) use of a single dichotomous measure for 
the presence of any protection law effectively obscures any and all variation among the 
independent variable.  That is to say, such a measure inhibits us from seeing if the effect 
of protection laws on anti-abortion behavior varies by the type of law that is enacted.  
This is important, as there are substantial differences between these laws which cannot be 
accounted for in such a model.  For example, N.Y. Penal Law § 240.70, specifically 
prohibits the use of physical violence directed against individuals whereas Oregon 
Revised Statute §164.365 proscribes only those acts of protest which involve the 
destruction of clinic property.  Other laws such as Washington Revised Code §§ 
9A.50.005 prohibit the harassment of clinic staff and patients or the disruption of cliic 
services.  Still, protection laws such as the FACE Act, forbids all three crim  types 
(violence, property destruction and harassment).   
 For the purposes of this dissertation, personal violence refers to incidents 
involving the use or attempted use of physical violence against clinic personnel or 
patients.  These include such acts as armed assault, unarmed assault, assassination, 
attempted assassination, bombing24, attempted bombing, robbery, attempted robbery, and 
hostage taking/kidnapping.  By contrast, property destruction is defined as attacks against 
the property of clinics, staff or patients.  Examples include arson, attempted arson, 
bombing/explosion, chemical/acid attack, attempted chemical attack, glue in locks, 
                                                
24 Bombings are only included as a violent attack when th  purpose is to inflict physical damage on another 
person.  Thus, bombings which occur during business hours are classified as a violent attack while those 
occurring at night when the building is empty are classified as a property attack. 
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broken windows, acts of sabotage and burglary.  Incidents of anti-abortion harassment 
represent an illegal form of protest behavior that is less physically severe or violent, yet 
highly disruptive.  Typically, this form of anti-abortion crime is geared less towards 
physical harm or the irrevocable damage of property and more towards the disruption of 
clinic practices.  They consist of blockades, facility invasions, death threats, bomb 
threats, chemical/biological threats, the stalking of staff or physicians, vandalism25 and 
cyber attacks.   
 The use of a single dichotomous measure fails to control for these differences and 
as such, may partly explain Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) null findings.  The current 
study corrects for this through the inclusion of three separate independent variables 
accounting for the legal prohibition of acts involving violence, property destruction and 
harassment respectively.          
 Finally, although numerous scholars suggest that federal legislation protecting 
clinics such as the FACE Act have had a significant impact upon anti-abortion crime 
(Kaufman, 2000; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Kenny and Reuland, 2002), its effects 
have yet to be empirically assessed.  Furthermore, given the fact that the FACE Act 
stands as the most visible of the clinic protection laws, it would seem prudent to model its 
effects.  As such, the models presented in this dissertation reflect the presence of this law. 
 
What it all means  
 
 Although the origins of the abortion debates can be traced back nearly two 
millennia (Blanchard, 1994), the use of violent and illegal forms of pro-life protest is a 
                                                
25 Unlike property attacks such as arson or bombings, vandalism is defined here as those acts which result 
in defacement of property, yet do not cause the owner to replace the affected property.   
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recent and America-centric phenomenon.  Despite its short history, anti-abortion crime 
has become commonplace in the post-Roe era (Doan, 2007; Kaplan, 1995).  In response 
to the rising use of violent, property and harassment attacks against abortion clinics, staff 
and patients, state and federal governments have over the course of the last 26 years
enacted a series of clinic protection laws.  Raising the penalty for illegal forms of pro-life 
protest, these laws are essentially designed as a deterrent.  However, a thorough and 
interdisciplinary review of the literature reveals a spirited theoretical competition 
surrounding the utility of such legislation.      
 Theories of deterrence and rational choice hold that crimes are predicated on 
individual considerations of potential costs and benefits, wherein criminal acts are more 
likely to occur when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs (Becker, 1968; 
Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005; Paternoster and Pogarsky, 
2009).  The introduction of state and federal abortion clinic protection laws represents a 
direct attempt by policymakers to reduce the number of anti-abortion crimes by raising 
the costs associated with the commission of illegal forms of pro-life protst.  Proponents 
of the rational actor perspective hypothesize that the implementation of clinic protection 
laws will ultimately reduce the number of anti-abortion crimes (Baird-Windle and Bader, 
2001; Kenny and Reuland, 2002). 
    Conversely, research from labeling theorists in criminology (Becker, 1963;
Braithwaite, 2005; Sherman, 1993; Tannenbaum, 1938), in addition to findings from 
within the fields of terrorism (LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009; McCauley, 2006; Nice, 
1988) psychology (Baumeister et al., 2002; Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; 
Wicklund, 1974) and political science (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970) suggest that certain 
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criminal countermeasures may actually cause an increase in the number and severity of 
the behaviors which they are intended to prevent.  Scholars who subscribe to the backlash 
thesis predict that laws designed to protect abortion clinics, clinic staff and clinic patients 
from violent and criminal forms of protest will ultimately lead to additional att cks 
(Kaplan, 1993; 1995).   
 Whereas deterrence/choice and backlash models have been deployed often and 
successfully in attempts to gauge the effects of various criminal justice and t rrorism 
countermeasures, Pridemore and Freilich (2007) suggest that such an eit er, or approach 
may be inappropriate for the study of anti-abortion crime.  Research on anti-abortion 
offenders (Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Risen and Thomas, 1998) and 
the broader pro-life activist movement (Munson, 2008) indicates that pro-life activists are 
perhaps less alike than previously thought.  Individuals and offenders within the 
movement often differ not only on why they believe abortion is wrong, but on how best 
to go about putting an end to the practice (Ginsberg, 1989; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 
2008).   
 Although studies have shown that the majority of anti-abortion activists reject the 
use of violence and other forms of unconventional protest (Norrander and Raymond, 
1998), it is clear that for certain individuals, conventional means are seen as insufficient.  
However, even within this criminal subsection of the activist movement, there exists
considerable variation (Munson, 2008).  While activists within the direct action stream 
routinely apply techniques of harassment and intimidation (Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; 
Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008), they seldom cross over into violence (Munson, 2008)       
or severe property attacks.  This tactical ideology stands in contrast to that of t ose 
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activists for whom the use of the most radical and violent techniques is seen as not only
acceptable, but essential (Kaplan, 1995).    
 Pridemore and Freilich (2007) contend that this ideological heterogeneity is likely 
to have a substantive impact on the utility of clinic protection laws.  Specifically, they 
hypothesize that the more conservative and law abiding members of the direct action 
stream will reduce their use of harassment and vandalism once a new protection law is 
enacted.  Conversely, they predict that the more radical and violent stream of the activist 
movement will respond to the presence of these laws with additional and more severe 
attacks.  Ultimately, the authors find no support for their blended model. 
    Although Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) findings fail to support this 
theoretical model, methodological limitations endemic to the study, combined with a
broader shortage of empirical research have ensured that the questions surrounding the 
deterrent value of clinic protection laws persist.  As such, the current study aims to better 
our understanding by empirically assessing the impact of these laws on anti-abortion 
crime.  I also address many of the limitations in the Pridemore and Freilich (2007) study 
by employing a previously unavailable, longitudinal dataset on anti-abortion crimes.  
This allows for a more thorough test of the blended deterrence/backlash model by 
enabling me to look for legislation effects that may develop over an extended perio  of 
time.  Additionally, by including separate measures for violent, property and harassment 
protection laws, this study is able to determine whether the utility of clinic protection 
legislation varies by the type of behavior prohibited.  Finally, by controlling for the 
presence of the FACE Act, this study represents the first attempt to empirically assess the 
effects of both state and federal clinic protection laws.  Before discussing the merits and 
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weaknesses of the current dataset in greater detail, we must first turn to Chapter 3, where 
I outline the specifics of the theoretical models to be tested in this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL MODELS TO BE TESTED 
 
 The previous chapter illustrated the dearth of knowledge on anti-abortion crime in 
general and the effects of clinic protection legislation in particular.  Given the high costs 
associated with these crimes and the fact that clinic protection laws repre ent the 
dominant response by state and federal governments to violent and illegal forms of pro-
life protest, it is striking that their impact on anti-abortion crime has so rarely be n 
subject to empirical examination.  Relatedly, as noted in the paragraphs above, scholars 
continue to debate whether these laws actually serve as a deterrent or as a cause of future 
crimes.  In this dissertation, I attempt to address this issue by testing the relationship 
between the presence of state and federal clinic protection laws and the numb r of 
criminal acts committed against abortion clinics, staff and patients at the sta e level, using 
a series of statistical models based upon the negative binomial distribution.  I will discuss 
the advantages of this particular type of statistical methodology in Chapter 5.    
 The main goal of this dissertation is to empirically assess whether an increase in 
the threat and severity of sanctions for anti-abortion crime will have a deterrent, backlash 
or null effect.  The logical first step is to test one of the deterrence/rational choice 
literature’s broader hypotheses; that any increase in the threat of sanction for anti-
abortion crime will have a deterrent effect.  To paraphrase Kaplan (1995), when anti-
abortion activists are subject to legal punishment, they shift their behaviors away from 
illegal acts of protest.  Thus, broadly speaking, any type of clinic protection law should 
deter anti-abortion crime.   
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 In Chapter 2, I noted that prior research also indicates that pro-life activists vary 
both ideologically and tactically.  As such, one activist’s deterrent may proveanother 
activist’s flash point.  Pridemore and Freilich (2007) hypothesized that protection laws 
are most likely to have the desired effect on the low level harassment offenses since they 
tend to be the province of mainstream activists who generally follow and respond to 
changes in the law.  Conversely, the authors hypothesized these laws would only serve to
raise frustrations within the violent fringe of the protest movement, thus leading to 
additional crimes of violence.  Therefore, the second step is to see if the authors’ null 
findings can be reproduced with longitudinal, incident-level, open source data.   
 It is important to note here that this dissertation is not a replication of the 
Pridemore and Freilich (2007) study, in which the authors performed a cross-sectional 
analysis using clinic self-report data.  Further, the authors included a variable controlling 
for the effects of legislation that protects “general” pro-choice interests which fall outside 
of the scope of this dissertation.  The authors differentiate between clinic protetion laws 
or “specific legislation” and laws which protect the broader pro-choice interests (i.e., 
“general legislation”) using the NARAL Foundation’s data and methodology (see 
NARAL Foundation, 2001:272-274).   
 I chose not to include these data on general legislation for three reasons.  First, 
Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) operationalization of this variable is based on a state 
grade assigned by NARAL staff.  High grades are marked by states with feer restrictive 
policies with respect to reproductive healthcare; however, the grade is based in part on 
accessorial measures such as the availability of insurance plans that cover non-emergency 
contraception.  Research has shown that even the most ardent of pro-life activists remain 
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fractured with respect to beliefs surrounding the morality of contraception (Munson, 
2008).  Some believe that it is wrong and directly related to the issue of abortion while 
others see contraception as appropriate and only tangentially related to abortion.  Such 
legislation is arguably less likely to be noticed by activists, and therefor less likely to 
incite acts of violence and harassment.  Therefore, “general legislation” as 
operationalized by NARAL and the previous study is perhaps less relevant to the 
explanation of anti-abortion crime than are clinic protection laws.   
 Second, the absence of such laws may result in more abortions, which have been 
shown in some studies to increase anti-abortion crime (Nice, 1988; Freilich and 
Pridemore, 2007).  However, as this dissertation controls directly for state abortion rates, 
this law is rendered moot to the question at hand.  Finally, the NARAL data on state 
general legislation only dates back to 1990, and as this study looks at clinic anti-abortion 
crime from 1975 through 2008, the inclusion of these data would be prohibitive.   
 The second and third models in this dissertation provide a test of the blended 
deterrence/backlash model presented by Pridemore and Freilich (2007).  As illustrated 
below in Figure 3.1, these models predict that clinic protection laws, broadly defined will 
decrease crimes of anti-abortion harassment while raising the levels of violent and 









Figure 3.1: Model 2 and Model 3 - The Impact of State Protection Laws on 




 Notably, Pridemore and Freilich (2007) find no evidence that clinic protection 
laws have a significant effect on anti-abortion crime levels.  However, as the authors do 
not control for substantive differences among state and federal protection laws, any 
deterrent or backlash effects may be obscured.  Therefore, the next step is to separate the 
main independent variable (clinic protection laws) into three main categories, enabling us 
to see if the effects vary by the type of protection law enacted (violent law, property law 
and harassment law).  Because research has shown that those who commit crimes of 
violence and severe property damage differ both ideologically and tactically from those 
who engage in lower-end crimes of harassment and vandalism (Blanchard and Prewitt, 
1993; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008), it stands to reason that clinic protection laws will 
elicit varying effects depending on the type of behavior that is prohibited.   
 Those who engage in violence and severe property attacks against abortion 













community.  These individuals are often marked by weak societal ties, a shared 
fundamentalist ideology that promotes the use of extremist tactics, and a common belief 
that abortion is tantamount to murder (Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; 
Risen and Thomas, 1998).  It follows that the activists of this stream are perhaps more 
likely to view any type of protection law as both a cultural threat and as a sign that the 
pro-life agenda lies in jeopardy.  Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.2, H1: I hypothesize 
that violence, property damage and harassment protection laws will result in a 
backlash effect, promoting additional acts of abortion provider-related violence and 
property damage. 
 In contrast, acts of harassment and vandalism tend to be committed by activists of 
the relatively social, ideologically moderate and heterogeneous direct action stream.  
These individuals tend to maintain stronger societal connections and they generally reject 
the use of violence and major property damage.  Thus, it is unlikely that they would 
disagree with a law which raises the penalties for such crimes, much less alter their 
tactics because of it.  As such, H2: laws protecting against violence and property 
damage are expected to have no effect on abortion provider-related harassment and 
vandalism crimes.  It is however, given the relatively conservative and generally law 
abiding nature of this stream, more likely that H3: a protection law prohibiting acts of 
harassment and vandalism will also elicit a reduction in this form of anti-abortion 







Figure 3.2: Model 3 and Model 4 - The Impact of Violence, Property & Harassment 





 In this dissertation I seek to better our understanding of criminal and extremist 
behavior within the pro-life movement by presenting the most robust test to date of the 
deterrence and backlash hypotheses.  Using a newly available dataset, I present the first 
longitudinal test of the relationship between anti-abortion crime and the threat of 
sanctions.  In the following section, I outline the data collection methodology, the 
creation of the independent and dependent variables, and the strengths and weakness of 




















CHAPTER 4: DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
 
 As I mentioned in Chapter 2, many of the limitations surrounding the extant 
research on anti-abortion crime are rooted in the use of inadequate data.  In particular, the 
apparent overreliance on cross-sectional survey data precludes the most robust 
examination of anti-abortion crimes and the clinic protection laws they have inspired.  In 
order to address these limitations and the research questions outlined in Chapter3, I 
employ the use of an event-based dataset on acts of anti-abortion crime.  This chapter 
outlines the procedures used in the collection of this unique data set.    
 The data used in this dissertation were collected in two separate stages by 
researchers at the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) at the University of Maryland.  The original platform for this dataset comes 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); an open source database on domestic and 
international terrorist incidents.  The first stage commenced during the 2003-2004 
academic years when START researchers at the University of Maryland verified and 
coded a database of terrorist events originally collected by Pinkerto  Global Intelligence 
Services (PGIS); a private research company dedicated to providing various business 
interests with information on acts of domestic and international terrorism.  The data 
included more than 69,000 terrorist events recorded worldwide from 1970 to 199726, and 
were based on the systematic coding of news wire service data obtained from scanning 
English and foreign language media reports. 
                                                
26 The original PGIS data included information on type of terrorist activity (e.g., bombing, assault, 
kidnapping, etc.), incident date, whether domestic or international, weapons used, victim characteristics, 
target characteristics and incident outcome (see LaFree and Dugan, 2007 for a review). 
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 Although the original GTD benefitted from the many strengths inherent in the 
Pinkerton data (see LaFree and Dugan, 2007 for a review), perhaps none was more 
important than the inclusive nature of PGIS coding procedures.  PGIS employees 
collected data on both domestic and international incidents; providing the GTD with 
seven times the number of cases included in the vast majority of similar datasets.  Ev n 
so, as shown in Table 4.1, these data provided information on just 52 incidents of anti-
abortion crime, a fraction of the true number of anti-abortion attacks.  Indeed, for the 
same time period, this figure is more than doubled by the number of abortion-related 
arson incidents alone27.  
 
Table 4.1: Anti-abortion Crime Incident Counts by Database (with duplicates) 
 
                                                
27 The data used in this dissertation includes information on 203 incidents involving the use of incendiary 
weapons against abortion clinics from 1975 through 1997.    
Source Years Number of U.S. Incidents 
GTD 1970-1997 52 
Bader Chronology 1973-2001 283 
Hewitt Chronology 1954-2004 234 
ATF 1978-2008 249 
WITS 2004-2008 2 
NAF 1975-2008 301 
PPFA 1991-2008 869 
Total 1970-2009 1,990 
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 In 2006, START received funds from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to extend the GTD beyond 1997 and as of November, 2011, the GTD includes 
information on over 120 variables for more than 98,000 domestic and international 
terrorist incidents from 1970 through 2010 (for a more recent review of the GTD, see 
LaFree, 2010).  The second phase of the data collection process was initiated in 2008 
when START devoted the efforts of faculty, graduate research assistants and interns to 
augmenting the amount of information on several forms of domestic terrorism, including 
anti-abortion incidents.  Under the guidance of Drs. Gary LaFree and Jean McGloin, I 
developed a systematic, two stage procedure for the collection of these data. 
 The first stage of the data collection process consisted of identifying all open and 
private sources of anti-abortion crime data.  A careful review of the literatur  nd 
informal discussions with several private and government organizations revealed the 
existence of three basic sources of information: academic chronologies, gov rnment 
databases and reproductive healthcare advocacy groups.  In the paragraphs that follow, I 




 Academic chronologies are written accounts of individual criminal victimizations.  
A review of the literature identified two chronologies: Targets of Hatred: Anti-Abortion 
Terrorism by Patricia Baird-Windle and Eleanor J. Bader28(2001) and Political Violence 
and Terrorism in Modern America by Christopher Hewitt29 (2005).  Penned in the style 
                                                
28 Patricia Baird-Windle is a former reproductive healthcare provider.  Eleanor J. Bader is a journalist, 
currently writing for The Indypendent newspaper. 
29 Christopher Hewitt is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland Baltimore County.  
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of a social history, Targets of Hatred provides information on abortion-related crime 
from 1973 through 2001.  In narrative form, the authors describe in detail, the 
experiences of over 190 abortion providers.  Information presented on criminal attacks 
was obtained through interviews and open source periodicals.  This source provided us 
with information on 283 incidents of anti-abortion crime (see Table 4.1).   
 Unlike Targets of Hatred which focuses entirely on anti-abortion crime, Hewitt 
provides information on several different types of domestic terrorism in America from 
1954 through 2004.  Using a mixture of periodicals, academic texts, federal and hate 
crime watchdog publications, Hewitt presents a series of short incident descriptions, 
usually one sentence in length.  This text provided us with information on 234 incidents 
of anti-abortion crime. 
 
Government Terrorism and Criminal Databases 
 
 The second set of databases on anti-abortion crime came from federal institutio  
of research and law enforcement.  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) is the primary federal investigative agency for crimes involving the use 
of explosives, arson and firearms (Nice, 1988; Jacobson and Royer, 2011).  As such, the 
ATF maintains and compiles information on all such attacks, including those committed 
against reproductive healthcare providers.  These data provided us with information on 
249 attacks from 1978 through 2008 (see Table 4.1).   
 In 2004, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created by the United 
States Congress for the purpose of becoming the primary federal repository of 
information related to the field of counterterrorism.  Since its inception, NCTC 
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employees have been gathering information on terrorist incidents from a variety of open 
sources including commercial newswire services and local news agencies.  This 
information is systematically coded into a publicly available electronic database known 
as the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System or WITS (for an in-depth review of the 
WITS methodology see Wigle, 2010).  As indicated above in Table 4.1, the WITS 
database provided us with information on two incidents30 of anti-abortion crime. 
   
Reproductive Healthcare Advocacy Groups 
 
 The final set of outside databases was obtained from reproductive freedom and 
pro-choice advocacy organizations.  The National Abortion Federation (NAF), a 
professional association of abortion providers in North America, is one example.  Since 
1977, the NAF has collected data on incidents of violence and disruption against abortion 
providers through the use of victimization reports from member clinics, news media
services and reports from other advocacy groups (see www.prochoice.org).  With the 
cooperation of NAF officials, we obtained electronic copies of data for 301 incidents of 
arson, bombings and butyric acid attacks on abortion providers and patients from 1975 
through 2008 (see Table 4.1).   
 Finally, incident data was also procured from Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America (PPFA); an association of reproductive healthcare providers, promoting 
comprehensive reproductive healthcare across the United States and social policies based 
                                                
30 Although WITS presents data on over 98,000 incidents of domestic and international terrorism, as of 
September, 2010, only two of these incidents involve abortion clinics.  This exceptionally small number is 
partially due to the fact that the WITS data only goes back as far as January of 2004.  Even so, this doe  not 
account for the omission of recent high-profile attacks on abortion providers such as the 2009 assassination 




on the concept of reproductive self-determination (see www.plannedparenthood.org).  
Since 1991, PPFA has collected victimization data from abortion clinic staff throug out 
the U.S.  Similar to the NAF, PPFA methodology relies primarily on the use of 
victimization reports from affiliated clinics.  Although PPFA routinely publishes incident 
data on their website, public access is only granted for crimes of the previous 14 months.  
Fortunately, PPFA officials agreed to grant START access to all of their victimization 
incident data.  Looking again to Table 4.1, we see that this produced information on 869 
crimes of anti-abortion violence, property damage and harassment from 1991through 
200831.  Altogether, the six databases outlined above in combination with the original 
GTD, produced information on 1,990 incidents of anti-abortion crime. 
 
Anti-Abortion Crime Data: Supplementary Procedures 
 
 The second stage of the project consisted of the identification and removal of all 
duplicated incidents across the seven databases mentioned above, and then updating these 
data through the use of independent media sources.  In order to identify duplicated 
incidents, we first sought to standardize these data by combining them into a single 
database.  Then, a team of research interns, faculty research assistants and I coded each 
incident across 33 separate variables including but not limited to incident location, date of 
attack, attack type, weapon type and target name32.  To identify duplicates, coders were 
instructed to sort all incidents by a series of predetermined variable combinations and 
then compare across incidents.  For example, in order to identify all duplicate clinic arson 
                                                
31 Although the NAF also routinely gathers information n acts of harassment and vandalism, they do not 
publish incident-level data on these crimes and my attempts to acquire hard copies of these data were 
unsuccessful.     
32 The full list of incident variables is provided in the project codebook, which is found in Appendix B-2.  
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cases, the database was initially sorted by date of attack, state and attack type, then by 
date of attack, city and target, then by date of attack, city and perpetrator, etc..  This 
sorting process enabled coders to easily compare all of the clinic arson cases occurring 
within a given month and city.  Any two arson cases that were found to have identical 
information across a majority of the 33 variables coded were tagged as potential 
duplicates.   
 Once this step was complete, all tagged incidents were individually screened 
against each other in order to separate the “potential” duplicates from the “likely
duplicates”.  Likely duplicates were defined as groups of incidents that share identical 
information across all coded variables or with up to two exceptions.  Most often, these 
exceptions were minor in which case the assurance of duplicate status remained and the 
duplicates were summarily removed from the database.  For example, two arson incide ts 
may have identical information with the exception of a $100 discrepancy in the property 
damage estimate.  However, in certain cases where the exceptions were not minor (e.g., a 
discrepancy of $1,000,000 or different names listed for the perpetrator(s)), the incidents 
were kept separate.  These steps were repeated using several sorting combinations in 
order to capture duplicates across every crime type. A total of 666 duplicates were 
identified and removed from the database, producing a final sample of 1,324 incidents of 
anti-abortion crime from 1975 to 2008.      
 The remaining incident data provided a substantial amount of information on anti-
abortion crime.  However, due to the varying amounts and types of data supplied by the 
aforementioned entities, some entries provided more information than others.  For 
example, several entries provided the name of the perpetrator while others did not.  
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Omissions such as these may very well result from the fact that most anti-abortion 
offenders are in fact, never caught.  However, since it is impossible to know for sure, we 
supplemented the attack data with information found in independent news sources.  This 
final step was accomplished by a team of trained research assistants, running a series of 
queries on open source newswire databases (e.g., LexisNexis Academic, Factiva, Google 
News, Google News Archives, The New York Times, etc.) based upon information 
unique to each incident.  The resulting list of English language news articles and reports 
was then sorted and ranked according to the strength of the publication from which each 
article originated.  Articles which were printed by nationally or regionally recognized 
media (e.g., The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, etc.) were lab led 
as “Tier 1” sources and received the highest ranking.  “Tier 2” sources consisted of 
smaller, local news publications such as Indiana’s The South Bend Tribune or Ohio’s 
Chillicothe Gazette while the lowest ranking (Tier 3) went to articles found in blogs and 
tabloid magazines33.   
 In order to ensure the highest level of consistency and accuracy, only Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 sources were used to update and enhance the incident information provided in each 
of the seven anti-abortion crime databases.  As illustrated below in Table 4.2, this process 
produced supplementary information for approximately 45% and 53% of all unique 






                                                
33 A copy of the data supplementation instruction sheet is provided in Appendix B-1. 
34 A complete breakdown of supplementary information by individual crime type (e.g., assassination, 
bombing, arson, etc.) is presented in Table A.1 of Appendix A-1. 
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Table 4.2: Number and Percent of Incidents Supplemented by Crime Category  
  
Unfortunately, the same procedures used to supplement the violent and property 
cases produced independent sources of information for less than five percent of incidents 
involving some form of harassment or minor vandalism.  This is not entirely unexpectd 
considering that the most serious crimes are also the most likely to be deemed 
newsworthy (Chermak, 1995; Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Graber, 1980).  
Similarly, the most contentious and violent aspects of abortion protests garner the lion’s 
share of media coverage (Blanchard, 1996; Doan, 2007; Munson, 2008).  Thus, an 
instance of minor vandalism involving the spray painting of anti-choice slogans on clinic 
property is much less likely to receive the same amount of coverage as an assault on a 
physician or an act of clinic arson.  Regardless of the reasons for this discrepan y, it is 
unlikely to affect the current analyses as the supplementary data did not alter the basic 
nature of the original data.   
 A distribution of these incidents over time is provided below in Figure 4.135.  We 
can see that the positive trend in property and harassment attacks begins to take shape in
the early 1980s.  For property attacks, this trend reverses course by the year 2000.  
Meanwhile, harassment attacks seem to peak or plateau in the middle 1990s.  The upward 
                                                
35 Incident frequencies depicted in Figure 4.1 are based upon a three year moving average. 
Crime 
Category 
Number of U.S. 
Incidents 
% of Incident 
Total 
Number and (% of Incidents 
Supplemented) 
Violent 56 4.23% 25(44.64%) 
Property 678 51.21% 358(52.8%) 
Harassment 590 44.56% 26(4.41%) 
Total 1,324 100% 409(30.89%) 
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trend in violent attacks begins during the late 1980s and also reaches a peak in the middle 
1990s.  Interestingly, it appears as though all three crime distributions start to decline or 
plateau only after the majority of all clinic protection laws had come into being.  By 
1995, over 70% of current protection laws had been enacted.  Although this figure is in 
no way conclusive, it suggests that clinic protection laws may be related to the decline in 
anti-abortion crime.  In the following paragraphs I will detail the resulting strengths and 
limitations of these incident data, as well as their implications for testing the hypotheses 
outlined above.   
Figure 4.1: Annual Distribution of Anti-Abortion Crime (1975-2008)  
 
Database Strengths and Limitations 
 
 The procedures listed in the preceding paragraphs have produced a database with 
several advantages over its predecessors.  First, the data collected in this project includes 
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incident-level information on multiple types of anti-abortion crime.  The inclusion of 
violent, property and harassment/vandalism incident measures provides a more complete 
picture of anti-abortion crime.  Previous studies have often focused solely on one or two 
specific crime types such as clinic bombings and clinic arson (Nice, 1988; Blanchard and 
Prewitt, 1993) or harassment (Kahane, 2000; Doan, 2007).  Such a narrow focus is ill-
advised for the study of anti-abortion crime in so much as model estimates could be 
generalized incorrectly across movement streams and attack types.  As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, the causal mechanisms associated with violent and property attacks 
may differ substantially from those for harassment and vandalism incidents.  The data 
used in this study presents a more comprehensive measure of anti-abortion crime, thereby 
allowing for a more complete test on the effects of clinic protection legislation.    
 Second, one of the greater limitations associated with event databases on acts of 
terrorism and political extremism is the tendency to focus primarily on international 
attacks despite the fact that statistical comparisons indicate that domestic attacks 
outnumber international attacks by a factor of seven (LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw, 2009).  
This limitation is especially common within government agencies and as such, may 
partially account for the substantial undercounting of anti-abortion attacks in certain 
government datasets.  This dissertation avoids this potential pitfall by focusing solely on 
domestic attacks occurring within the United States and by incorporating data from seven 
separate datasets on domestic acts of terrorism and anti-abortion crime.  Thus, the 
analyses performed in this study are less likely to suffer from biases commonly 




 Finally, the analyses conducted in this dissertation benefit from an extesive and 
systematic data collection process involving the use of government, academi , advocate 
and news media services.  Although individually, each one of these data sources is 
limited, as a whole, they offer a breadth and diversity of information that is well uit d to 
the study of anti-abortion crime.  The collection procedures mentioned above have 
produced what I believe to be the most comprehensive incident-based dataset on anti-
abortion crime in the United States to date.  This provides an advantage over prior studies 
which rely entirely upon the use of a single data source, be it government (Nice, 1988) or 
advocate-based (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).   
 In addition to the many strengths listed above, a few limitations are also present in 
the data and must be recognized as such.  First, one of the more common limitations with 
open-source event databases concerns the validity of information reported through the 
media.  As LaFree (2010:24) states, “The media may report inaccuracies and lies; there 
may be conflicting information or false, multiple or no claims of responsibility”.  
Furthermore, Falkenrath (2001) notes how media agencies may regard certain ter or st 
attacks as more newsworthy than others.  Should “less newsworthy” attacks such as 
incidents of anti-abortion harassment and vandalism fail to capture the media’s attention, 
they are less likely to be identified for inclusion.  If this is indeed the case, additional bias 
may be present in the model.  Unlike most event databases on anti-abortion crime 
however, the data used in this study benefit from a diverse collection strategy which 
allows me to incorporate information from several different private and public sour es, 
each with their own unique data collection procedures, thus limiting the potential for 
misinformation or inaccuracies.     
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 Second, despite the benefits associated with the assimilation of data from both 
open and private sources, it is still likely the data used in this dissertation do not fully 
constitute the true number of anti-abortion attacks.  This is especially true for the 590 
crimes of harassment and vandalism, the data for which were derived primarily from 
Baird-Windle and Bader (2001) and PPFA.  According to the NAF, there have been 
4,899 of these attacks from 1977 through 200836.  Assuming the NAF figures represent 
the more accurate count, it is safe to say that the data used in this dissertation undercount 




 As mentioned in the paragraphs above, previous efforts to study the effects of 
clinic protection laws on criminal behaviors have suffered from the use of insuficient 
crime data.  In this dissertation, I attempt to address this limitation by employing a 
previously unavailable dataset on anti-abortion crime events.  Covering a 34 yer period 
from 1975 to 2008, these data represent what I believe to be the most comprehensive 
event-based dataset on anti-abortion crime yet to be assembled.  In the following chapter, 
I will outline the statistical methodology used to test the blended model of deterrenc  and 
backlash, as explained in Chapter 3.            
   
 
                                                
36 Conversations with NAF officials revealed that although the NAF routinely reports national-level 
statistics on the annual number of harassment and valism crimes, they currently do not make public 
information by state or by incident.  
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CHAPTER 5: STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
 In the previous chapter I documented the collection methodology used to procure 
the anti-abortion crime data used in this dissertation.  The unique nature of this dataset 
allows for the most robust test of the deterrence/backlash thesis on anti-abortion crimes to 
date.  In this chapter, I will offer an accounting of the methods used in these analyses.  
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
 The analyses in this dissertation are based upon annual counts of anti-abortion 
crime for each of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia over a 34 year period 
from 1975 to 2008 (N=51x34=1,734).  The choice of state years over county or city years 
as the unit of analysis is justified on both theoretical and methodological grounds.  To 
paraphrase Blanchard (1994), state-level lobbying efforts on the part of pro-life advocacy 
groups represent a cornerstone of pro-life activism.  It therefore comes as little surprise 
that the vast majority of all clinic protection laws are enacted at the sate level.  This 
suggests pro-life activists are sensitive to changes in state policy and thus, the state 
represents the most appropriate unit of analysis.   
 In principle, the following analyses could also be conducted at the county, city or
at the individual clinic level yet this would likely prove impracticable for several reasons.  
To begin, previous research on right-wing extremist groups indicates that smaller units of 
analysis may be less successful in observing cultural influences or characteristics that 
operate on a regional-level (Baller et al. 2001; Chermak, 2002; Freilich, 2003).  
Additionally, anti-abortion crime is a relatively rare event, especially when partitioned by 
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crime type.  Analyses conducted at the city or county level would likely serve to 
exaggerate this aspect of the data thereby inhibiting any reliable estimate of the 
intervention’s impact.                
 For reasons similar to those mentioned above, analyses performed at the national
level are also more plausible than those at more micro levels; however, such models 
would surely obscure any state level variation in protection law influence.  Moreover, 
analyses conducted at the national level would not allow for any meaningful examination 
of the differences between the five types of clinic laws identified in this study.   
 
Construction of Variables 
Anti-Abortion Attacks 
 
 The three dependent variables used in this analysis represent annual counts of the 
total number of anti-abortion attacks by crime type.  Viol/Property Attacks refers to 
counts of incidents involving either the use of physical violence or property destruction 
against clinics, clinic personnel, patients and pro-choice protesters.  This includes acts of 
armed assault, unarmed assault, assassination, attempted assassination, bombing, 
attempted bombing, robbery, attempted robbery, hostage taking/kidnapping as well as 
acts of arson, attempted arson, bombing/explosion, chemical/acid attack, attempted 
chemical/acid attack, glue in locks, broken windows, acts of sabotage and burglary.  The 
descriptive statistics listed above in Table 4.2 indicate that the database contains 
information on a total of 735 such crimes (56 violent attacks + 679 property attacks).  
The Harassment variable represents the number (N=590) of less severe, yet illegal acts of
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protest including blockades, facility invasions, death threats37, bomb threats, 
chemical/biological threats, the stalking of staff or physicians, vandalism nd cyber 
attacks.  Finally, Total Attacks refers to the combined sum of all three attack types.   
 
Clinic Protection Laws 
 
 Data on state and federal clinic protection laws were obtained from the National 
Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) Foundation.  NARAL; a pro-
choice advocacy organization, routinely monitors state and federal governments for 
changes in abortion-related policy.  Every month, NARAL compiles this information and 
publishes a chronological list and brief description of all clinic protection laws in the 
United States38.  This provided us with descriptions for 33 laws in 16 states and the 
District of Columbia over this 34 year time period.   
 To ensure the validity of these data, I compared NARAL’s legal descriptions with 
the original legal texts, obtained through a series of queries using the legal search engines 
Westlaw and LexisNexis State Capital.  Next, I removed all laws from the database 
which do not explicitly prohibit crimes involving the use of personal violence, property 
destruction or harassment against clinics, staff or patients.  For example, Washington and 
California state laws prohibiting insurance companies from increasing premiums or 
canceling coverage for victimized abortion clinics were removed.  Although such laws 
could potentially influence the decisions of anti-abortion protestors, they do not explicitly 
prohibit acts of violence, property damage or harassment and as such, remain outside the 
                                                
37 Death threats include explicit threats against clini  staff and patients (e.g., “I am going to kill you”) as 
well as implicit threats such as hoax anthrax attacks.  




scope of this dissertation.  I identified and removed from the database, a total of nine such 
laws.  The remaining 24 laws39 were then categorized by the type of activity prohibited 
(personal violence, property damage and harassment/vandalism or some combination 
thereof).  
 Table 5.1 below, offers a more detailed breakdown of these protection laws.   
First, it is notable that the 23 state statutes are distributed across the northeast (CT, D.C., 
MA, MD, ME, NY), the west (CA, NV, OR, WA) and the Midwest and plains states 
(CO, KS, MI, MN, MT, WI) with seven, eight and six laws respectively.  Although the 
intensity of the pro-life movement in the geographic south has been well documented 
(Hoffman and Miller, 1997; Hoffman and Johnson, 2005), it is remarkable that only two 
of the protection laws were enacted by a southern legislature (NC).    
 Second, it is evident that the typological distribution of protection laws skews 
towards acts of harassment/vandalism.  Indeed, 16 laws expressly prohibit this type of 
crime compared to just three property crime laws.  Currently, there are no laws which 
prohibit violent acts exclusively.  In addition to these single behavior laws, I have 
identified five pieces of legislation which prohibit multiple types of illegal behavior.  For 
example, two of the protection laws encompass violence, property and 
harassment/vandalism (VPH) crimes.  Similarly, the Connecticut and Maine protection 
laws are geared towards violent crime and harassment/vandalism (VH) and property 





                                                





Table 5.1: Distribution of Protection Laws by State and Behavior(s) Prohibited 
1985-2008 
State Violence Property Harassment/Vandalism VPH VH PH Total 
CA  2 2 1   5 
CO   1    1 
CT     1  1 
D.C.   1    1 
KS   1    1 
MA   2    2 
MD   1    1 
ME      1 1 
MI   1    1 
MN   1    1 
MT   1    1 
NC   2    2 
NV   1    1 
NY    1   1 
OR  1     1 
WA   1    1 
WI   1    1 
Total 0 3 16 2 1 1 23 
 
 Upon categorization, the state protection law data were collapsed into three broad 
categories: Anti-violence laws, anti-property crime laws and anti-harassment/vandalism 
laws.  This enables me to expand upon the Pridemore and Freilich (2007) study by 
controlling for a key difference between state laws; the type(s) of anti-aboron c ime that 
are prohibited.  Similar to the main independent variable in the previous study, I also 
include a variable controlling for the presence of any state clinic protection law 
mentioned above.  For a complete list of protection laws by state, dates effective and 
prohibited behaviors, see Table A.3 in Appendix A-2.  
 Third, I include a measure controlling for the effects of the single most visible 
federal clinic protection law; the FACE Act.  The decision to create a separat  
dichotomous variable for this federal protection law was based in part, on the greater 
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level of visibility associated with national laws compared to state laws.  Additionally, the 
FACE Act is unique in that it prohibits acts of violence, property damage and harassment.  
As such, it targets a wider range of behaviors than most state laws.  The inclusion of a 
FACE variable will also allow me to see if the application of a highly visible fed ral 
protection law trumps its local counterparts. Each of these seven legal variables are 
dichotomous; assigned a value of 1 for all years during and after the date on which the 
law became effective and a 0 for all years before. 
 Finally, three of the states listed above (CA, MA and NC) have passed multiple 
property or harassment/vandalism protection laws.  Unfortunately, one drawback to the 
current operationalizing of these legal variables is that I am unable to gauge the effects of 
multiple laws from the same category.  That is to say, although I can assess the impact of 
one California anti-violence law on the number of anti-abortion crimes, I cannot measure 
the impact of a second or third California anti-violence law.  Fortunately, the number of 
states that merit this consideration is relatively small and as such, this limitation should 
prove a modest one.   
 
Abortion Rates     
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, several scholars also suggest that anti-
abortion crime is more likely to occur in places where the pro-life movement is 
experiencing political failure (Nice, 1988; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Blanchard, 
1994).  However, Nice’s study found that anti-abortion violence is also a product of 
practical failure, as clinic bombings were clustered in states with higher rates of abortion 
(but see also Freilich and Pridemore, 2007 and Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).  This 
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suggests that anti-abortion crime is rational and instrumental in so far as it is designed to 
prevent abortions (Nice, 1988; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Blanchard, 1994; King and 
Husting, 2003).  Insomuch as anti-abortion offenders seek to maximize the utility of their 
actions (Bentham, 1781), they are expected to engage in more criminal activities when 
the perceived benefit (i.e., the potential quantity of abortions prevented) is at its highe t, 
all else considered equal.  Thus, we should expect more attacks in states with higher 
abortion rates.   
 Statewide data on the abortion rate per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 were obtained 
from a survey of all known abortion providers in the United States.  The survey was 
conducted by the Allen Guttmacher Institute, with the most recent findings reported by 
Henshaw and Kost, (2008), Jones and Kooistra (2011) and the Allen Guttmacher 
Institute40.  There are 12 years in which the survey was not conducted (1983, 1986, 1989, 
1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2006).  Estimates for missing data 
in these years were constructed through a process of linear interpolation (i.e. mean 
averages).   
 
Violent Female Victimization 
 
 Some scholars suggest that anti-abortion crime and violence is also indicative of  
broader tolerance for violence against women.  For example, Nice’s (1988) study of anti-
abortion violence finds that clinic bombings occurred more often in states with more 
violent crime directed at women.  Similarly, Freilich and Pridemore (2007) find that 
female homicide victimization rates predicted certain types of clinic vandalism (but see 
                                                
40 Abortion rates for the year 2005 can be found on the company’s website (http://www.guttmacher.org). 
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Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).  As Nice (1988:180) writes, “Violence may be 
encouraged by norms that indicate that it is relatively acceptable behavior or by elites 
who indicate that its use may be justified in some circumstances or at least deserves 
understanding in view of the nature of a particular problem.”   
 These findings coincide with the rational actor perspective in so much as they 
suggest that broad cultural characteristics can influence the individual offender’s 
cost/benefit analysis.  While the violent victimization of women is generally taboo in the 
U.S., the stigma or cost associated with such crimes may be lower in states wher  the 
interests of women are discounted.  Thus, as tolerance for violence against women rises, 
so too should the number of anti-abortion crimes.  In order to control for levels of non-
political violence directed against women, annual figures on the rape rate per 100,000 
residents for the 50 states and the District of Columbia were obtained for from the 




 Because the creation of laws and policy does not occur in a vacuum, it is 
important to give careful consideration to the potential relationship between protection 
laws and the crimes they are designed to prevent.  Just as clinic laws may have an effect 
on the number of crimes committed, so too could the number and type of crimes 
committed affect the creation of the law.  The widely publicized murder of Polly Klass 
for instance, spurred the creation of “three strikes” laws in California.  Similarly, the 
1993 high profile murder and attempted murder of Drs. David Gunn and George Tiller 
respectively, provided the political pressure necessary for the passage of the FACE Act 
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(Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001).  This may lead to positively biased coefficient estimates 
and the erroneous conclusion that the protection law led to more crime when in reality, it 
produced either a deterrent or null effect.   
 On the other hand, a law prompted by a random spike in clinic arson may 
incorrectly appear to have a deterrent effect once the expected number of incidents 
returns to the mean41.  In either case, the utility of the findings would surely be 
compromised.  To address this limitation, I lagged each of the protection law varibles by 
one year.  This ensures that each of the protection law variables speak to the legal context 
running up to the start of each year, which in turn controls for problems of simultaneity 
bias, as a spike in clinic crime cannot impact policy from the year previous.   
 The potential for simultaneity bias also extends to the abortion variable.  
Although the literature outlined in the paragraphs above suggests that higher levels of 
abortion may excite potential offenders to commit additional acts of anti-abortion c ime, 
it also indicates that these attacks are successful in reducing the number of providers 
(Kahane, 2000; Medoff, 2003; Jacobson and Royer, 2011).  A reduction in the provider 
base should in turn, lead to fewer legal abortions.  The abortion variable was lagged by 
one year in order to correct for this potential bias. 
 Descriptive statistics for the legal and control variables used in this dissertation 
are presented below in Table 5.2.  Of the legal variables (Statelaw, Violaw, Proplaw, 
Harasslaw, FACE), FACE is present in the greatest number of observations (N=765), just 
over 44%.  This is to be expected as federal legislation applies to all states and the 
District of Columbia, and it contrasts with the apparent rarity of state laws that prohibit 
                                                
41 This statistical phenomenon is commonly referred to as regression to the mean.  For a review and 
historical accounting, see Stigler (1997). 
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the use of violent protest, which are present in less than 2% (N=33) of all observations.  
Unlike the legal variables, the two measures controlling for state rape and abortion rates 
are continuous and exhibit a good deal of variation from state year to state year.  This is
also expected as rape and abortion rates often differ significantly from state to state.  
Correlation statistics for the independent variables are provided in Appendix A-3, Table 
A.4.  
    
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Legal and Control Variables  
Variable N Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Statelaw 1,734 0.00 1.00 0.149 0.357 
Violaw 1,734 0.00 1.00 0.019 0.137 
Proplaw 1,734 0.00 1.00 0.033 0.178 
Harasslaw 1,734 0.00 1.00 0.139 0.346 
FACE 1,734 0.00 1.00 0.441 0.497 
Abortion 1,734 0.3 185.2 21.316 18.187 




 This dissertation uses fixed-effects zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
regressions to test the relationship between illegal forms of pro-life protest and clinic 
protection laws.  Count-based rare event procedures such as the ZINB are uniquely 
tailored for the study of anti-abortion crime for two reasons. 
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 First, unlike many street crimes, anti-abortion crime is a relatively rare event.  In 
1995 there were nearly 14 million reported index crimes in the United States compared to 
95 reported acts of abortion-related crime.  Thus, as shown below in Table 5.3, there are 
several years during which certain states experience a total absence of attacks.  
Illustratively, not a single violent/property or harassment/vandalism crime is recorded for 
nearly 80% of all observations.  Furthermore, just over 30% of all observations 
experience one or more attacks of any type.  In traditional linear regression modeling 
(LRM), the dependent variable (anti-abortion crime) is assumed to be normally 
distributed.  However, this assumption is unlikely to hold given the large number of z os 
in the model and the resulting skew in the error distribution.  Thus, LRM estimates will 
be inefficient, inconsistent and biased (Long, 1997).   
Table 5.3: Number and Percent of Observed Zero Counts by Crime Category 
 
 Statistical models such as the Poisson Regression Model (PRM), the Negative 
Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), the Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model (ZIP) 
and the ZINB that are based on the Poisson or Negative Binomial distributions are better 
suited for the count data used in this dissertation because they do not maintain the same 
assumptions as the LRM.  As much, they are better able to model rare event data and re 
thus, representative of a more appropriate statistical methodology for this analy is.  For 
Crime 
Category Number of 
Observations 
Number and % of 
Observations With 1 or  
More Attacks 
Number and % of 
Observations With No 
Attacks 
Total Attacks 1,734 532 (30.68%) 1,202 (69.2%) 
Viol/Property 1,734 356 (20.53%) 1,378 (79.47%) 
Harassment 1,734 323 (18.63%) 1,411(81.37%) 
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an overview of rare event models, see Allison and Waterman, (2002), Long, (1997) and 
Osgood, (2000). 
 Second, it is highly possible that the population of study falls into two statistical 
groups: those which are sometimes attacked and those which are likely never attack d.  
As mentioned previously, the number of clinics has changed dramatically over the past 
34 years.  From 1992 to 2008, the number of abortion clinics declined by nearly 25 
percent (N=587) (Jones et. al., 2008; Jones and Kooistra, 2011).  This national reduction 
in the provider pool has contributed to growing disparities in the level of access.  For 
example, in 2008, the state of California had roughly one provider for every 36,000 
women.  This figure contrasts with those from states such as North Dakota, where the 
ratio of providers to women is closer to one to 335,000 (see Jones and Kooistra, 2011).  
Simply put, some states offer fewer potential targets than others.  Furthermore, some 
providers are more conspicuous than others.  Planned Parenthood clinics for example, are 
synonymous with abortion and as a result, they are often the target of attacks.  However, 
it may not be obvious to the average offender, when abortion procedures are performed at 
the local hospital or at the independent offices of a local physician.  Thus, in any give  
year, a state’s probability of sustaining an attack could effectively reach zero depending 
on the number of providers and the offenders’ awareness of them.   
 Zero-modified count models such as the ZINB and ZIP represent a more 
appropriate approach for the current study because they are able to model the eff c s of 
protection laws for each of these groups (i.e., those who are likely to never experience an 
attack and those who will sometimes experience an attack).  This is done by explicitly 
modeling the production of zero counts (Long, 1997).  Essentially, these models use 
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maximum likelihood estimation for two sets of predictors.  One set or process is used to 
predict zero values (i.e., observations that do not experience attacks) while the other is 
used to predict positive counts for those observations that sometimes experience attacks. 
Specifically, the likelihood of the observation belonging to the “never attacked group” is 
identified through a binary logit or probit process while the probability of experiencing 
some positive number of attacks is generated by a negative binomial or poisson count 
process.  For a review of zero-modified count models see (Long, 1997; Minami et. al., 
2007).   
 Although the ZIP and ZINB models each excel at modeling the production of zero 
counts, the ZINB model often surpasses the ZIP model in practice.  The reason for this 
centers on the fact that Poisson-based models such as the ZIP and the PRM maintain the 
assumption of equidispersion where the conditional variance is equal to the conditional 
mean.  In fact, it is somewhat common for count-based data in the social sciences to be 
overdispersed (i.e., variance is greater than the mean).  As a result, the PRM and ZIP 
models will produce consistent yet inefficient estimates wherein the standard errors are 
biased downward.  This is likely to generate inflated test statistics, leading us to believe 
that the intervention is having a greater effect than what is true (Long, 1997).  The 
NBRM and ZINB models account for the possibility of overdispersion by including a 




 Time variant analyses provide several benefits over standard cross-sectional 
research models (see Hedeker and Gibbons, 2006 and Dugan, 2010 for a review).  
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Central among these is the ability to reduce the model’s vulnerability to vari us forms of 
bias, thereby enhancing our ability to accurately estimate the effect o  X on Y (Dugan, 
2010).  That said, these models also have notable limitations, such as a vulnerability to 
dependence among the model’s error terms.  For example, years of increased anti-
abortion activity could potentially attract additional acts of extremism for the following 
year.  This time dependency often leads to biased standard errors and false conc usions 
regarding the utility of the intervention (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  Additionally, should 
any unobserved variables be correlated with the observed variables in the model, 
estimates will be biased42.   
 The incorporation of a fixed state effect into the model allows me to control for 
all time-invariant variables, both observed and unobserved.  As Dugan (2010:755) notes, 
“The fixed effect thus provides a unit-specific intercept vector, α
i
, which estimates the 
deviation of that unit from the overall intercept.  Since all of the time-invariant observed 
and unobserved variables are controlled for, the coefficient estimates are now estimating 
the effects of changes in X on Y”.  In other words, the fixed effect absorbs all variation 
between states, allowing me to focus solely on variation within states.  Thi  enables me to 
control for all possible time stable covariates, including those which I am not able to 
explicitly place in the equation (Allison and Waterman, 2002).   
For example, state electoral cycles are often associated with an increase in 
abortion-related media coverage which is likely to have an effect on anti-abortion crime 
rates.  Although the exact date of these elections varies from state to state, they are 
generally time stable in the sense that these dates are not often subject to change from one 
                                                
42 This is also known as time invariant omitted variable bias (Dugan, 2010). 
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year to the next.  By including a fixed-effect, each state is allowed to act as its own 
control.  In turn, I am able to control for the unobserved effects of state elections or any 
other time stable influence. 
 While the ability to control for all time stable differences protects the model from 
time invariant omitted variable bias, the fixed-effect method also comes at a cost.  To 
begin, the model can no longer account for variation across states.  This is a very minor 
limitation however, given the fact that the research questions posed in this study concern 
differences within states.  Second, by including a control for each state, the model loses 
51 degrees of freedom and some efficiency.  However, given the model’s large ample 
size (N=1,734) this should not be an issue.  Finally, it is worth noting that fixed-effect 
models cannot account for time variant omitted variables.  Thus, unobserved variables 
that move up and down over time in a way that is correlated with the observed variables 
included in the model will remain a source of omitted variable bias.  These limitations 
aside, fixed-effects modeling stands as an exceptionally powerful technique for 
estimating the intervention’s impact on Y.  For a review of fixed-effects modeling, see 
Dugan, 2010.   
 For each of the three dependent variables listed above, I estimate fixed- ffects 
ZINB models of the form 
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where Equation 5.4 represents the probability that an observation will be in the “always 
zero (AZ) group” and Equation 5.5, the probability for some positive number of attacks.  
For these equations,Y is the observed number of attacks (violent/property, harassment or 
total), X is the independent variable, i and t index states and years respectively, δ  
represents the unknown intercept for each state (i.e., the fixed-effect), ψ equals the 
probability of being in the “always zero group”, Γ is the gamma function, α represents 
the dispersion parameter and µ  = exp(δ + B1Statelawit-1 + B2Violawit-1 + B3Proplawit-1 




 As outlined in the passages above, this study uses a uniquely comprehensive and 
longitudinal dataset on anti-abortion crime incidents, collected during a year-long project 
at the START center in order to test the key tenets of the deterrence and backlash 
hypotheses.  These data will be incorporated into a series of ZINB regression models 
designed to test the relationship between clinic protection legislation and the criminal acts 
which they are designed to prevent.  Conducted at the state level, these analyses will add 
to our knowledge on the effects of state and federal protection policies which have been 
at the forefront of official efforts to deter anti-abortion crime for the past quarter century.      
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS 
 
 Having outlined the methodology for the current study, this chapter presents 
findings for the statistical models testing the deterrence and backlash hypotheses outlined 
in Chapter 3.  The main analyses are performed with fixed effects ZINBmodels testing 
the relationship between anti-abortion crime and clinic protection laws.  A total of five 
models are estimated with ZINB regressions, four of which reach statistic l 
convergence43.   
 
Interpretation of Model Estimates 
 
 Because the ZINB model uses two distinct distributions, estimates will be 
interpreted in ways that are fitting for both the Negative Binomial (i.e. the count process) 
and Logit distributions (i.e., the binary process).  First, I will interpret th  probability of 
zero-inflation or “being in the always-zero group” by taking the exponential of the 
inflation coefficient. This provides us with the odds ratio, or the probability of being in 
the always zero (AZ) group versus not being in that group.  Second, I interpret the 
expected change in the number of attacks by taking the exponential of the negative 
binomial coefficient, which provides the factor change in the expected value of Y.  Given
the fact that my model includes both independent variables of a binary/dummy (e.g., 
Statelaw, Violaw, Proplaw, Harasslaw, FACE) and a continuous nature (e.g., Abortion, 
                                                
43 Since Model 5 failed to converge using the ZINB process, the model was run again using a standard 




Rape), the factor/percent change in the expected number of attacks will be the most 
informative (Long, 1997). 
 Final Model selections were also informed by three goodness of fit measures 
including the likelihood ratio (LR) test of alpha = 0, the Vuong statistic and a comparison 
of mean observed and predicted counts.  Briefly, the LR test is used to identify the 
presence of overdispersion by comparing the log likelihood of two nested models such as
the ZIP and ZINB or the PRM and NBRM.  If the likelihood is significantly reduc by 
the constrained model (ZIP or PRM), then we can be confident that the ZINB model 
achieves the best fit (Long, 1997).  The Vuong statistic provides a similar test of fit for 
non-nested models (e.g., NBRM and ZINB) wherein a significant result indicates that the 
ZINB model fits best.  Finally, by comparing the observed and predicted counts fr the 
PRM, ZIP, NBRM and ZINB, I am able to compare goodness of fit at different values of 




 Model 1 presents the first and most basic test of the deterrence and backlash 
hypotheses.  One of the most fundamental assertions emanating from the rational choice 
literature is that an increase in the threat of sanctions will produce a deterrent effect for 
anti-abortion crime.  However, the estimates presented in Table 6.1 do not bear this 
assertion out.  FACE, Abortion and Rape all reach statistical significa ce indicating the 
presence of a dual-state process.  Holding everything else constant, implementing the 
FACE Act resulted in decreased odds of being in the “always zero” (AZ) group by about 
0.12 or 88.5% while a one unit increase in the abortion and rape rates result in nine% and 
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17% reduced odds of being in the AZ group respectively.  In other words, the 
introduction of FACE, along with the abortion and rape rates are significantly predictiv  
of zero anti-abortion crime counts.   
 
Table 6.1: Estimates (Standard Errors), z-statistics and Factor Change for Model 1 - 
The Impact of General Protection Laws on the Total Number of Attacks 






Statelaw 0.694** (0.184) 3.78 2.00 0.761 (0.693) 1.1 2.14 
FACE 0.567** (0.13) 4.36 1.76 -2.163** 
(0.615) 
-3.52 0.12 
Abortion -0.007 (0.007) -1.07 0.99 -0.095* (0.047) -2.02 0.91 
Rape 0.032** (0.008) 4.19 1.03 -0.189** 
(0.049) 
-3.87 0.83 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic = 132.778** 
Vuong Statistic = 2.50** 
 
 For the Negative Binomial (NB) component of the model, Statelaw, FACE and 
Rape all have a positive and significant impact on the expected number of attacks.  
Specifically, the introduction of state and federal protection laws results in a factor 
change in the annual number of expected attacks of 2.00 (100%) and 1.76 (76%) 
respectively.  This runs counter to the null results of the Pridemore and Freilich (2007) 
study as well as the deterrence-based notion that increasing legal penalties for anti-
abortion crime should reduce the number of incidents (Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; 
Kenny and Reuland, 2002).  The results provide more support for the backlash 
perspective, where the introduction of new protection laws is said to increase feelings of 
desperation among certain activists, leading to additional incidents (Kaplan, 1993, 1995; 
Kaufman, 2000; Mason, 2004; Maxwell, 2002)   
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 The significance and positive direction of the coefficient for Rape indicates that 
for every one unit increase in the rape rate, we can expect to see a factor change of 1.03 
(3%) in the expected number of attacks.  This finding coincides with those found in the 
works of Nice (1988) and Freilich and Pridemore (2007), suggesting a culture that 
tolerates or promotes the violent victimization of women is also conducive to the criminal 
victimization of abortion providers.  The significance of both the LR (132.778**) and 
Vuong (2.50**) test statistics indicate that the data are overdispersed and that the model 
achieves an acceptable level of fit. 
 Even so, Model 1 does not differentiate between the effects of protection laws on 
violent/property crime and less severe incidents of harassment and vandalism.  As such, 
these results are only able to tell part of the story.  Recall that Pridemore and Freilich 
(2007) hypothesized the effect of protection laws should vary according to the type of
activist, essentially deterring those who engage in harassment/vandalism crimes while 
generating a backlash effect among those who commit more severe violent/pr perty 
attacks.  The next step is to see if the current data will support Pridemore and Freilich’s 
(2007) blended model of deterrence and backlash.  To this end, I generated two setsof 
estimates: one where the dependent variable is the number of violent and property attacks 
(Model 2) and one in which it is the number of harassment/vandalism attacks (Model 3).  
Beginning with the estimates provided in Table 6.2, we see that for violent/property 
attacks, Rape is the only variable to reach statistical significance in th  Logit component 
of the model.  This indicates that for every one unit increase in the rape rate, the odds of 





Table 6.2: Estimates (Standard Errors), z-statistics and Factor Change for Model 2 - 
The Impact of General Protection Laws on Violent/Property Attacks 






2.54 1.82 1.005 (1.022) 0.98 2.73 
FACE 0.169 (0.17) 0.99 1.18 -1.493 (0.976) -1.53 0.22 
Abortion -0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.67 0.99 -0.059 (0.075) -0.79 0.94 
Rape 0.033** 
(0.01) 
3.28 1.03 -0.162** (0.06) -2.72 0.85 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic = 76.906** 
Vuong Statistic = 0.99 
 
 Both Statelaw and Rape reach significance in the NB component of the model, 
indicating that as states enact protection laws, the expected count of violent/pr perty 
attacks increases by a factor of 1.77 (83%) and 1.03 (3%) respectively.  This lends 
support to the Pridemore and Freilich (2007) hypothesis that state protection laws elicit a 
backlash among offenders who engage in violent and property attacks.  Notably, the 
coefficient for FACE does not reach significance as it does in Model 1, suggesting that 
federal protection laws do not have the same impact on violent/property attacks as do 
their state-level counterparts.  The LR test statistic (76.906**) provides some evidence 
for an acceptable level of model fit.  Although the Vuong statistic (0.99) fails to reach 
significance, a comparison between observed and predicted counts reveals that the ZINB 
model provides the best fit (see Graph A.2 located in Appendix A-4). We now look to 
examine the deterrence portion of their hypothesis by estimating the impact of protection 
laws on harassment attacks.       
 Estimates for Model 3 are presented below in Table 6.3.  For the Logit component 
of the model, Abortion reaches significance as does Rape (although marginally so).  
Interestingly, the direction of the Abortion coefficient is now positive, indicating that as 
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the abortion rate rises, so too do the chances of being in the AZ group.  Conversely, an 
increase in the rape rate reduces this likelihood.  Although none of the legal variab es are 
predictive of zero anti-abortion crime counts, Statelaw and FACE have a significant 
impact on the expected count of harassment attacks.  Once a state enacts a protection law, 
the expected number of harassment attacks rises by a factor of 1.77 (77%).  The 
coefficient for FACE reveals that the backlash effect for federal protecti n laws is even 
greater at 2.04 (104%).  Also, we see that once again, the coefficient for Rape is 
significant and positive, signifying that a one unit increase in the rape rate results in a 
factor change of 1.04 (4%) in the expected number of attacks.  Finally, the LR test 
statistic (20.286**), Vuong statistic (2.53**) along with the observed and predicted 
values shows us that not only does the ZINB model provide the best fit, but that Models 2 
and 3 achieve a better fit to the data than Model 1. 
 
Table 6.3: Estimates (Standard Errors), z-statistics and Factor Change for Model 3 - 
The Impact of General Protection Laws on Harassment/Vandalism Attacks  






2.29 1.77 -0.247 (0.893) -0.28 0.78 
FACE 0.713** 
(0.235) 





1.43 1.02 0.039* (0.019) 2.12 1.04 
Rape 0.037** 
(0.011) 
3.42 1.04 -0.034+ (0.02) -1.68 0.97 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic = 20.286** 
Vuong Statistic = 2.53** 
 
 
 Figure 6.1 illustrates the results for Models 2 and 3, which are notable for how 
much they complement the findings from Model 1.  We can see that switching the 
92 
 
dependent variable to assess the impact of state and federal protection laws by crime type 
provides additional evidence of a backlash effect.  The predicted increase in the numb r 
of violent and property attacks falls in line with Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) 
theoretical framework.  The same cannot however, be said for the harassment attacks 
model (Model 3).  Contrary to both their expectations and findings, the enactment of 
protection laws at the state and federal levels is also shown to generate addition l 
incidents of harassment and vandalism.   
 
Figure 6.1: Estimates for Model 2 and Model 3 – The Impact of State Protection 
Laws on Violent/Property and Harassment/Vandalism Crime 
 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
 
  
Taken as a whole, the estimates from Models 1, 2 and 3 provide ample support for 
the backlash argument and no evidence for the deterrence stance.  However, as notd in 
Chapter 3, the effects of these laws may also vary according to the type of law that is 
enacted.  If there is truth in the idea that not all protection laws are created equal with 












varying effects by controlling for the type of law that is enacted.  Therefore, the next step 
is to separate the main independent variables by the type of behavior that is prohibited.  
 Recall that research on anti-abortion activists has shown that the whole of the 
movement exhibits remarkable diversity in terms of ideology and tactics (Munson, 2008).  
Those of the extremist stream, who routinely engage in crimes of violence and severe 
property damage, possess different ideology and tactics compared to those in the direc  
action stream who engage primarily in lower-end crimes of harassment and vandalism 
(Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Blanchard, 1994; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008).  The 
former is characterized by social isolation, religious fundamentalism nd a dualist 
approach to the abortion question that generates a premium for the use of the most severe 
and illegal forms of protest regardless of the costs involved.  In contrast, the latter is 
noted for broader social networks, a relative degree of religious diversity and a more 
moderate and nuanced approach regarding protest activities.  
 With this in mind, it is unlikely that the introduction of new laws carrying greater 
penalties will dissuade activists of the extremist stream from future attacks.  On the 
contrary, I expect that the implementation of any and all protection laws will only serve 
to impart a growing sense of desperation and enhance the call to arms.  Thus, violence, 
property damage and harassment protection laws should produce a backlash effect for 
crimes of violence and property damage.  
 Table 6.4 presents the results of Model 4 which examines the impact of the three 
types of state protection laws (anti-violence laws, anti-property damage laws and anti-
harassment/vandalism laws) on acts of violence and property damage.  Contrary to 
Hypothesis 1 and the results of Model 2, none of the state legal variables reach statistical 
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significance.  These findings echo those of Pridemore and Freilich (2007), as none of the 
three major types of clinic protection laws have either a deterrent or backlash effect on 
the more serious anti-abortion crimes.  However, unlike Model 2, the variable controlling 
for the presence of the FACE Act is highly significant and in the expected direction 
indicating that with the enactment of FACE, the expected number of violent and property 
attacks rises by a factor of 1.47 (47%).  Thus, the predicted backlash effect appears to 
extend only to the highly visible federal protection law.     
 
Table 6.4: Estimates (Standard Errors), z-statistics and Factor Change for Model 4 - 
The Impact of Individual Protection Laws on Violent/Property Attacks44 
Variable Beta (S.E.) Z Factor 
Change 
Violaw -0.241 (0.432) -0.56 0.79 
Proplaw 0.183 (0.326) 0.56 1.20 
Harasslaw 0.306 (0.2) 1.54 1.36 
FACE 0.387** (0.125) 3.10 1.47 
Abortion -0.001 (0.006) -0.22 1.00 
Rape 0.02** (0.006) 3.16 1.02 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 




 Another similarity between the results of Model 4 and Model 2 is the significance 
of the Abortion and Rape variables.  Again, we see that while the abortion rate does not 
significantly affect the number of violent and property attacks, the rape rate does.  As the 
rape rate increases for any given state, the expected number of attacks rises by a factor of 
1.02 (2%).  It therefore appears that broader cultural aspects regarding the violent 
victimization of women also play a role in the production of serious forms of anti-
                                                
44 Because the fixed-effects ZINB model would not converge, estimates for Table 6.4 were generated with 
fixed-effects Negative Binomial regressions. 
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abortion crime.  Again, the significance of the LR test statistic (360.542**) and a 
comparison of the observed and predicted counts gives us confidence that the model is 
well fit to the data.   
 The fifth and final model tests the impact of these protection laws on the more 
minor forms of anti-abortion crime such as harassment and vandalism.  As I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the majority of these minor attacks are thought to be committed by direct 
action activists.  Unlike its extremist counterpart, the dir ct action stream represents a 
broader and relatively moderate swath of pro-life ideologies (Munson, 2008).  As minor 
offenders such as these tend to have a stronger stake in society, (Cernkovich, Giordano, 
and Pugh, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 2003) they are often opposed to committing more 
serious crimes where the perceived moral, social and legal costs are likely to outweigh 
the perceived benefits.  As such, the number of harassment and vandalism attacks is not 
expected to change with the enactment of anti-violence and anti-property damage 
protection laws.  Conversely, we would expect these minor crimes will fall in response to 
the enactment of anti-harassment laws.      
 Results from Model 5 are listed below in Table 6.5.  Starting with the Logit 
component of the model, we see no evidence to suggest that any of the legal variables are 
predictive of zero anti-abortion crime counts.  However, the inflation coefficient for 
Abortion is significant and Rape is marginally so, indicating that a dual-state process 
does exist for the production of harassment and vandalism crimes.  As the abortion and 
rape rates increase by one unit, the expected odds of being in the AZ group rises by a 





Table 6.5: Estimates (Standard Errors), z-statistics and Factor Change for Model 5 - 
The Impact of Individual Protection Laws on Harassment/Vandalism Attacks 




Violaw 0.06 (0.406) 0.14 1.06 15.584 (6347.9) 0 0.00 
Proplaw -0.254 
(0.48) 





2.31 1.96 -0.465 (0.937) -0.5 0.63 
FACE 0.712** 
(0.233) 





1.5 1.02 0.04* (0.019) 2.12 1.04 
Rape 0.036** 
(0.011) 
3.36 1.04 -0.035+ (0.02) -1.73 0.97 
+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
Vuong Statistic45 = 2.61** 
 
  
 Moving to the Negative Binomial component, the Z-statistics for Violaw and 
Proplaw show no evidence of statistical significance.  As I predicted in Hypothesis 2, 
laws protecting against violence and property damage have no discernible impact on the 
number of harassment and vandalism crimes.  Contrary to Hypothesis 3 however, the 
coefficient for the Harasslaw variable is positive and significant, signify ng that the 
presence of anti-harassment/vandalism legislation raises the expected number of attacks 
substantially, by a factor of 1.96 (96%).  A similar backlash effect is produced by the 
FACE Act, which results in a factor change of 2.04 (104%).  Thus, the evidence suggest 
that the low-level offender is not deterred by the threat of new sanctions.  Much the 
opposite, state and federal protection laws seem only to antagonize those within the direct 
action stream. 
                                                
45 The Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic could not be calculated because the Zero-Inflated Poisson version of 
Model 5 would not converge.  However, a test statistic of 138.714** was calculated for the Negative 
Binomial version indicating that the Negative Binomial Version provided a better fit than the standard 
Poisson Regression Model (PRM).  In turn, the significance of the Vuong Statistic reported here gives u  
confidence that the ZINB model provides a better fit than the Negative Binomial version.  Thus, we can be 
confident that the ZINB model provides the best fit o he data.  
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 As in the previous model (Model, 4), the variable controlling for the state abortion 
rate does not achieve significance; however it does appear that the rape rate remains
linked to the attack generating process.  With each one-unit increase in the rape rate, we 
can expect the number of harassment and vandalism attacks to rise by a factor of 1.04 
(4%).  Once again, the results indicate that the states with higher rape rates are at 
increased risk for future attacks.  Furthermore, the goodness of fit statis ics (LR = 2.61**, 
observed and predicted counts) provide evidence for an acceptable level of model fit.  
 Looking to Figure 6.2, we see that together, the results of Models 4 and 5 offer 
several additional pieces of information regarding clinic protection laws.  Most notably, 
by controlling for the various types of clinic protection laws, it is now evident that he 
effects of these laws are not uniform.  First, none of the three main types of state 
protection laws are generating either a deterrent or backlash effect for violent and 
property crimes.  On the surface, these results suggest that activists who engage in more 
serious forms of crime do not respond to the threat of new sanctions.  However, the 
significance of the FACE variable indicates otherwise.  Indeed, the introducti n of the 
highly visible FACE Act appears to have created a backlash effect within the extremist 













Figure 6.2: Estimates for Model 4 and Model 5 – The Impact of Violence, Property 





+ =p <0.10;  *p <0.05;  **p <0.01 
 
 Second, of the three types of state protection laws, only those prohibiting acts of 
harassment and vandalism have a significant effect on these less severe crim s.  This was 
expected, but contrary to the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) the 
positive direction of the coefficient reveals the creation of a distinct backlash effect.  The 





 Overall, the models presented in this chapter support the notion that clinic 
protection laws have a significant impact on the number of anti-abortion crimes 
committed within a given state.  In opposition to the null findings of the previous study 



















state and federal protection laws generate a backlash effect within certain st eams of the 
pro-life movement, leading to additional attacks.  However, by controlling for the type of 
state protection law enacted, we are able to see that this effect is relegated to the less 
severe crimes of harassment and vandalism.  Not only does this indicate that earlier 
models of analysis which fail to differentiate between various law types are too 
simplistic, it also reinforces previous research pointing to the existence of separate groups 
or streams within the pro-life movement (see Blanchard, 1993; Blanchard and Prewitt, 
1994; Munson, 2008).  The current findings suggest that the various types of protection 
law affect certain offenders differently than others. 
 In the final chapter of this dissertation, I provide an overview of the findings and 
discuss the implications for rational choice theory and policy.  Chapter 7 will also outline 
the limitations of the current study and present ideas for how future scholars may build 
upon this research to advance our understanding of anti-abortion crime and its 
relationship with legal countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this dissertation, I set out to improve our knowledge of anti-abortion crime and 
our understanding of its relationship with state and federal protection laws.  Although the 
public debate on abortion in the United States dates back to the early nineteenth century 
(Blanchard, 1994), it is only in the last four decades that the traditionally peaceful nd 
legal methods of pro-life protest began to share space with illegal acts of violence, 
property damage, harassment and vandalism.  Since the first documented incident in 
1975, reproductive healthcare clinics, staff and patients have sustained over 1,300 
additional attacks resulting in substantial physical (e.g., eight murders (National Abortion 
Federation, 2010)), fiscal (e.g., several hundred million dollars in property damage 
estimates) and mental (Fitzpatrick and Wilson, 1999) costs.      
 Since the mid-1980s, state and federal legislatures have responded to this growing 
threat by enacting a total of 24 laws designed to protect access to reproductive healthcare 
clinics by increasing the penalties for the various types of anti-abortion crime.  Based 
upon traditional notions of deterrence (Beccaria, 1764; Bentham, 1781), these protection 
laws represent a dominant theme in the effort to stamp out this type of crime.  Despite the 
recent proliferation of protection laws, scholars remain conflicted as to the utility of these 
new countermeasures.     
 Proponents of the rational actor perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) argue that 
protection laws have been successful in reducing anti-abortion crime because increasing 
the threat and severity of sanction deters current and potential offenders by raising the 
perceived costs associated with the act (see Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Doan, 2007; 
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Johnson, 2007; Kaplan, 1995; Kenny and Reuland, 2002; Press, 2006; Solinger, 1998) 
while research from criminology (Becker, 1963; Braithwaite, 2005; Sherman, 1993; 
Tannenbaum, 1938), terrorism (LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009; McCauley, 2006; Nice, 
1988) psychology (Baumeister et al., 2002; Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; 
Wicklund, 1974) and political science (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970), suggest such policies 
are likely to generate a backlash effect, where increases in government threats and 
punishment results in more of these prohibited behaviors.  In short, scholars adhering to 
the backlash perspective argue that government intervention has or is likely to make the 
problem worse (see Kaplan, 1993; 1995; Garrow, 1999; Johnson, 2007; Kaufman, 2000).   
 Still, others (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007) hypothesize that protection laws will 
have a deterrent effect for certain offenders and a backlash effect for others.  Recent 
research (Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Munson, 2008; Risen and 
Thomas, 1998) provides convincing evidence that the anti-abortion movement is not a 
monolith.  Rather, it is comprised of several distinct groups or movement streams 
(Munson, 2008).  Activists in the direct action stream closely approximate what rational 
choice theorists refer to as minor (Cernkovich, Giordano, and Pugh, 1985) or mundane 
(Cornish and Clarke, 2003:62) offenders in that they are generally law-abiding people 
with a stake in society, who occasionally engage in certain types of “minor” crimes such 
as the harassment of clinic staff and the vandalism of clinic and/or staff property.   
 Conversely, activists in the extremist stream are noted not only for their use of 
extreme tactics (e.g., acts of violence and severe property damage), but also for well 
defined, extremely narrow and homogenous social networks marked by religious and 
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cultural fundamentalism, and a view of abortion and those who practice it as true evil 
(Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993). 
 Pridemore and Freilich (2007) hypothesized that the more socially bonded and 
law abiding members of the direct action stream should reduce their use of harassment 
and vandalism once a new protection law is enacted.  Conversely, they also predicted that 
the more radical stream of the activist movement will respond to the presence of these 
laws with additional and more severe attacks.   
 Considering the pointed nature of this debate and the considerable costs 
associated with anti-abortion crime, the near total absence in attempts to test these 
competing theories carries with it a considerable amount of irony.  As the literature 
review from Chapter 2 made clear, the lack of quantitative research has compromised ur 
ability to understand anti-abortion crime.  The current study excluded, Pridemore and 
Freilich (2007) represents the only attempt to quantify the impact of protection laws on 
anti-abortion crime.  While the null findings of the study did not support their blended 
deterrence/backlash model, the authors acknowledge that the results may be influenced 
by limitations in the data.   
 Notably, the cross-sectional design of the study prohibited the authors from 
controlling for the amount of time each protection law was in place. As such, the 
statistical model was unable to identify protection law effects which may develop subtly 
over the course of time.  Relatedly, the study of crime at a single point in time (i.e., the 
year 2000) precluded the inclusion of a measure controlling for the passage of the single 
most visible protection law; the FACE Act.   
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 Additionally, data on anti-abortion crime comes from clinic self-survey reports 
which contain information on incident prevalence in lieu of information on the precise 
number of incidents (Freilich and Pridemore, 2007; Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).  This 
limits the ability to quantify the extent of the intervention’s impact.  Furthermore, low 
response rates commonly associated with clinic survey data may introduce selection bias 
into the model as the characteristics of the clinics and staff may lead to differential 
response (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).   
 Most importantly, the study’s use of a single dichotomous measure for the 
presence of any protection law obscures all variation among the independent variable.  
This is important, as there are substantive differences between these laws which cannot 
be accounted for in such a model.  As such, the best question to ask is not whether 
protection laws work, but rather does this particular law work for this particular type of 
anti-abortion crime.  
 The central contribution of this dissertation rests in addressing these limitations.  
Using a series of fixed-effect ZINB regression models, this study tested the key variables 
of the deterrence and backlash theses mentioned above.  This study used a previously 
unavailable event-based dataset on anti-abortion crime incidents across the 50 U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia to create measures for the different types of illegal acts 
committed by pro-life activists from 1975 to 2008.  As such, this dissertation represents 
the first longitudinal test of the rational choice and backlash perspectives.  
 Measures for the presence of state and federal protection laws were derived from 
information provided by NARAL and the legislatures of 16 states, the District of 
Columbia and the U.S. federal government.  Categorizing the state laws according to the 
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type(s) of behavior prohibited enabled me to differentiate between the different typ s of 
protection laws that have been enacted (i.e., anti-violence, anti-property and anti-
harassment/vandalism).  
 This is an important contribution, as this study is also the first to control for 
substantive differences among and between state and federal protection laws.  Overall, 
the findings were partially supportive of the backlash perspective as well as the notion 
that not all types of protection laws produce the same effect on criminal behaviors.  
Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that these laws prevent future crimes against 
reproductive healthcare providers or their patients. 
 The results for Model 1 indicated that the presence of state and federal protection 
laws, broadly defined, is significantly related to an increase in the expected number of 
anti-abortion crimes.  This finding coincides with the broader backlash perspective (see 
Kaplan, 1993; 1995; Garrow, 1999; Johnson, 2007; Kaufman, 2000).  In addition, 
increases in the rape rate were significantly predictive of future attacks.  This falls in line 
with previous studies (Nice, 1988; Freilich and Pridemore, 2007), which suggest that 
cultures which tolerate or promote the violent victimization of women are also conducive 
to the criminal victimization of abortion providers. 
 For Models 2 and 3, the dependent variable was changed to measure the effects of 
protection laws on violent/property crime and less severe incidents of harassment and 
vandalism respectively.  In so doing, these models also tested Pridemore and Filich’s 
(2007) blended model of deterrence and backlash, using longitudinal data and controlling 
for the presence of both state and federal protection laws.   
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 The results of Model 2 indicated that for violent and property crimes, state 
protection laws continue to elicit an increase in the number of attacks.  Thus, in contrast 
to the null findings of Pridemore and Freilich (2007), it appears that broad measures of 
clinic protection laws are significantly predictive of future increases in the number of 
more severe crimes committed against abortion providers.  In addition to this finding, the 
results of Model 2 provides a second notable contrast to the previous study, as increases 
in the state rape rate are also significantly predictive of future violent and property 
crimes. 
 In Model 3, the focus of the analyses shifted from major forms of anti-abortion 
crime to less severe forms of harassment and vandalism.  For the most part, the resul s 
from this model closely mirror those from Model 2.  Again, the presence of a state 
protection law was shown to raise the expected number of attacks.  This finding departs
not only from the null results of the previous study, but also from the blended model of 
deterrence and backlash as outlined by Pridemore and Freilich (2007).  Recall that 
according to this blended model, protection laws are predicted to have a deterrent ffect 
on those activists which only chose to engage in minor offenses (i.e., the direct action 
stream).  Moreover, the presence of the FACE Act was significantly and positively 
related to future crimes of harassment and vandalism.  Thus, the results of Model 3 
suggest that both state and federal protection laws generate a backlash effect among this 
section of the pro-life movement.   
 Together, the early findings from Models 2 and 3 provide partial support for the 
blended model of backlash and deterrence.  As Pridemore and Freilich (2007) predicted, 
state protection laws were found to create a backlash among the extremist stream leading 
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to an increase in the number of violent and property crimes.  However, state and federal 
protection laws did not appear to have a deterrent effect for crimes of harassment and 
vandalism. Rather, they were shown to increase the number of these crimes as well.  
Finally, the models also supported the notion that violent female victimization is 
significantly related to both types of anti-abortion crime.  The next and final step was to 
extend the test of the blended model by introducing measures for the various types of 
state clinic protection laws that have been enacted.   
 The results of this test were presented in Models 4 and 5 and again, the findings 
were more supportive of the backlash hypothesis than they were for the deterrence 
hypothesis.  For crimes of violence and property damage, none of the three types of state
protection laws reached statistical significance.  Conversely, estimates for the presence of 
the FACE Act were positive and significant, implying that for the more severe forms of 
anti-abortion crime, the backlash effect is generated solely from the enactmet of f deral 
protection legislation.  Thus, it appears that although the most serious offenders are 
influenced, indeed provoked by the introduction of federal protection law, they are not 
likely to change their behaviors in response to the enactment of local protection laws.  
 Although the lack of individual-level data only allows us to speculate on the 
causal mechanisms underlying this finding, it could very well be that members of the 
extremist stream are simply more likely to pay attention to far reaching federal laws than 
they are to the comparatively limited reach of their local counterparts.  This is not 
altogether unexpected given that the enactment of the FACE Act received a 
disproportionate amount of coverage from national and local news organizations 
compared to the enactment of the average local protection law.  The increased visibility 
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of federal law may aid in informing the offender of new legislation.  Relatedly, the 
repeated exposure to news coverage may also serve to provoke the offender into action.  
However, the merit of such explanations is for future research to decide.  
 For crimes of harassment and vandalism, we see that both state and federal 
protection laws have a significant effect on future attacks.  As expected, the only type of 
state law to have a significant influence on this brand of anti-abortion crime is anti-
harassment and vandalism law.  Given previous research indicating that direct action 
offenders generally stick to the more minor types of anti-abortion crimes (se  Munson, 
2008), this was expected.  What was not expected, was the positive direction of the 
estimates.  Despite the fact that scholars contend that minor offenders such as these have 
a substantial stake in mainstream society (Cernkovich, Giordano, and Pugh, 1985; 
Cornish and Clarke, 2003; Pridemore and Freilich, 2007), they do not appear to be 
deterred by the prospect of legal sanction.  To the contrary, the threat of punishment by 
the state seems to provoke them into committing additional crimes.   
 The estimates point to two additional findings.  First, the measure for state 
abortion rates did not reach statistical significance in either model.  This suggests that 
that although anti-abortion offenders are paying attention to and consequently provoked 
by the introduction of new protection laws, they are not readily influenced by and/or 
aware of changes in the actual number of abortions being performed.  This is a curious 
finding considering that preventing abortions is the primary goal for all pro-ife ffenders 
(Ginsberg, 1989; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008) and previous research links abortion 
rates to abortion clinic bombings (Nice, 1988, but see also Freilich and Pridemore, 2007 
and Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).  Again, although one can only speculate, it is quite 
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possible that the aspect of visibility plays a role.  As this study attests, public data on state 
abortion rates are readily available to those who are willing to look.  However, gradual 
changes in the number of abortions are not likely perceived by those who are not.  Anti-
abortion offenders may concern themselves with more visible signs of failure and 
progress, such as the enactment of new protection laws. 
 Second, we can see that the measure for violent female victimization remained 
consistently positive and significant throughout all of the models presented in Chapter 6.  
From this, it is clear that broader cultural aspects also contribute to the generation of 
major and minor forms of anti-abortion crime. This finding coincides with previous 
research indicating that societal norms regarding the toleration for violence against 
women may also be used to justify certain related behaviors such as the bombing (Nice, 
1988) or vandalizing (Freilich and Pridemore, 2007) of an abortion clinic (but see 
Pridemore and Freilich, 2007). 
 Overall, the findings provided in this dissertation are more supportive of the 
backlash perspective than the deterrence perspective with respect to the impact of state 
and federal protection laws on future incidents of anti-abortion crime.  In particul, the 
presence of state anti-harassment and vandalism laws, and the FACE Act were found to 
generate increases in the expected number of attacks for any given state.  Thes  findings 
have important implications for theory and policy.  However, before I discuss these, I 
must first elaborate on some of the study’s limitations. 
 
Limitations          
 The first and main limitation of this study centers on the lack of publicly available 
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information on crimes of harassment and vandalism.  Despite the fact that the models
presented in this dissertation benefit from what I believe is the most comprehensiv  
incident-based dataset on anti-abortion crime yet assembled, there is reason to believe 
that these minor forms of anti-abortion crime are substantially undercounted.  Although 
information from academic, government and advocacy groups provided us with 
information on 590 incidents from 1975 through 2008, national statistics provided by 
NAF suggest that this is likely a fraction of the total number of attacks.  It i possible that 
this lack of data could affect the results for models 1, 3, and 5 and as such, they must be 
viewed with a moderate amount of caution.  That said, there is no evidence to suggest 
that these data were undercounted in a systematic fashion, wherein reports of hara sment 
and vandalism from certain states were privileged over others.   
 Unfortunately, much of the incident-level data on crimes of anti-abortion 
harassment and vandalism (NAF data included) are not publicly available.  There are 
likely several reasons for this.  Given the sheer volume of these attacks (4,899 from 1977 
through 2008 according to NAF figures) and the limited resources of advocacy groups, 
there may not be enough man hours available to code each attack to the incident level.  
Furthermore, organizations which rely in part, on the media for information on 
harassment and vandalism crimes, are placed at a disadvantage by the fact that the most 
violent and extreme incidents of anti-abortion crime garner the majority of the media
coverage (Blanchard, 1996; Doan, 2007; Munson, 2008).   
 For these reasons, collecting such data will likely be a difficult task.  Future 
researchers can either wait for these data to be made public, or they can survey individual 
clinics on the number of attacks sustained within a given time period.  The former option 
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is not likely to happen any time soon and the latter is potentially time consuming and 
expensive.  Regardless, such efforts are strongly advised, for these data are not only 
relevant to the examination of the deterrence and backlash hypotheses, but integral to our 
understanding of the various forms of anti-abortion crime. 
 The second potential limitation of this dissertation surrounds the impact of 
religious belief structures on acts of anti-abortion crime.  Previous research indi ates that 
religious views often play a critical role in defining one’s stance on the issue of abortion 
(Legge, 1983; Himmelstein, 1986; Hunter, 1994) as well as the use of contentious protest 
tactics (Raymond and Norrander, 1990).  Indeed, there exists a wide body of literature 
linking protestant fundamentalism to anti-abortion crime (Lo, 1982; Clarke, 1987a; 
Clarke, 1987b; Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Kaplan, 1993; Blanchard, 1994; Risen and 
Thomas, 1998; Juergensmeyer, 1998; Garrow, 1999; Ferrell and Websdale, 1999; 
Kahane, 2000 Reiter, 2000; McVeigh and Sikkink, 2001; Mason, 2002; Maxwell, 2002; 
Kirkwood, 2003; Mason, 2004).   
 Although previous research conducted by Nice (1988), Pridemore and Freilich 
(2007) and Freilich and Pridemore (2007) did not find religion to be predictive of future 
attacks, the cross-sectional design of these studies may prohibit the identification of any 
significant effects which may accrue over time.  Due to the lack of a longitudinal 
approach, the question surrounding the role of religion in anti-abortion crime remains 
open.   
 Third, because of limitations in the data, I was unable to discern between the 
difference in the average punishment or sentence length before and after the enactment of 
a clinic protection law.  Although protection laws are created from the classical notion 
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that increasing the threat of sanction will prevent future crime, it stands to reas n that 
some states are likely to be more aggressive than others in their attempts to deter curr nt 
and prospective offenders.  States in which the pro-choice movement is especially strong 
and active for instance, may have more influence on legislatures with respect to the 
creation of said laws and penalties.  Hence, the average or median penalty for clinic a son 
or simple vandalism may be far greater in California than in states such as Michigan 
where pro-choice interests are perhaps present yet less influential (see NARAL 
Foundation, 2001). 
 By integrating information on sentence length into the study of clinic protecti n 
laws, future researchers would be better equipped to identify not only the types of 
sanction that have the greatest effect on anti-abortion crime, but the levels at which he 
effect becomes significant.  Admittedly, gathering data on individual cases may be even 
more difficult than collecting information on harassment and vandalism crimes.  
Nonetheless, this information is crucial to our efforts to understand the causal 
mechanisms underlying clinic protection laws and criminal behavior.       
 Having outlined the limitations of this dissertation, the discussion now turns to 
what the findings mean for criminological theory and criminal justice policy.    
 
Implications for Criminological Theory 
 
 As noted above, clinic protection laws originated from classical notions of 
deterrence and rational choice wherein offenders make decisions based upon a 
calculation of the prospective costs and benefits of committing a particular crime (see 
Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  By raising the severity of the sanction, protection laws are 
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designed to raise the offender’s perceptions of costs to the point where he/she no longer 
views the benefits of the crime as being worth the risk.  And yet, as mentioned in Chapter 
2, there exists a startling lack of effort on behalf of the research community to test this 
hypothesis and see if these laws actually reduce the number of future attacks.  The central 
contribution of this dissertation rests in testing the relationship between the presence of 
the various types of protection laws and acts of anti-abortion crime.  
 Despite the limitations outlined above, the analyses conducted in this dissertation 
provide strong support for the notion that clinic protection laws do not act as a deterrent 
for any category of anti-abortion crime.  Neither state nor federal laws were shown to 
reduce the expected number of future attacks.  Moreover, state anti-harassment/vandalism 
laws were found to increase the expected number of minor offenses while federal 
protection laws resulted in increases for both major and minor offense types.  
 Ostensibly, these findings seem to raise questions with regard to the ability of 
rational choice theory to explain the behavior of anti-abortion offenders.  It is after all, 
possible that anti-abortion offenders are in certain ways, less rational than other offenders 
(see Kaplan, 1995).  However, given the findings from previous research indicating that 
acts of anti-abortion crime are more rational than psychopathological (Clarke, 1997a; 
Kenny and Reuland, 2002; Kirkwood, 2003), such explanations seem facile.  A closer 
inspection of the backlash results suggests that anti-abortion offenders likely make 
decisions on a cost/benefit analysis, but it also suggests that the various groups that 
comprise the movement may differ in their evaluations of specific costs and benefits.  
 First, the more serious offenses of violence and property damage were found to 
increase after the introduction of the FACE Act.  Recall that previous research suggests 
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that offenders who engage in these more serious types of crime are often characterized by 
social isolation, religious fundamentalism and a dualist approach to the abortion debate
that generates a premium for the use of the most severe and illegal forms of protest (see 
Blanchard and Prewitt, 1993; Blanchard, 1994; Risen and Thomas, 1998; Mason, 2004).  
As such, members of this extremist stream are more likely to view any type of protection 
law as both a cultural threat and as a sign that the pro-life movement is in decline.  The 
effect is to raise both the perceived benefits associated with the crime as well as the cost 
of not offending.  Put simply, the offender may view the risks of action as more 
acceptable than those of inaction.   
 In this sense, rational choice theory remains compatible with serious form of 
anti-abortion crime.  Proving the merits of this assumption however, will require future 
scholars to examine the perceptions of individual offenders with regard to the risks and 
rewards of anti-abortion crime before and after the enactment of a protection law.   
 Second, the results also show that the less serious offenses of harassment and 
vandalism increase in the presence of both state anti-harassment laws and the FACE Act.  
This finding was unexpected given the previous research on members of the direct action 
stream (Ginsberg, 1989; Baird-Windle and Bader, 2001; Maxwell, 2002; Munson, 2008) 
suggesting that the more minor offenses tend to be committed by individuals possessing a 
greater stake in society than those who engage in more severe crimes (see Cernkovich, 
Giordano, and Pugh, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  One possible explanation could 
be that many of the state anti-harassment and vandalism laws offer only toke increases 
in the severity of sanction, thereby failing to convince the offender that the costs 
outweigh the benefits, while simultaneously serving as a call to arms.   
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 To be certain, the FACE Act offers more than token increases in the severity of 
federal sanctions for certain types of anti-abortion harassment and vandalism (see 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 48) and as such, it is unlikely that the reason why federal law promotes futur  
crimes is because the penalty is not strong enough.  Rather, it is more likely that this 
backlash effect is the product of feelings of desperation in combination with a lack of 
certainty of punishment.  As with the extremist stream, it is entirely possible that minor 
offenders will also regard the enactment of protection laws aimed at their prefe red type 
of protest activity as a symbol of the movement’s failure.  However, some argu that 
sanction severity is rendered inconsequential by the fact that protection laws in general 
and the FACE Act in particular, are sporadically enforced (Baird-Windle and Bader, 
2001).  A national survey of police revealed that some police departments are partially or 
wholly unaware of state and legal provisions for abortion-related conflict (Kenney and 
Reuland, 2002).  Furthermore, a sizeable body of research has shown that punishment 
severity is not as important as punishment certainty when it comes to deterring prohibited 
behavior (see LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009 for a review).   
 Clearly, the perceived costs of committing an anti-abortion offense are likely to 
be reduced when the risks of being caught are low.  However, we cannot know for sure 
whether rational choice theory is suited to explain minor forms of anti-abortion crime
until we put such notions to the test.  To this end, future research on the utility of clinic 
protection laws should also include measures controlling for both the severity and 
certainty of sanction.   
 Lastly, studies of clinic protection laws must also seek to include information on 
legal forms of protest.  Although anti-abortion crime continues to be an unwelcome 
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reality, the activists on either side of the abortion debate generally agree that the majority 
of pro-life activism is legal if not peaceful (Kenney et al., 1999).  Because this 
dissertation did not examine the impact of protection laws on such activities, we are
unable to discern whether or not the reach of these laws extend beyond the extremist and 
direct action streams and into the broader pro-life movement.    
 In sum, this dissertation demonstrates that rational choice theory is well suited to 
the explanation of anti-abortion crime events.  The findings in this study reveal that state 
and federal clinic protection laws are significantly related to the number of future attacks.  
That said, a full test of the deterrence hypothesis requires scholars to distinguish between 
the causal mechanisms surrounding changes in criminal behavior as well as increes in 
the number of criminal events.  Thus, future tests of the utility of clinic protecti n laws 
should include measures for sanction severity, sanction certainty as well as individual 
measures of costs and benefits.  Having outlined the implications of the current findi gs 
for rational choice theory, the discussion now turns to a consideration of what the 
findings mean for criminal justice policy. 
 
Implications for Policy 
 
 In 1985, the state of Wisconsin became the first to enact legislation designed to 
protect abortion clinics and staff from criminal acts associated with increasingly violent 
and disruptive forms of protest.  Over the course of the next 23 years, the legislatures of 
15 other states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. federal government followed suit 
by passing their own clinic protection laws with the hope that such laws would deter anti-
abortion offenders.  In all, the results of this dissertation are not supportive of this line of 
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reasoning for either of the two main categories of anti-abortion crime.  Moreove , 
deterrence-based thinking appears to have only made the problem worse, possibly by 
fostering a sense of desperation among pro-life offenders.   
 Given these findings, it is tempting to advocate for the repeal of clinic protection 
laws.  However, previous research shows that fully half of all state and federal police 
agencies that routinely deal with anti-abortion crime either fail to consiste tly avail 
themselves of these laws or are altogether unaware of their existence.  Inded, less than 
28% of police agencies offer any form of basic training on the provisions of state and 
federal protection laws or the ordinances that regulate activities at health care facilities 
(Kenney and Reuland, 2002).  Regardless of how strong the penalty is, research has 
shown that offenders are more readily deterred when they believe that they re l ss likely 
to get away with the crime (see LaFree, Dugan and Korte, 2009 for a review).  Thus, the 
problem with protection laws may have less to do with sanction severity than with 
sanction certainty.  By mandating entry-level training on anti-abortion confli t and state 
and federal protection laws, police can increase the consistency with which these 
countermeasures are applied. 
 Alternatively, the findings in this dissertation offer support for a more proactive 
approach to dealing with anti-abortion crime.  Traditionally, police have responded to 
incidents of anti-abortion conflict and violence by dispatching the beat and superviing 
officers to the scene.  A minority of agencies will also involve the K-9 unit, bomb squad, 
traffic control unit or other specialty units depending on the situation (Kenney and 
Reuland, 2002).  Although traditional methods such as these have their place, their utility 
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is limited by a unidimensional approach that focuses on reaction as opposed to 
prevention.    
 Undoubtedly, certain types of anti-abortion crime such as the murder of Dr. Tille  
can be difficult to predict.  However, previous research suggests that police departments 
which proactively engage the pro-life and pro-choice activist communities are better able 
to gather intelligence concerning the prospect of future attacks.  In particular, such 
agencies are found to be better equipped to identify potentially dangerous individuals 
and/or events (Kenney and Reuland, 2002).   
 Establishing a dialogue between law enforcement and the activist communities 
could also enable police to act as mediators between the pro-life and reproductive 
healthcare communities.  In so doing, police may be able to diffuse or dampen tensions 
between each side before another crime occurs.  By the same token, regular 
communication between police and clinic staff enables police to provide clinic staff with 
important information regarding building and personal security that may help to prevent 
future attacks.   
 Finally, it is worth noting that although these findings offer no support for a 
traditional deterrence-based policy, reducing crime is only one part of the goal for clinic 
protection laws.  As Pridemore and Freilich (2007:623) note, “state laws protecting 
abortion clinics and reproductive rights provide Constitutional support for a woman’s 
right to choose and retributive justice for those that employ violence, intimidation, or 
harassment to discourage the exercise of this right.  Thus while the law may not have 
deterrent utility, the right to an abortion is guaranteed and therefore the presence of these 





 This dissertation contributes to our understanding of anti-abortion crime by 
providing the first longitudinal test of Pridemore and Freilich’s (2007) deterrence and 
backlash hypothesis on the impact of abortion clinic protection laws on anti-abortion 
crime.  Using a unique, event-based dataset, this study examined the impact of the three 
main types of clinic protection laws on incidents of anti-abortion crime from 1975 to 
2008.  Broadly, the findings offer considerable support for the backlash perspective and 
the notion that traditional deterrence-based policy is often demonstrably unsuccessf l in 
the prevention of this particular type of crime.  The results indicate that states enacting 
anti-harassment/vandalism laws can expect to see an increase in the number of ino
crimes against abortion providers.  Furthermore, the presence of federal protection law 
(i.e., the FACE Act) is found to increase the expected number of major and minor anti-
abortion crimes. 
 In all, these findings improve our knowledge of anti-abortion crime in two 
important ways.  First, the results make clear that abortion clinic protection laws do not 
serve as an effective deterrent.  In fact, the traditional deterrence-based criminal justice 
policy of the previous 26 years appears to generate more crime than it prevents.   
 Second, the findings suggest that not all protection laws are created equal with 
respect to their impact on crime.  While state laws prohibiting minor forms of anti-
abortion crime are shown to produce a backlash effect for crimes of harassment and 
vandalism, other types of state protection laws were shown to have no effect on crime 
whatsoever.  Furthermore, the presence of the highly visible FACE Act is shown to 
generate similar increases for both major and minor crime types.   
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 However, while these results challenge conventional notions surrounding the 
utility of protection laws, they cannot refute them entirely for a couple of r asons.  First, 
although this dissertation benefits from what I believe is the most comprehensive vent-
based dataset on anti-abortion crime, there is good reason to believe that the number of 
harassment and vandalism crimes is substantially undercounted.  Therefore, the results of 
the models looking at the impact of protection laws on minor crimes must be viewed with 
caution.   
 Second, this dissertation does not control for actual differences in punishment 
severity before and after a protection law comes into effect.  Hence, we cannot say for 
certain whether the backlash effect witnessed here is primarily the result of an increase in 
sanctions or merely the perception of an increase. 
 Thus, while this dissertation makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of anti-abortion crime and the utility of deterrence-based clinic protection 
law, it also raises the following questions for future research: 
1.  What is the extent of anti-abortion crime with respect to acts of harassment and 
vandalism? 
 
2.  Over time, what impact does religion and religious belief have on the relationship 
between protection laws and anti-abortion crime? 
 
3.  What is the actual change in sentence severity following the enactment of a protection 
law and what role does this change play in the production or prevention of anti-abortion 
crime? 
 
4.  Do offenders accurately perceive the severity of punishment for crimes again t 
abortion providers? 
 
 Answering questions one and three will require an extensive data collection 
process at the incident level.  Although question two does not necessarily require 
individual-level data, it does necessitate longitudinal information on the membership 
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rates of those religious denominations which are most adamantly opposed to the practic
of abortion.  In order to answer questions four and five, researchers must collect 
perceptual and objective measures of punishment severity at the individual level.  
Although the collection of these data will undoubtedly require a substantial amount of 
resources, such costs pale in comparison to those sustained by the victims of anti-abortion 
crime.  Moreover, collecting this information is imperative for our efforts to better 















APPENDIX A-1: INCIDENT DATA SUPPLEMENTATION STATISTICS  
 







Crime Type Number of U.S. 
Incidents 
% of Incident 
Total 
Number and % of 
Incidents Verified 
Armed Assault 10 0.76% 7(70%) 
Assassination 11 0.83% 11(100%) 
Blockade 111 8.38% 5(4.5%) 
Bomb Threat 120 9.06% 3(2.5%) 
Bombing/Explosion 81 6.12% 57(70.37%) 
Burglary 15 1.13% 0(0%) 
Death Threat 131 9.89% 9(6.87%) 
Facility/Infrastructure 
Attack 
582 44% 301(51.72%) 
Hostage Taking 
(Kidnapping) 
2 0.15% 1(50%) 
Invasion 66 4.98% 5(7.58%) 
Stalking 18 1.36% 0(0%) 
Unarmed Assault 33 2.49% 6(18.18%) 
Vandalism 144 10.88% 4(2.78%) 
Total 1,324 100% 409(30.89%) 
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Table A.2: Original Legal Texts by State and Statute  
California  
• Penal Code  § 423 This title shall be known and may be cited as the California Freedom 
of Access to Clinic and Church Entrances Act, or the California FACE Act. 
 
• Penal Code  § 423.1. Definitions. The following definitions apply for the purposes of this 
title: 
 
(a) “Crime of violence” means an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. 
 
(b) “Interfere with” means to restrict a person's freedom of movement. 
 
(c) “Intimidate” means to place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to 
herself or himself or to another. 
 
(d) “Nonviolent” means conduct that would not constitute a crime of violence. 
 
(e) “Physical obstruction” means rendering ingress to or egress from a reproductive 
health services facility or to or from a place of religious worship impassable to another 
person, or rendering passage to or from a reproductive health services facility or a place 
of religious worship unreasonably difficult or hazardous to another person. 
 
(f) “Reproductive health services” means reproductive health services provided in a 
hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other facility and includes medical, surgical, 
counseling, or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including 
services relating to pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy. 
 
(g) “Reproductive health services client, provider, or assistant” means a person or entity 
that is or was involved in obtaining, seeking to obtain, providing, seeking to provide, or 
assisting or seeking to assist another person, at that other person's request, to obtain or 
provide any services in a reproductive health services facility, or a person or entity that is 
or was involved in owning or operating or seeking to own or operate, a reproductive 
health services facility. 
 
(h) “Reproductive health services facility” includes a hospital, clinic, physician's office, or 
other facility that provides or seeks to provide reproductive health services and includes 
the building or structure in which the facility is located. 
 
• Penal Code  § 423.2. Elements of offense. Every person who, except a parent or 
guardian acting towards his or her minor child or ward, commits any of the following acts 
shall be subject to the punishment specified in Section 423.3. 
 
(a) By force, threat of force, or physical obstruction that is a crime of violence, 
intentionally injures, intimidates, interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate, or 
interfere with, any person or entity because that person or entity is a reproductive health 
services client, provider, or assistant, or in order to intimidate any person or entity, or any 
class of persons or entities, from becoming or remaining a reproductive health services 
client, provider, or assistant. 
 
(b) By force, threat of force, or physical obstruction that is a crime of violence, 
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intentionally injures, intimidates, interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate, or 
interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment 
right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship. 
 
(c) By nonviolent physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates, or interferes with, 
or attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with, any person or entity because that 
person or entity is a reproductive health services client, provider, or assistant, or in order 
to intimidate any person or entity, or any class of persons or entities, from becoming or 
remaining a reproductive health services client, provider, or assistant. 
 
(d) By nonviolent physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates, or interferes with, 
or attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with, any person lawfully exercising or 
seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious 
worship. 
 
(e) Intentionally damages or destroys the property of a person, entity, or facility, or 
attempts to do so, because the person, entity, or facility is a reproductive health services 
client, provider, assistant, or facility. 
 
(f) Intentionally damages or destroys the property of a place of religious worship. 
 
• Penal Code § 423.3. Punishment.  
(a) A first violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 423.2 is a misdemeanor, punishable 
by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than six months and a fine not to 
exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000). 
 
(b) A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 423.2 is a 
misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than 
six months and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). 
 
(c) A first violation of subdivision (a), (b), (e), or (f) of Section 423.2 is a misdemeanor, 
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than one year and a 
fine not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). 
 
(d) A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (a), (b), (e), or (f) of Section 423.2 is 
a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than 
one year and a fine not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). 
 
(e) In imposing fines pursuant to this section, the court shall consider applicable factors in 
aggravation and mitigation set out in Rules 4.421 and 4.423 of the California Rules of 
Court, and shall consider a prior violation of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 248), or a prior violation of a statute of another 
jurisdiction that would constitute a violation of Section 423.2 or of the federal Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, to be a prior violation of Section 423.2. 
 
(f) This title establishes concurrent state jurisdiction over conduct that is also prohibited 
by the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 248), 
which provides for more severe misdemeanor penalties for first violations and felony-
misdemeanor penalties for second and subsequent violations. State law enforcement 
agencies and prosecutors shall cooperate with federal authorities in the prevention, 
apprehension, and prosecution of these crimes, and shall seek federal prosecutions 
when appropriate. 
 
(g) No person shall be convicted under this article for conduct in violation of Section 
423.2 that was done on a particular occasion where the identical conduct on that 
occasion was the basis for a conviction of that person under the federal Freedom of 
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Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 248). 
 
• Penal Code § 423.4. Civil actions. (a) A person aggrieved by a violation of Section 
423.2 may bring a civil action to enjoin the violation, for compensatory and punitive 
damages, and for the costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert 
witnesses, except that only a reproductive health services client, provider, or assistant 
may bring an action under subdivision (a), (c), or (e) of Section 423.2, and only a person 
lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom 
in a place of religious worship, or the entity that owns or operates a place of religious 
worship, may bring an action under subdivision (b), (d), or (f) of Section 423.2. With 
respect to compensatory damages, the plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the 
rendering of a final judgment, to recover, in lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory 
damages in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per exclusively nonviolent 
violation, and five thousand dollars ($5,000) per any other violation, for each violation 
committed. 
 
(b) The Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney may bring a civil action to 
enjoin a violation of Section 423.2, for compensatory damages to persons aggrieved as 
described in subdivision (a) and for the assessment of a civil penalty against each 
respondent. The civil penalty shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) for an 
exclusively nonviolent first violation, and fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for any other 
first violation, and shall not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for an exclusively 
nonviolent subsequent violation, and twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for any other 
subsequent violation. In imposing civil penalties pursuant to this subdivision, the court 
shall consider a prior violation of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 248), or a prior violation of a statute of another jurisdiction that 
would constitute a violation of Section 423.2 or the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act of 1994, to be a prior violation of Section 423.2. 
 
(c) No person shall be found liable under this section for conduct in violation of Section 
423.2 done on a particular occasion where the identical conduct on that occasion was the 
basis for a finding of liability by that person under the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 248). 
 
• Penal Code § 423.5. Safeguarding of health, safety,  or privacy by court  
(a)(1) The court in which a criminal or civil proceeding is filed for a violation of subdivision 
(a), (c), or (e) of Section 423.2 shall take all action reasonably required, including 
granting restraining orders, to safeguard the health, safety, or privacy of either of the 
following: 
 
(A) A reproductive health services client, provider, or assistant who is a party or 
witness in the proceeding. 
 
(B) A person who is a victim of, or at risk of becoming a victim of, conduct prohibited 
by subdivision (a), (c), or (e) of Section 423.2. 
 
(2) The court in which a criminal or civil proceeding is filed for a violation of subdivision 
(b), (d), or (f) of Section 423.2 shall take all action reasonably required, including granting 
restraining orders, to safeguard the health, safety, or privacy of either of the following: 
 
(A) A person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of 
religious freedom at a place of religious worship. 
 
(B) An entity that owns or operates a place of religious worship. 
 
(b) Restraining orders issued pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may include 
125 
 
provisions prohibiting or restricting the photographing of persons described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) when reasonably required 
to safeguard the health, safety, or privacy of those persons. Restraining orders issued 
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) may include provisions prohibiting or 
restricting the photographing of persons described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) when reasonably required to safeguard the health, 
safety, or privacy of those persons. 
 
(c) A court may, in its discretion, permit an individual described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) to use a pseudonym in a civil proceeding described 
in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) when reasonably required to safeguard the health, 
safety, or privacy of those persons. A court may, in its discretion, permit an individual 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) to use a 
pseudonym in a civil proceeding described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) when 
reasonably required to safeguard the health, safety, or privacy of those persons. 
 
• Penal Code § 423.6. Construction of title. This title shall not be construed for any of the 
following purposes: 
 
(a) To impair any constitutionally protected activity, or any activity protected by the laws 
of California or of the United States of America. 
 
(b) To provide exclusive civil or criminal remedies or to preempt or to preclude any 
county, city, or city and county from passing any law to provide a remedy for the 
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this title or to make any of those acts a crime. 
 
(c) To interfere with the enforcement of any federal, state, or local laws regulating the 
performance of abortions or the provision of other reproductive health services. 
 
(d) To negate, supercede, or otherwise interfere with the operation of any provision of 
Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 1138) of Part 3 of Division 2 of the Labor Code. 
 
(e) To create additional civil or criminal remedies or to limit any existing civil or criminal 
remedies to redress an activity that interferes with the exercise of any other rights 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or of Article I of the 
California Constitution. 
 
(f) To preclude prosecution under both this title and any other provision of law, except as 
provided in subdivision (g) of Section 423.3. 
 
• Penal Code § 602.11. Obstructing passage to or from  health care facilities, places 
of worship or schools; punishment; definitions. (a) Any person, alone or in concert 
with others, who intentionally prevents an individual from entering or exiting a health care 
facility, place of worship, or school by physically detaining the individual or physically 
obstructing the individual's passage shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250), 
or both, for the first offense; imprisonment in the county jail for not less than five days and 
a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the second offense; and 
imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 30 days and a fine of not more than two 
thousand dollars ($2,000) for a third or subsequent offense. However, the court may 
order the defendant to perform community service, in lieu of any fine or any imprisonment 
imposed under this section, if it determines that paying the fine would result in undue 
hardship to the defendant or his or her dependents. 
 




(1) “Physically” does not include speech. 
 
(2) “Health care facility” means a facility licensed pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing 
with Section 1200) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code, a health facility 
licensed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1250) of Division 2 of the 
Health and Safety Code, or any facility where medical care is regularly provided to 
individuals by persons licensed under Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of 
the Business and Professions Code, the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic 
Initiative Act. 
 
(3) “Person” does not include an officer, employee, or agent of the health care facility, 
or a law enforcement officer, acting in the course of his or her employment. 
 
(c) This section shall not be interpreted to prohibit any lawful activities permitted under 
the laws of the State of California or by the National Labor Relations Act in connection 
with a labor dispute. 
 
• Penal Code § 11413. Terrorism; use of destructive d evice or explosive or 
commission of arson in certain places; punishment  
 
(a) Any person who explodes, ignites, or attempts to explode or ignite any destructive 
device or any explosive, or who commits arson, in or about any of the places listed in 
subdivision (b), for the purpose of terrorizing another or in reckless disregard of 
terrorizing another is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for three, five, or seven years, and a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars 
($10,000). 
 
(b) Subdivision (a) applies to the following places: 
 
(1) Any health facility licensed under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1250) of 
Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code, or any place where medical care is 
provided by a licensed health care professional. 
 
(2) Any church, temple, synagogue, mosque, or other place of worship. 
 
(3) The buildings, offices, and meeting sites of organizations that counsel for or 
against abortion or among whose major activities are lobbying, publicizing, or 
organizing with respect to public or private issues relating to abortion. 
 
(4) Any place at which a lecture, film-showing, or other private meeting or 
presentation that educates or propagates with respect to abortion practices or 
policies, whether on private property or at a meeting site authorized for specific use 
by a private group on public property, is taking place. 
 
(5) Any bookstore or public or private library. 
 
(6) Any building or facility designated as a courthouse. 
 
(7) The home or office of a judicial officer. 
 
(8) Any building or facility regularly occupied by county probation department 
personnel in which the employees perform official duties of the probation department. 
 
(9) Any private property, if the property was targeted in whole or in part because of 
any of the actual or perceived characteristics of the owner or occupant of the property 




(10) Any public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten or grades 1 to 
12, inclusive. 
 
(c) As used in this section, “judicial officer” means a magistrate, judge, justice, 
commissioner, referee, or any person appointed by a court to serve in one of these 
capacities, of any state or federal court located in this state. 
 
(d) As used in this section, “terrorizing” means to cause a person of ordinary emotions 
and sensibilities to fear for personal safety. 
 
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person 
pursuant to Section 12303.3 or any other provision of law in lieu of prosecution pursuant 
to this section. 
 
• Civil Code § 3427. Definitions. As used in this title: 
(a) "Aggrieved" means and refers to any of the following persons or entities: 
 
(1) A person physically present at a health care facility when a commercial blockade 
occurs whose access is obstructed or impeded. 
 
(2) A person physically present at a health care facility when a commercial blockade 
occurs whose health care is disrupted. 
 
(3) A health care facility where a commercial blockade occurs, its employees, 
contractors, or volunteers. 
 
(4) The owner of a health care facility where a commercial blockade occurs or of the 
building or property upon which the health care facility is located. 
 
(b) "Commercial blockade" means acts constituting the tort of commercial blockade, as 
defined in Section 3427.1. 
 
(c) "Disrupting the normal functioning of a health care facility" means intentionally 
rendering or attempting to render a health care facility temporarily or permanently 
unavailable or unusable by a licensed health practitioner, the facility's staff, or patients. 
"Disrupting the normal functioning of a health care facility" does not include acts of the 
owner of the facility, an agent acting on be-half of the owner, or officers or employees of 
a governmental entity acting to protect the public health or safety. 
 
(d) "Health care facility" means a facility that provides health care services directly to 
patients, including, but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, licensed health practitioner's 
office, health main-tenance organization, diagnostic or treatment center, neuropsychiatric 
or mental health facility, hospice, or nursing home. 
 
• Civil Code § 3427.1.  Tort of commercial blockade 
It is unlawful, and constitutes the tort of commercial blockade for a person, alone or in 
concert with others, to intentionally prevent an individual from entering or exiting a health 
care facility by physically obstructing the individual's passage or by disrupting the normal 
functioning of a health care facility. 
 
• Civil Code § 3427.2.  Action for civil damages 
A person or health care facility aggrieved by the actions prohibited by this title may seek 





• Penal Code § 594.4. Vandalism; structure; noxious o r caustic chemicals or 
substances  
 
(a) Any person who willfully and maliciously injects into or throws upon, or otherwise 
defaces, damages, destroys, or contaminates, any structure with butyric acid, or any 
other similar noxious or caustic chemical or substance, is guilty of a public offense, 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail, by a fine as specified in 
subdivision (b), or by both that imprisonment and fine. 
 
(b)(1) If the amount of the defacement, damage, destruction, or contamination is fifty 
thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000). 
 
(2) If the amount of the defacement, damage, destruction, or contamination is five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or more, but less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), by a 
fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000). 
 
(3) If the amount of defacement, damage, destruction, or contamination is nine 
hundred fifty dollars ($950) or more, but less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), by a 
fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000). 
 
(4) If the amount of the defacement, damage, destruction, or contamination is less 
than nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000). 
 
(c) For purposes of this section, “structure” includes any house or other building being 
used at the time of the offense for a dwelling or for commercial purposes. 
 
Colorado 
• Criminal Code § 18-9-122. Preventing passage to and  from a health care facility--
engaging in prohibited activities near facility  
 
(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care facilities for the purpose 
of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the citizens of this state; 
that the exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel against certain medical 
procedures must be balanced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling 
and treatment in an unobstructed manner; and that preventing the willful obstruction of a 
person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a health care facility is a matter 
of statewide concern. The general assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to 
enact legislation that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another person's 
entry to or exit from a health care facility. 
 
(2) A person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person knowingly obstructs, 
detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person's entry to or exit from a health care 
facility. 
 
(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, 
unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, 
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other 
person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any 
entrance door to a health care facility. Any person who violates this subsection (3) 
commits a class 3 misdemeanor. 
 
(4) For the purposes of this section, “health care facility” means any entity that is 
licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to administer medical 




(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a statutory or home rule city or 
county or city and county from adopting a law for the control of access to health care 
facilities that is no less restrictive than the provisions of this section. 
 
(6) In addition to, and not in lieu of, the penalties set forth in this section, a person who 
violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to civil liability, as provided in 
section 13-21-106.7, C.R.S 
 
• Courts and Court Procedure § 13-21-106.7. Civil dam ages for preventing passage 
to and from a health care facility and engaging in prohibited activity near facility  
 
(1) A person is entitled to recover damages and to obtain injunctive relief from any person 
who commits or incites others to commit the offense of preventing passage to or from a 
health care facility or engaging in prohibited activity near a health care facility, as defined 
in section 18-9-122(2), C.R.S. 
 
(2) A conviction for criminal obstruction of passage to or from a health care facility 
pursuant to section 18-9-122, C.R.S., shall not be a condition precedent to maintaining a 
civil action pursuant to the provisions of this section. 
 
Connecticut 
• Civil Actions § 52-571a. Action for deprivation of equal rights and privileges  
Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the superior court for 
injunctive relief, recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and 
equitable. 
 
• Crimes  § 53-37b. Deprivation of a person's equal rights an d privileges by force or 
threat  
Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving 
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state or the 
United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the 
United States, engages in the use of force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall 
be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall 
be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B 
felony. 
 
District of Columbia 
• Criminal Offenses and Penalties  § 22-1314.01. Definitions. 
For the purpose of § 22-1314.02, the term: 
 
(1) “Health professional” means a person licensed to practice a health occupation in the 
District pursuant to § 3-1201.01. 
 
(2) “Medical facility” includes a hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other facility that 
provides health or  surgical services. 
 
(3) “Person” shall not include: 
 
(A) The chief medical officer of the medical facility or his or her designee; 
 
(B) The chief executive officer of the medical facility or his or her designee; 
 
(C) An agent of the medical facility; or 
 




• Criminal Offenses and Penalties  § 22-1314.02. Prohibited acts.  
(a) It shall be unlawful for a person, except as otherwise authorized by District or federal 
law, alone or in concert with others, to willfully or recklessly interfere with access to or 
from a medical facility or to willfully or recklessly disrupt the normal functioning of such 
facility by: 
 
(1) Physically obstructing, impeding, or hindering the free passage of an individual 
seeking to enter or depart the facility or from the common areas of the real property upon 
which the facility is located; 
 
(2) Making noise that unreasonably disturbs the peace within the facility; 
 
(3) Trespassing on the facility or the common areas of the real property upon which the 
facility is located; 
 
(4) Telephoning the facility repeatedly to harass or threaten owners, agents, patients, and 
employees, or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be so used 
for the purpose of threatening owners, agents, patients, and employees; or 
 
(5) Threatening to inflict injury on the owners, agents, patients, employees, or property of 
the medical facility or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be 
used for such purpose. 
 
(b) A person shall not act alone or in concert with others with the intent to prevent a 
health professional or his or her family from entering or leaving the health 
professional's home. 
 
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall not be construed to prohibit any 
otherwise lawful picketing or assembly. 
 
(d) Any person who violates subsections (a) or (b) of this section, upon conviction, 
shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more than 180 days, or both. 
 
Kansas 
• Crimes and Punishments  21-3721. Criminal trespass  
 
(a) Criminal trespass is: 
 
(1) Entering or remaining upon or in any land, nonnavigable body of water, structure, 
vehicle, aircraft or watercraft, other than railroad property as defined in K.S.A. 21-
3761, and amendments thereto, or nuclear generating facility as defined in K.S.A. 66-
2302, and amendments thereto, by a person who knows such person is not 
authorized or privileged to do so, and: 
 
(A) Such person enters or remains therein in defiance of an order not to enter or 
to leave such premises or property personally communicated to such person by 
the owner thereof or other authorized person; or 
 
(B) such premises or property are posted in a manner reasonably likely to come 
to the attention of intruders, or are locked or fenced or otherwise enclosed, or 
shut or secured against passage or entry; or 
 
(C) such person enters or remains therein in defiance of a restraining order 
issued pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1607, 60-3105, 60-3106, 60-3107, 60-31a05 or 60-
31a06 or K.S.A. 38-2243, 38-2244 or 38-2255, and amendments thereto, and the 
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restraining order has been personally served upon the person so restrained; or 
 
(2) entering or remaining upon or in any public or private land or structure in a 
manner that interferes with access to or from any health care facility by a person who 
knows such person is not authorized or privileged to do so and such person enters or 
remains thereon or therein in defiance of an order not to enter or to leave such land 
or structure personally communicated to such person by the owner of the health care 
facility or other authorized person. 
 
(b) As used in this section: 
 
(1) “Health care facility” means any licensed medical care facility, certificated health 
maintenance organization, licensed mental health center, or mental health clinic, 
licensed psychiatric hospital or other facility or office where services of a health care 
provider are provided directly to patients. 
 
(2) “Health care provider” means any person: (A) Licensed to practice a branch of the 
healing arts; (B) licensed to practice psychology; (C) licensed to practice professional 
or practical nursing; (D) licensed to practice dentistry; (E) licensed to practice 
optometry; (F) licensed to practice pharmacy; (G) registered to practice podiatry; (H) 
licensed as a social worker; or (I) registered to practice physical therapy. 
 
(c)(1) Criminal trespass is a class B nonperson misdemeanor. 
 
(2) Upon a conviction of a violation of subsection (a)(1)(C), a person shall be 
sentenced to not less than 48 consecutive hours of imprisonment which must be 
served either before or as a condition of any grant of probation or suspension, 
reduction of sentence or parole. 
 
(d) This section shall not apply to a land surveyor, licensed pursuant to article 70 of 
chapter 74 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, and such 
surveyor's authorized agents and employees who enter upon lands, waters and other 
premises in the making of a survey. 
 
Massachusetts 
• Crimes and Punishments  § 120E. Obstructing entry to or departure from medi cal 
facilities; penalties; injunctive relief  
 
As used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:-- 
 
“Medical facility”, any medical office, medical clinic, medical laboratory, or hospital. 
 
“Notice”, (i) receipt of or awareness of the contents of a court order prohibiting blocking of 
a medical facility; (ii) oral request by an authorized representative of a medical facility, or 
law enforcement official to refrain from obstructing access to a medical facility; or (iii) 
written posted notice outside the entrance to a medical facility to refrain from obstructing 
access to a medical facility. 
 
Whoever knowingly obstructs entry to or departure from any medical facility or who 
enters or remains in any medical facility so as to impede the provision of medical 
services, after notice to refrain from such obstruction or interference, shall be punished 
for the first offense by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or not more than six 
months in jail or a house of correction or both, and for each subsequent violation of this 
section by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand 
dollars or not more than two and one-half years in jail or a house of correction or both. 





A person who knowingly obstructs entry to or departure from such medical facility or who 
enters or remains in such facility so as to impede the provision of medical services after 
notice to refrain from such obstruction or interference, may be arrested by a sheriff, 
deputy sheriff, constable, or police officer. 
 
Any medical facility whose rights to provide services under the provisions of this section 
have been violated or which has reason to believe that any person or entity is about to 
engage in conduct proscribed herein may commence a civil action for injunctive and 
other equitable relief, including the award of compensatory and exemplary damages. 
Said civil action shall be instituted either in superior court for the county in which the 
conduct complained of occurred, or in the superior court for the county in which any 
person or entity complained of resides or has a principal place of business. An aggrieved 
facility which prevails in an action authorized by this paragraph, in addition to other 
damages, shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable 
attorney's fees in an amount to be fixed by the court. 
 
Nothing herein shall be construed to interfere with any rights provided by chapter one 
hundred and fifty A or by the federal Labor-Management Act of 1947 or other rights to 
engage in peaceful picketing which does not obstruct entry or departure. 
 
• Crimes and Punishments  § 120E   1/2 . Reproductive health care facilities  
 
(a) For the purposes of this section, “reproductive health care facility” means a place, 
other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or 
performed. 
 
(b) No person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a 
reproductive health care facility within a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, 
exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility or within the area within a rectangle 
created by extending the outside boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of a 
reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point where such lines intersect the 
sideline of the street in front of such entrance, exit or driveway. This subsection shall not 
apply to the following:-- 
 
(1) persons entering or leaving such facility; 
 
(2) employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment; 
 
(3) law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public works and 
other municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment; and 
 
(4) persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to such facility 
solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than such facility. 
 
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) shall only take effect during a facility's business hours 
and if the area contained within the radius and rectangle described in said subsection (b) 
is clearly marked and posted. 
 
(d) Whoever knowingly violates this section shall be punished, for the first offense, by a 
fine of not more than $500 or not more than three months in a jail or house of correction, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment, and for each subsequent offense, by a fine of not 
less than $500 and not more than $5,000 or not more than two and one-half years in a 
jail or house of correction, or both such fine and imprisonment. A person who knowingly 
violates this section may be arrested without a warrant by a sheriff, deputy sheriff or 
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police officer if that sheriff, deputy sheriff, or police officer observes that person violating 
this section. 
 
(e) Any person who knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes or blocks another 
person's entry to or exit from a reproductive health care facility shall be punished, for the 
first offense, by a fine of not more than $500 or not more than three months in a jail or 
house of correction, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and for each subsequent 
offense, by a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $5,000 or not more than two and 
one-half years in a jail or house of correction, or by both such fine and imprisonment. A 
person who knowingly violates this provision may be arrested without a warrant by a 
sheriff, deputy sheriff or police officer. 
 
(f) A reproductive health care facility or a person whose rights to provide or obtain 
reproductive health care services have been violated or interfered with by a violation of 
this section or any person whose rights to express their views, assemble or pray near a 
reproductive health care facility have been violated or interfered with may commence a 
civil action for equitable relief. The civil action shall be commenced either in the superior 
court for the county in which the conduct complained of occurred, or in the superior court 








(a)  (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. 
 
(2)(i) “Medical facility” means: 
 
1. a facility as defined in § 10-101 of the Health--General Article; or 
 
2. a health care facility as defined in § 19-114 of the Health--General Article. 
 
(ii) “Medical facility” includes an agency, clinic, or office operated under the 
direction of the local health officer or under the regulatory authority of the 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
 
Scope of section 
 
(b)  (1) This section does not apply to: 
 
(i) the chief executive officer of the medical facility; 
 
(ii) a designee of the chief executive officer of the medical facility; 
 
(iii) an agent of the medical facility; or 
 
(iv) a law enforcement officer. 
 
(2) This section does not prohibit: 
 
(i) speech; or 
 







(c) A person may not intentionally act, alone or with others, to prevent another from 
entering or   exiting a medical facility by physically: 
 
(1) detaining the other; or 
 




(d) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is 




• Administrative Procedures and Services § 4684-B. Ad ditional protections  
 
1. Definitions.  As used in this section, unless the context otherwise indicates, the 
following terms have the following meanings. 
 
A. “Building” means any structure having a roof or a partial roof supported by 
columns or walls that is used or intended to be used for shelter or enclosure of 
persons or objects regardless of the materials of which it is constructed. 
 
B. “Health service” means any medical, surgical, laboratory, testing or counseling 
service relating to the human body. 
 
C. “Physical obstruction” means rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a 
building or rendering passage to or from a building unreasonably difficult or 
hazardous. 
 
2. Violation.  It is a violation of this section for any person, whether or not acting 
under color of law, to intentionally interfere or attempt to intentionally interfere with 
the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights secured by the United States 
Constitution or the laws of the United States or of rights secured by the Constitution 
of Maine or laws of the State by any of the following conduct: 
 
A. Engaging in the physical obstruction of a building; 
 
B. Making or causing repeated telephone calls to a person or a building, whether or 
not conversation ensues, with the intent to impede access to a person's or building's 
telephone lines or otherwise disrupt a person's or building's activities; 
 
C. Activating a device or exposing a substance that releases noxious and offensive 
odors within a building; or 
 
D. After having been ordered by a law enforcement officer to cease such noise, 
intentionally making noise that can be heard within a building and with the further 
intent either: 
 
(1) To jeopardize the health of persons receiving health services within the 
building; or 
 






• Public Health Code  333.20198. Entering upon health facility or agency premise for 
purpose of engaging in prohibited activity or condu ct relating to intimidation, 
harassment, molestation, etc.; misdemeanor  
 
Sec. 20198. (1) Subject to subsection (3), an individual shall not enter upon the premises 
of a health facility or agency that is an inpatient facility, an outpatient facility, or a 
residential facility for the purpose of engaging in an activity that would cause a 
reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or 
molested and that actually causes a health facility or agency employee, patient, resident, 
or visitor to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 
This subsection does not prohibit constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves 
a legitimate purpose. 
 
(2) An individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than 
$10,000.00, or both. 
 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a nursing home covered under sections 
21763(5) and 21799c(1)(c).[FN1] 
 
Minnesota 
• Criminal Code 609.7495. Physical interference with safe access to health care  
 
Subdivision 1. Definitions.  For the purposes of this section, the following terms have 
the meanings given them. 
 
(a) “Facility” means any of the following: 
 
(1) a hospital or other health institution licensed under sections 144.50 to 144.56; 
 
(2) a medical facility as defined in section 144.561; 
 
(3) an agency, clinic, or office operated under the direction of or under contract with 
the commissioner of health or a community health board, as defined in section 
145A.02; 
 
(4) a facility providing counseling regarding options for medical services or recovery 
from an addiction; 
 
(5) a facility providing emergency shelter services for battered women, as defined in 
section 611A.31, subdivision 3, or a facility providing transitional housing for battered 
women and their children; 
 
(6) a facility as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2, paragraph (f); 
 
(7) a facility as defined in section 626.5572, subdivision 6, where the services 
described in that paragraph are provided; 
 
(8) a place to or from which ambulance service, as defined in section 144E.001, is 
provided or sought to be provided; and 
 




(b) “Aggrieved party” means a person whose access to or egress from a facility is 
obstructed in violation of subdivision 2, or the facility. 
 
Subd. 2. Obstructing access prohibited.  A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor 
who intentionally and physically obstructs any individual's access to or egress from a 
facility. 
 
Subd. 3. Not applicable.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the right of 
any individual or group to engage in speech protected by the United States Constitution, 
the Minnesota Constitution, or federal or state law, including but not limited to peaceful 
and lawful handbilling and picketing. 
 
Subd. 4. Civil remedies.  (a) A party who is aggrieved by an act prohibited by this 
section, or by an attempt or conspiracy to commit an act prohibited by this section, may 
bring an action for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, as appropriate, in district 
court against any person or entity who has violated or has conspired to violate this 
section. 
 
(b) A party who prevails in a civil action under this subdivision is entitled to recover from 
the violator damages, costs, attorney fees, and other relief as determined by the court. In 
addition to all other damages, the court may award to the aggrieved party a civil penalty 
of up to $1,000 for each violation. If the aggrieved party is a facility and the political 
subdivision where the violation occurred incurred law enforcement or prosecution 
expenses in connection with the same violation, the court shall award any civil penalty it 
imposes to the political subdivision instead of to the facility. 
 
(c) The remedies provided by this subdivision are in addition to any other legal or 
equitable remedies the aggrieved party may have and are not intended to diminish or 
substitute for those remedies or to be exclusive. 
 
Montana 
• Crimes §  45-8-110. Obstructing health care facility access  
 
 (1) A person commits the offense of obstructing health care facility access if the person 
knowingly obstructs, hinders, or blocks another person's entry into or exit from a health 
care facility. Commission of the offense includes but is not limited to knowingly 
approaching within 8 feet of a person who is entering or leaving a health care facility to 
give the person written or oral information, to display a sign, or to protest, counsel, or 
educate about a health issue, when the person does not consent to that activity and is 
within 36 feet of an entrance to or exit from the health care facility. 
 
(2) A person convicted under this section shall be fined an amount not to exceed $100. 
 
(3) For purposes of this section, "health care facility" means an office of a medical 
practitioner, as defined in 37-2-101, or any other facility or entity that is licensed, certified, 




• Criminal Law § 14-277.2. Weapons at parades, etc., prohibited  
 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person participating in, affiliated with, or present as a 
spectator at any parade, funeral procession, picket line, or demonstration upon any 
private health care facility or upon any public place owned or under the control of the 
State or any of its political subdivisions to willfully or intentionally possess or have 
immediate access to any dangerous weapon. Violation of this subsection shall be a Class 
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1 misdemeanor. It shall be presumed that any rifle or gun carried on a rack in a pickup 
truck at a holiday parade or in a funeral procession does not violate the terms of this act. 
 
(b) For the purposes of this section the term “dangerous weapon” shall include those 
weapons specified in G.S. 14-269, 14-269.2, 14-284.1, or 14-288.8 or any other object 
capable of inflicting serious bodily injury or death when used as a weapon. 
 
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a person exempted by the provisions 
of G.S. 14-269(b) or to persons authorized by State or federal law to carry dangerous 
weapons in the performance of their duties or to any person who obtains a permit to carry 
a dangerous weapon at a parade, funeral procession, picket line, or demonstration from 
the sheriff or police chief, whichever is appropriate, of the locality where such parade, 
funeral procession, picket line, or demonstration is to take place. 
 
• Criminal Law  § 14-277.4. Obstruction of health care facilities  
 
(a) No person shall obstruct or block another person's access to or egress from a health 
care facility or from the common areas of the real property upon which the facility is 
located in a manner that deprives or delays the person from obtaining or providing health 
care services in the facility. 
 
(b) No person shall injure or threaten to injure a person who is or has been: 
 
(1) Obtaining health care services; 
 
(2) Lawfully aiding another to obtain health care services; or 
 
(3) Providing health care services. 
 
(c) A violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor. A second 
conviction for a violation of either subsection (a) or (b) of this section within three years of 
the first shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor. A third or subsequent conviction 
for a violation of either subsection (a) or (b) of this section within three years of the 
second or most recent conviction shall be punishable as a Class I felony. 
 
(d) Any person aggrieved under this section may seek injunctive relief in a court of 
competent jurisdiction to prevent threatened or further violations of this section. Any 
violation of an injunction obtained pursuant to this section constitutes criminal contempt 
and shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 days and no more 
than 12 months. 
 
(e) This section shall not prohibit any person from engaging in lawful speech or picketing 
which does not impede or deny another person's access to health care services or to a 
health care facility or interfere with the delivery of health care services within a health 
care facility. 
 
(f) “Health care facility” as used in this section means any hospital, clinic, or other facility 
that is licensed to administer medical treatment or the primary function of which is to 
provide medical treatment in this State. 
 
(g) “Health care services” as used in this section means services provided in a health 
care facility. 
 
(h) Persons subject to the prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section do not include 
owners, officers, agents, or employees of the health care facility or law enforcement 





• Public Health and Safety § 449.760. Unlawful acts; exception; penalty  
 
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not intentionally prevent 
another person from entering or exiting the office of a physician, a health facility, a 
nonprofit health facility, a public health center, a medical facility or a facility for the 
dependent by physically: 
 
(a) Detaining the other person; or 
 
(b) Obstructing, impeding or hindering the other person's movement. 
 
2. The provisions of subsection 1 are inapplicable to: 
 
(a) An officer, employee or agent of the physician, health facility, nonprofit health 
facility, public health center, medical facility or facility for the dependent; or 
 
(b) A peace officer as defined in NRS 169.125,  
 
while acting within the course and scope of his or her duties or employment. 
 
3. The provisions of subsection 1 do not prohibit a person from maintaining a picket 
during a strike or work stoppage in compliance with the provisions of NRS 614.160, or 
from engaging in any constitutionally protected exercise of free speech. 
 
4. A person who violates the provisions of subsection 1 is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than 3 months, or by both fine and imprisonment. 
 
5. As used in this section, the terms “health facility,” “nonprofit health facility” and “public 
health center” have the meanings ascribed to them in NRS 449.260. 
 
New York 
• Penal Law § 240.70 Criminal interference with healt h care services or religious 
worship in the second degree  
 
1. A person is guilty of criminal interference with health services or religious worship in 
the second degree when: 
 
(a) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, he or she intentionally 
injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with, 
another person because such other person was or is obtaining or providing 
reproductive health services; or 
 
(b) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, he or she intentionally 
injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with, 
another person in order to discourage such other person or any other person or 
persons from obtaining or providing reproductive health services; or 
 
(c) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, he or she intentionally 
injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with, 
another person because such person was or is seeking to exercise the right of 
religious freedom at a place of religious worship; or 
 
(d) he or she intentionally damages the property of a health care facility, or attempts 
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to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally 
damages the property of a place of religious worship. 
 
2. A parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be subject to prosecution for conduct 
otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a) or (b) of subdivision one of this section which is 
directed exclusively at such minor. 
 
3. For purposes of this section: 
 
(a) the term “health care facility” means a hospital, clinic, physician's office or other 
facility that provides reproductive health services, and includes the building or 
structure in which the facility is located; 
 
(b) the term “interferes with” means to restrict a person's freedom of movement; 
 
(c) the term “intimidates” means to place a person in reasonable apprehension of 
physical injury to himself or herself or to another person; 
 
(d) the term “physical obstruction” means rendering impassable ingress to or egress 
from a facility that provides reproductive health services or to or from a place of 
religious worship, or rendering passage to or from such a facility or place of religious 
worship unreasonably difficult or hazardous; and 
 
(e) the term “reproductive health services” means health care services provided in a 
hospital, clinic, physician's office or other facility and includes medical, surgical, 
counseling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including 
services relating to pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy. 
 
Criminal interference with health care services or religious worship in the second degree 
is a class A misdemeanor. 
 
• Penal Law  § 240.71 Criminal interference with health care ser vices or religious 
worship in the first degree  
 
A person is guilty of criminal interference with health care services or religious worship in 
the first degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal interference with health 
care services or religious worship in the second degree and has been previously 
convicted of the crime of criminal interference with health care services or religious 
worship in the first or second degree or aggravated interference with health care services 
in the first or second degree. 
 
Criminal interference with health care services or religious worship in the first degree is a 
class E felony. 
 
• Penal Law  § 120.45 Stalking in the fourth degree  
 
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no 
legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and 
knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: 
 
1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or 
property of such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party 
with whom such person is acquainted; or 
 
2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such 
conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with 
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such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom 
such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that 
conduct; or 
 
3. is likely to cause such person to reasonably fear that his or her employment, business 
or career is threatened, where such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning or 
initiating communication or contact at such person's place of employment or business, 
and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct. 
 
Stalking in the fourth degree is a class B misdemeanor. 
 
• Penal Law § 120.50 Stalking in the third degree  
 
A person is guilty of stalking in the third degree when he or she: 
 
1. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree in violation of section 120.45 of this 
article against three or more persons, in three or more separate transactions, for which 
the actor has not been previously convicted; or 
 
2. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree in violation of section 120.45 of this 
article against any person, and has previously been convicted, within the preceding ten 
years of a specified predicate crime, as defined in subdivision five of section 120.40 of 
this article, and the victim of such specified predicate crime is the victim, or an immediate 
family member of the victim, of the present offense; or 
 
3. With intent to harass, annoy or alarm a specific person, intentionally engages in a 
course of conduct directed at such person which is likely to cause such person to 
reasonably fear physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a sex offense 
against, or the kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment or death of such person or a member 
of such person's immediate family; or 
 
4. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree and has previously been convicted 
within the preceding ten years of stalking in the fourth degree. 
 
Stalking in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
 
• Penal Law § 120.55 Stalking in the second degree  
 
A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when he or she: 
 
1. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of 
section 120.50 of this article and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of 
such offense: (i) displays, or possesses and threatens the use of, a firearm, pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, electronic dart gun, electronic stun gun, cane 
sword, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, plastic knuckles, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sand bag, 
sandclub, slingshot, slungshot, shirken, “Kung Fu Star”, dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, 
razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, dangerous instrument, deadly instrument or deadly 
weapon; or (ii) displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun 
or other firearm; or 
 
2. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree in violation of subdivision three of 
section 120.50 of this article against any person, and has previously been convicted, 
within the preceding five years, of a specified predicate crime as defined in subdivision 
five of section 120.40 of this article, and the victim of such specified predicate crime is the 




3. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree and has previously been convicted 
of stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision four of section 120.50 of this 
article against any person; or 
 
4. Being twenty-one years of age or older, repeatedly follows a person under the age of 
fourteen or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of 
time intentionally placing or attempting to place such person who is under the age of 
fourteen in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or 
 
5. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree, as defined in subdivision three of 
section 120.50 of this article, against ten or more persons, in ten or more separate 
transactions, for which the actor has not been previously convicted. 
 
Stalking in the second degree is a class E felony. 
 
• Penal Law § 120.60 Stalking in the first degree  
 
A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of 
stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of section 120.50 or stalking in 
the second degree as defined in section 120.55 of this article and, in the course and 
furtherance thereof, he or she: 
 
1. intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to the victim of such crime; or 
 
2. commits a class A misdemeanor defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, or 
a class E felony defined in section 130.25, 130.40 or 130.85 of this chapter, or a class D 
felony defined in section 130.30 or 130.45 of this chapter. 
 
Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony. 
 
Oregon 
• Crimes and Punishments §  164.365. Criminal mischief in the first degree  
 
(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the first degree who, with intent to 
damage property, and having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the 
person has such right: 
 
(a) Damages or destroys property of another: 
 
(A) In an amount exceeding $1,000; 
 
(B) By means of an explosive; 
 
(C) By starting a fire in an institution while the person is committed to and confined in 
the institution; 
 
(D) Which is a livestock animal as defined in ORS 164.055; 
 
(E) Which is the property of a public utility, telecommunications carrier, railroad, 
public transportation facility or medical facility used in direct service to the public; or 
 
(F) By intentionally interfering with, obstructing or adulterating in any manner the 
service of a public utility, telecommunications carrier, railroad, public transportation 
facility or medical facility; or 
 
(b) Intentionally uses, manipulates, arranges or rearranges the property of a public 
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utility, telecommunications carrier, railroad, public transportation facility or medical 
facility used in direct service to the public so as to interfere with its efficiency. 
 
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section: 
 
(a) “Institution” includes state and local correctional facilities, mental health facilities, 
juvenile detention facilities and state training schools. 
 
(b) “Medical facility” means a health care facility as defined in ORS 442.015, a licensed 
physician's office or anywhere a licensed medical practitioner provides health care 
services. 
 
(c) “Public utility” has the meaning provided for that term in ORS 757.005 and includes 
any cooperative, people's utility district or other municipal corporation providing an 
electric, gas, water or other utility service. 
 
(d) “Railroad” has the meaning provided for that term in ORS 824.020. 
 
(e) “Public transportation facility” means any property, structure or equipment used for 
or in connection with the transportation of persons for hire by rail, air or bus, including 
any railroad cars, buses or airplanes used to carry out such transportation. 
 
(f) “Telecommunications carrier” has the meaning given that term in ORS 133.721. 
 
(3) Criminal mischief in the first degree is a Class C felony. 
 
United States of America 
• § 248. Freedom of access to clinic entrances  
 
(a) Prohibited activities. --Whoever-- 
 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates 
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because 
that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or 
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services; 
 
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates 
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully 
exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a 
place of religious worship; or 
 
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, 
because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally damages or 
destroys the property of a place of religious worship, 
 
shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies 
provided in subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be 
subject to any penalties or civil remedies under this section for such activities insofar as 
they are directed exclusively at that minor. 
 
(b) Penalties. --Whoever violates this section shall-- 
 
(1) in the case of a first offense, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both; and 
 
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction under this 
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section, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or 
both; 
 
except that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruction, the 
fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more 
than six months, or both, for the first offense; and the fine shall, notwithstanding section 
3571, be not more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 
18 months, or both, for a subsequent offense; and except that if bodily injury results, 
the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 10 years, and if death results, it shall 
be for any term of years or for life. 
 
(c) Civil remedies.--  
 
(1) Right of action.--  
 
(A) In general. --Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct prohibited by 
subsection (a) may commence a civil action for the relief set forth in subparagraph 
(B), except that such an action may be brought under subsection (a)(1) only by a 
person involved in providing or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain, 
services in a facility that provides reproductive health services, and such an action 
may be brought under subsection (a)(2) only by a person lawfully exercising or 
seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of 
religious worship or by the entity that owns or operates such place of religious 
worship. 
 
(B) Relief. --In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may award appropriate 
relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and 
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable 
fees for attorneys and expert witnesses. With respect to compensatory damages, the 
plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover, in 
lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per 
violation. 
 
(2) Action by Attorney General of the United States .-- 
 
(A) In general. --If the Attorney General of the United States has reasonable cause to 
believe that any person or group of persons is being, has been, or may be injured by 
conduct constituting a violation of this section, the Attorney General may commence 
a civil action in any appropriate United States District Court. 
 
(B) Relief. --In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may award appropriate 
relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, and 
compensatory damages to persons aggrieved as described in paragraph (1)(B). The 
court, to vindicate the public interest, may also assess a civil penalty against each 
respondent-- 
 
(i) in an amount not exceeding $10,000 for a nonviolent physical obstruction and 
$15,000 for other first violations; and 
 
(ii)  in an amount not exceeding $15,000 for a nonviolent physical obstruction and 
$25,000 for any other subsequent violation. 
 
(3) Actions by State Attorneys General.--  
 
(A) In general. --If the Attorney General of a State has reasonable cause to believe 
that any person or group of persons is being, has been, or may be injured by conduct 
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constituting a violation of this section, such Attorney General may commence a civil 
action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons 
residing in such State, in any appropriate United States District Court. 
 
(B) Relief. --In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may award appropriate 
relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, compensatory 
damages, and civil penalties as described in paragraph (2)(B). 
 
(d) Rules of construction. --Nothing in this section shall be construed-- 
 
(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful 
demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution; 
 
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities protected by the free speech 
or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, occurring outside a 
facility, regardless of the point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal remedies 
for such interference; 
 
(3) to provide exclusive criminal penalties or civil remedies with respect to the conduct 
prohibited by this section, or to preempt State or local laws that may provide such 
penalties or remedies; or 
 
(4) to interfere with the enforcement of State or local laws regulating the performance of 
abortions or other reproductive health services. 
 
(e) Definitions. --As used in this section: 
 
(1) Facility. --The term “facility” includes a hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other 
facility that provides reproductive health services, and includes the building or structure 
in which the facility is located. 
 
(2) Interfere with. --The term “interfere with” means to restrict a person's freedom of 
movement. 
 
(3) Intimidate. --The term “intimidate” means to place a person in reasonable 
apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to another. 
 
(4) Physical obstruction. --The term “physical obstruction” means rendering 
impassable ingress to or egress from a facility that provides reproductive health 
services or to or from a place of religious worship, or rendering passage to or from such 
a facility or place of religious worship unreasonably difficult or hazardous. 
 
(5) Reproductive health services. --The term “reproductive health services” means 
reproductive health services provided in a hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other 
facility, and includes medical, surgical, counselling or referral services relating to the 
human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the termination 
of a pregnancy. 
 
(6) State. --The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 
 
Washington 
• Criminal Code §  9A.50.020. Interference with health care facility  
 
It is unlawful for a person except as otherwise protected by state or federal law, alone or 
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in concert with others, to willfully or recklessly interfere with access to or from a health 
care facility or willfully or recklessly disrupt the normal functioning of such facility by: 
 
(1) Physically obstructing or impeding the free passage of a person seeking to enter or 
depart from the facility or from the common areas of the real property upon which the 
facility is located; 
 
(2) Making noise that unreasonably disturbs the peace within the facility; 
 
(3) Trespassing on the facility or the common areas of the real property upon which the 
facility is located; 
 
(4) Telephoning the facility repeatedly, or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or 
her control to be used for such purpose; or 
 
(5) Threatening to inflict injury on the owners, agents, patients, employees, or property of 
the facility or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be used for 
such purpose. 
 
• Criminal Code §  9A.50.040. Civil remedies  
 
(1) A person or health care facility aggrieved by the actions prohibited by RCW 9A.50.020 
may seek civil damages from those who committed the prohibited acts and those acting 
in concert with them. A plaintiff in an action brought under this chapter shall not recover 
more than his or her actual damages and additional sums authorized in RCW 9A.50.050. 
Once a plaintiff recovers his or her actual damages and any additional sums authorized 
under this chapter, additional damages shall not be recovered. A person does not have to 
be criminally convicted of violating RCW 9A.50.020 to be held civilly liable under this 
section. It is not necessary to prove actual damages to recover the additional sums 
authorized under RCW 9A.50.050, costs, and attorneys' fees. The prevailing party is 
entitled to recover costs and attorneys' fees. 
 
(2) The superior courts of this state shall have authority to grant temporary, preliminary, 
and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin violations of this chapter. 
 
In appropriate circumstances, any superior court having personal jurisdiction over one or 
more defendants may issue injunctive relief that shall have binding effect on the original 
defendants and persons acting in concert with the original defendants, in any county in 
the state. 
 
Due to the nature of the harm involved, injunctive relief may be issued without bond in the 
discretion of the court, notwithstanding any other requirement imposed by statute. 
 
The state and its political subdivisions shall cooperate in the enforcement of court 
injunctions that seek to protect against acts prohibited by this chapter. 
 
• Criminal Code § 9A.50.050. Civil damages  
 
In a civil action brought under this chapter, an individual plaintiff aggrieved by the actions 
prohibited by RCW 9A.50.020 may be entitled to recover up to five hundred dollars for 
each day that the actions occurred, or up to five thousand dollars for each day that the 
actions occurred if the plaintiff aggrieved by the actions prohibited under RCW 9A.50.020 
is a health care facility. 
 
Wisconsin 




(1) In this section, “medical facility” means a hospital under s. 50.33(2) or a clinic or office 
that is used by a physician licensed under ch. 448 and that is subject to rules 
promulgated by the medical examining board for the clinic or office that are in effect on 
November 20, 1985. 
 
(2) Whoever intentionally enters a medical facility without the consent of some person 
lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of 
the peace, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
 
(3) This section does not prohibit any person from participating in lawful conduct in labor 





Table A.3: State and Federal Clinic Protection Laws of the United States, 1985 – 
2008 
State Statute Effective 
Date 
Violence Property Harassment/Vandalism 







x x x 
CA Penal Code § 
602.11 
1/1/1993   x 
CA Penal Code § 
11413 
1/1/2005  x  
CA Civil Code §§ 
3427, 3427.1,  
3427.2 
1/1/1995   x 
CA Penal Code § 
594.4 
1/1/1994  x  













6/29/1993 x  x 
D.C. Criminal Law 9/20/1996   x 
                                                

















11/4/1993   x 




11/11/2000   x 
































10/1/1981   x 
NC General. 
Statutes- 








and Safety  
§ 449.760 
7/5/1991   x 
NY Consolidated 
Laws- 













9/29/1991  x  
USA Title 18 
United States 
Code § 248 
5/26/1994 x x x 
WA Revised Code- 
Washington 
Criminal Code 




4/26/1993   x 
WI Statutes- 
Crimes  
§ 943.145  
11/20/1985   x 
 
                                                








Table A.4: Correlation Matrix for Model Variables  
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
1. Total 
Attacks 
1.00          
2. Vio/Property 
Attacks 
0.86 1.00         
3. Harassment 0.75 0.31 1.00        
4. Statelawlag 0.17 0.09 0.2 1.00       
5. Violawlag 0.14 0.04 0.21 0.33 1.00      
6. Proplawlag 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.44 0.38 1.00     
7. Harasslawlag 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.96 0.35 0.29 1.00    
8. FACElag 0.19 0.05 0.28 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.34 1.00   
9. Abortionlag 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.19 1.00  
10. Rape 0.09 0.12 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 0.24 1.00 
150 
 
APPENDIX A-4: OBSERVED AND PREDICTED MODEL COUNTS 
 
Graph A.1: Observed Minus Predicted Counts for Model 1 - The Impact of General 























Note: positive deviations show underpredictions.
 
 
Graph A.2: Observed Minus Predicted Counts for Model 2 - The Impact of General 



























Graph A.3: Observed Minus Predicted Counts for Model 3 - The Impact of General 























Note: positive deviations show underpredictions.
 
 
Graph A.4: Observed Minus Predicted Counts for Model 4 - The Impact of 






























Graph A.5: Observed Minus Predicted Counts for Model 5 - The Impact of 



























APPENDIX B-1: ANTI-ABORTION CRIME INCIDENT 
SUPPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS 
 
INCIDENT VERIFICATION PROJECT INSTRUCTIONS 
INCIDENT VERIFICATION 
SUPERVISOR: BRAD BARTHOLOMEW, BBARTHOLOMEW@CRIM.UMD.EDU 
 
In this particular incident supplementation you will be searching for media sources 
(articles) that provide verification for the U.S. cases in the file AA Data.xls.  
Specifically, we will be focusing on procuring an independent media source for each 
of the U.S. cases. In doing so, you will also be adding any relevant/missing 
information that you come across for all of the coded variables.  For example, should 
the exact date of attack or property damage dollar estimate be missing in an incident 
row, you would enter this information as it exists in the media source/article, under 
your personal column (i.e., Tara's Summer 2010 Cleaning Notes or Mike's Summer 
2010 Cleaning Notes). 
 
 
Tools you may use: 
1. List of all U.S. cases in the GTD (GTD_abortion.xls) 
2. List of all previously found verification articles (AA Verification Files) 
3. Excel Spreadsheet of all U.S. cases (AA Data.xls) 
4. Lexis-Nexis and Factiva (Will be used to verify the existence of the terrorist 
incident as well as to find additional details that can help provide us with 
missing and/or additional details). 
a. Note: save all articles used in the verification process in PDF format 
and include the matching incident number (found at the third to last 
column in the Excel sheet “All Incidents ID #”) in the file name. (i.e., 
when you come across an article that matches one of the U.S. cases, 
save that article as a PDF and title it with the matching incident ID#). 
5. Google News and Google News Archive 
a. http://news.google.com/archivesearch 
b. http://news.google.com 
6. ProQuest  
a. http://proquest.umi.com/login 
Steps: 
1. For each incident that you are assigned, you will use the Factiva, Lexis-Nexis 
and Google-Web search engines. 
a. Directions for Factiva and Lexis-Nexis:  
i. Go to the UMD library website http://www.lib.umd.edu/  
ii. Click on the “Research Port” link 
iii. Type in either Factiva or Lexis Nexis in the database search 
field and click on “find database” 
iv. Click on the link for either Factiva or Lexis-Nexis 
2. Finding a source for your incident 
a. First, select a date range of one month before and one month after the 
incident date (listed on the Excel file) 




i. If the incident was a bombing, include the term bomb or some 
variation in the search field (note: you may have to use several 
derivations of key terms such as arson, bomb, assault, 
gunshot, etc. before you get a match).  You will also want to 
include the city name and the target name when available.   
c. Click the search or run search button 
d. Look through the resulting list of articles for a possible match48. 
e. Repeat this process using the other two search engines. 
3. What to do when you find a new source 
a. Immediately save any relevant article as a PDF file. Use the 
corresponding incident number (found under the column “All Incidents 
ID #”) as the title of the new PDF file.  For example, if you were to 
find an article on incident #23, you would save that article as a PDF 
file under the title “Incidient#23”. 
b. Carefully read through the newly found article for 
i. Any relevant information that is not already in the Excel sheet 
ii. Information that conflicts with the data in the Excel sheet   
You are to make a detailed note of any previously missing or 
conflicting information under your personal field (Tara's Summer 2010 
Cleaning Notes or Mike's Summer 2010 Cleaning Notes). 
4. When finished with your section, label it with your name as follows (Jackson 












                                                
48 When searching for media articles, it is important for you to pay attention to the strength of the 
publication.  Ideally, you will find two “Tier 1” articles/sources for each case.  Tier 1 articles come from 
nationally or regionally recognized newspapers or periodicals (The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, 




APPENDIX B-2: ANTI-ABORTION CRIME DATA COLLECTION PROJECT 
CODEBOOK  
 
1. INCIDENT IDENITIFICATION NUMBER:  The unique identifying number 
for this incident.  
2. DATE: In MM/DD/YYYY format. 
3. YEAR: In YYYY format. 
4. CITY: The name of the city in which the incident occurred. 
5. STATE: The name of the state in which the incident occurred. 
6. TARGET 1, 2, 3: The name of the specific person(s), group(s), building(s) or 
organization(s) that was the target of this attack.   
7. TARGET ADDRESS: U.S. Postal address of incidents involving an attack on or 
within a residence, commercial or government building. 
8. PERPETRATOR 1, 2, 3: The name of the specific person(s) and/or group(s) 
identified as directly taking part in this attack.   
9. ATTACK TYPE 1, 2, 3: Definitions listed below. 
 
Assassination An act whose primary objective is to kill 
one or more specific, prominent 
individuals. 
Armed Assault An attack whose primary objective is to 
cause physical harm or death directly to 
human beings by any means other than an 
explosive.  
Blockade An act where the perpetrators willfully 
place their bodies in such a manner as to 
prevent individuals from gaining entrance 
to and/or exit from a building/facility. 
These intentional disruptions of service 
occur outside the building and therefore 
do not require entry.  The target of the act 
is a place (i.e. the facility being 
blockaded). 
Bombing/Explosion An attack where the primary effects are 
caused by an energetically unstable 
material undergoing rapid decomposition 
(either deflagration or detonation) and 
releasing a pressure wave that causes 
physical damage to the surrounding 
environment. 
Bomb Threat Any act in which a person knowingly 
utters or conveys an expressed threat to 
cause injury or death to any person or 
group of people through the use of an 
explosive device.  Note: does not include 
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immediate threat of violence (i.e., there is 
no weapon pointed at the target and the 
target does not expect violence to occur at 
that very second).  Such acts are usually 
phoned in or expressed via mail or written 
materials, but may also be expressed in 
person.  The target of the act may be an 
individual or a group. 
 
Burglary Any act involving the illegal entry of either 
healthcare clinic or healthcare clinic 
employee for the express purpose of 
stealing property which would aid in the 
daily functions of said business.  Usually, 
such an act will entail a break-in at a clinic, 
followed by the theft of clinic computers, 
patient and employee records/information, 
and even funds.  Note: there must be 
reason to believe the incident was 
committed for the express purpose of 
inhibiting clinic operations.  Incidents that 
are believed to be solely motivated by 
monetary gain are not included 
Death Threat Any act in which a person knowingly 
utters or conveys an expressed threat to 
cause death to any person or group of 
people.  Note: does not include 
immediate threat of violence (i.e., there is 
no weapon pointed at the target and the 
target does not expect violence to occur at 
that very second).  These incidents often 
include phoned-in death threats, threats by 
mail and even threats in person.  The target 
of the act may be an individual or a group. 
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) As for barricade incident above, but 
distinguished by the intention to move and 
hold the hostages in a clandestine location. 
Facility/Infrastructure Attack An act, excluding the use of an explosive, 
whose primary objective is to cause 
damage to a non-human target, such as a 
building, monument, train, pipeline, etc.  
Such attacks consist of actions primarily 
aimed at damaging property, or at causing 
a diminution in the functioning of a useful 
system (mass disruption) yet not causing 
direct harm to people.  Such attacks 
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include arson, cyber attacks, and various 
forms of sabotage. 
Invasion An act in which an individual or group 
enters a reproductive healthcare facility 
with the intent of inhibiting the normal 
functions of said business in a nonviolent 
manner.  Typically, this type of attack 
involves a group of individuals entering a 
clinic during normal business hours and 
placing themselves in areas that make 
business functions impracticable.  Often, 
groups will chain themselves to various 
objects or lay in the prone position.  By 
definition, the act cannot include any form 
of violence.  Should violence be used at 
some point during the invasion, either 
against persons or property, the violent act 
is to be considered as a separate act and 
coded as such.   
Stalking This event involves a person who 
intentionally and repeatedly follows or 
harasses another person with the intent to 
place that person in reasonable fear for 
one’s safety.  Incidents of stalking differ 
from death threats in that they involve a 
series of events (i.e., the perpetrator must 
repeatedly follow or harass an individual) 
and incidents of stalking do not include 
express threats to kill said individual.  The 
target of the act is an individual. 
Unarmed Assault An attack whose primary objective is to 
cause physical harm or death directly to 
human beings by any means other than 
explosive, firearm, incendiary, or sharp 
instrument (knife, etc.). 
Unknown The attack type cannot be determined from 
the available information. 
Vandalism Willful or malicious defacement of 
property belonging to either a reproductive 
healthcare facility or facility employees.  
These are incidents which never result in 
any form of irrevocable damage (e.g., the 
act does not require the property to be 
replaced and/or the property can be 
cleaned/repaired with minimal effort and 
cost).  These incidents often include such 
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acts as spray painting pro-life graffiti on 
clinic property, placing pro-life 
propaganda on clinic property, the use of 
tar, oil, feces, etc. 
 
10.  EVENT SUCCESS: 0 or 1 (0=Incident did not have intended effects, 1=Incident 
had intended effects).  For example, “an attack involving the successful detonation of 
a bomb is classified as a successful attack.  An attack involving a failed detonation of 
a bomb is classified as unsuccessful. 
11.  NKILL:  Number of individuals killed during incident 
12.  NWOUND: Number of individuals wounded during incident 
13.  WEAPON TYPE 1, 2 & 3: Biological, Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, 
Firearms, Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite, Fake Weapons, Incendiary, Melee, Vehicle 
(not to include vehicle-borne explosives, i.e., car or truck bombs), Sabotage 
Equipment, Other, Unknown 
14.  WEAPON SUB-TYPE 1, 2 & 3: Definitions listed below. 
Biological no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Chemical Poisoning 
Radiological no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Nuclear no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Firearms Automatic Weapon  
Handgun  
Rifle/Shotgun (non-automatic)  
Unknown Gun Type  
Other Gun Type 




Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPGs, etc.) 
Remote Trigger 
Suicide (carried bodily by human being)  
Time Fuse 
Vehicle 
Unknown Explosive Type 
Other Explosive Type 
Fake Weapons no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Incendiary Arson/Fire 
Flame Thrower 
Gasoline or Alcohol 
Melee Blunt Object 
Hands, Feet, Fists 
Knife 
Rope or Other Strangling Device 
Sharp Object Other Than Knife 
Suffocation 
Vehicle no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Sabotage Equipment no corresponding weapon sub-types 
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Other no corresponding weapon sub-types 
Unknown no corresponding weapon sub-types 
 
15.  PROP_DAMAGE: 0 or 1 (0=There was no evidence of property damage during 
the incident, 1=There was evidence of property damage during the incident). 
16.  DAM_AMT:  The amount of property damage in U.S. dollars at the time of the 
incident.  
17.   EVENT DETAILS:  Short description of incident. 
18.   DATABASE 1: Primary source used to collect initial incident information 
National Abortion Federation 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
Baird-Windle & Bader Chronology 
Hewitt Chronology 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 
19:  DATABASE HEWITT: 0 or 1 (0 = incident not found in the Hewitt database, 1 
= incident found in the database) 
20:  DATABASE NAF: 0 or 1 (0 = incident not found in the National Abortion 
Federation database, 1 = incident found in the database) 
21:  DATABASE PPFA: 0 or 1 (0 = incident not found in the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America database, 1 = incident found in the database) 
22:  DATABASE BW&B: 0 or 1 (0 = incident not found in the Baird-Windle & 
Bader database, 1 = incident found in the database) 
23:  DATABASE WITS: 0 or 1 (0 = incident not found in the Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking System database, 1 = incident found in the database) 
24: MULTIPLE INCIDENTS: 0 or 1 (0 = a single incident, 1 = attack was part of a 
multiple incident where several attacks are connected, but where the various actions do 
not constitute a single incident) 
25:  PERPETRATOR TYPE: The ideological classification of the perpetrator(s) 




26:  ARREST DATE: Date (MM/DD/YYYY format) on which the perpetrator was 
arrested by local, state or federal law enforcement authorities. 
27:  CASE OUTCOME: Short summary of any criminal justice proceedings (e.g., 
case status, conviction status, sentence length, etc.) that are directly related to this 
incident. 
28:  DUPLICATE: 0 or 1 (0 = incident was not duplicated across two or more 
databases, 1 = incident was duplicated across two or more databases) 
29:  MATCHING INCIDENT NUMBER: The unique identification numbers of 
any incidents which duplicate this incident. 
30:  VERIFICATION NOTES: A short summary of any and all discrepancies 
between the original source and the media sources used to verify this incident. 
31:  TWO TIER 1 SOURCES: 0 or 1 (0 = Incident has not been verified by at least 




32:  ANY VERIFICATION: 0 or 1 (0 = Incident has not been verified by at least 
one media source of tier 3 or higher, 1 = Incident has been verified by at least one 
media source of tier 3 or higher). 
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